

Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union by Maj. Ing. Radomír Jahoda. At present, people speak very often about long-discussed common foreign and security European policy (CFSP), European forces, or crisis management. The necessary prerequisites for the effective CFSP are capacities (potential) for independent operations, based on European defence industry and technologies. They were fixed by adopting the so-called European Headline Goal (Helsinki summit, 1999). The policy of the EU was formed under the Amsterdam Treaty. This treaty also includes the potential for co-operation and integration with the Western European Union (WEU), focused on defence. Mr. Jahoda, who is a member of military section of the Permanent Delegation of the CR to NATO and the WEU in Brussels, makes our readers acquainted with (a) the CFSP of the EU and (b) newly established military structures. They are: Political and Security Committee, EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council of Europe is allowed to appoint special representatives, with mandates for solving particular problems (Near East, Great Lakes in Africa and Eastern Europe). Although the CFSP has no special tools in the shape of directives or regulations, the Amsterdam Treaty offers two other means: common strategy and international agreements, in addition to the means established under the Maastricht Treaty: common positions, joint actions and declaration. The Europeans promise that till the year 2003 their countries prepare forces, numbering around 50-60,000 soldiers (the size of an army corps). It is a very ambitious task, because - e. g. - the numbers of supporting elements will be two or three times higher. The main missions of common European forces will take place in the frame of Petersburg operations (peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, rescue and humanitarian missions). Are the Europeans able to fulfil their intentions? Hardly to say, as those demanding plans will be realized without the smallest increase in military budgets.

The Development of Concepts and Experimentations (CDE): Important Initiative of NATO by Ing. Václav Svoboda, and Col. GSO Ing. Vladimír Karaffa, CSc. The purpose of this article is to inform readers about the initiative called Concept Development and Experimentations (CDE), which is a complementing part of the Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), especially in the field of Effective Engagement (EE). The process is controlled at three levels: CDE Cell at SACLAN level, Bi-SC Working Group at the level of NATO Strategic Commands, and finally at the level of National Representatives - National Advisory Group. Dozens of NATO institutions and organizations are to be involved in CDE process. Nation centred reporting, advising, directing and command activities begin at the level of individual nation, then proceed with the inclusion of the National Advisory Group via SACLAN (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), and the NATO Military Committee. This organizational structure is intended to provide full transparency of the Concept Review process to participant nations. It is a top priority of the whole CDE process to be transparent. There are many ways how to reach high effectivity in this field. We can name at least those most significant: (i) reducing unnecessary duplicities, (ii) implementing scientific results into forces, (iii) sharing financial costs in the frame of NATO Security Investment Programme under Capability Packages, (iv) introducing up-to-date technology, e.g. Computer Aided or Assisted Exercises (CAX). In our country, the directing and co-ordinating body is the Section of Defence Planning of the Czech MoD.

New Approach to Drafting-Up Security and Defence Concepts of the State by Ing. Jiří Štěpanovský and PhDr. Marie Michálková. The Czech Republic as a sovereign, independent state needs military forces which like a valuable component of NATO will be capable of facing the external and internal threats to the state. Therefore, in November 1999, the ACR was ordered to update basic

security documents of the Czech Republic, i. e. Security Strategy and Military Strategy of the Czech Republic. Those documents are based on the evaluation of contemporary internal and external situations, as well as on principal documents of the NATO alliance. The Czech Armed Forces have to fulfil their mission both under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and out-of-area missions, which are far beyond Article 5 (conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing or peace-building operations). Documents again emphasize the resolution of the country to defend territorial integrity by its own forces. The ACR ought to take part in combating terrorism, rescue, and humanitarian operations. In all missions we should make use of help of our allies. And this is the very trend that will be more reflected in drafting up our new documents. Integration of structures means the sharing of the necessary degree of standardization with the military structures of the member states. We must put higher stress on training troops and military or civil experts; adopt principles of NATO nuclear policy. Further key targets include: safe command and control at all levels; target identification; and protection against weapons of mass destruction. Really new moments are in moulding civil responsibility for the defence of the Republic as an important element in the process of building military forces. This means active civil participation and reaching popular consensus with military and security policy of the state. Those are ideas that were in fact the main themes of working conference held in June 2000, at Brno Military Academy.

Defence Planning Peripeties by Col. GSO Ing. Vladimír Karaffa, CSc. From the institutional point, we have been speaking about defence planning for two years. Some experts put great hopes in that process, some looked at it with a sort of distrust. In the last ten years, the Czech armed forces have gone through numbers of innovations for which we could hardly find any historical parallels. The defence build-up is the problem of decades, the question of money and political resolutions. Defence planning is the matter of all departments, it means that all inputs and outputs ought to be co-ordinated according to a time-schedule, technically and procedurally. All systems are mutually tied, no one could be

separated or earmarked as more important. Defence planning takes place at the level of the Parliament, Government, Ministry of Defence, General Staff of the ACR. At the medium levels, in the chain of command (short and medium-time planning), it is the problem of Planning, Programming and Budgeting system. It is a task overlapping mere Force Goals and Defence Planning Questionnaire, because all sections of the Defence Ministry are involved in this process, not only the Section of Defence Planning that plays a role of co-ordinator - the conductor of a large orchestra (the author's parable). Political assignments set tasks for a long-time period, operational planning verifies political assignments from political and military points, defence planning reduces assignments in accordance with nations' capacities and codified international and Alliance's disposals. It is a process of reviewing challenges, or rather looking for new solutions. The harmonization has been accomplished. Of course, it is a great oversimplification, but it is a base for development of reliable and trustworthy systems of complex defence of the Czech Republic. As it is not a question of financial resources, but that of common sense.

The Project of Introduction of Medium-Term Financial Planning in Defence Sector (II) by Lt.Col. Ing. Oldřich Zlatuška and Ing. Josef Múčka. This is a first sequel to the article published in the previous issue *Vojenské rozhledy* magazine. This time the author concentrates on individual items and critical points of medium-term planning (SFP1). The advantages of this project and its particular document (SFP) are as follows: they furnish top-officials with effective tools for gaining financial resources; it is a tool of civilian control of the army, and also an effective apparatus of army top-officials for financial control of the whole defence sector. And finally it sets the General Staff of the ACR as a main source centre. The Chief of the General Staff gains the authority to define and co-ordinate the allocation of financial means to particular subjects within all defence sector. Last but not least, there is no extra paper work, as this process does not need any new organizational structures. Of course, in processes like those, there are many unknown figures. Many new procedures are

not properly mastered and we lack consensus among basic developmental and methodological items, etc. Such facts have unfortunate influence upon counting phases and the propositions of defence bill. As an indispensable prerequisite, we have to introduce the chain of documents for effective planning and control of financial expenses within the defence sector. They are Methodological Instructions, and Methodological Plans for corresponding time periods and levels of responsibility. The chain ends with Reports on Fulfilment. Proposed proceedings are only a pilot project, the task of which is to integrate elements at strategy levels, and thus connect strategical, operational and tactical financial plans. They must be regarded as an excuse for discussion or arguing about proposed methods. The E-mail address of the authors' is: vohnickm@army.cz.

MILITARY ART

New Forms of War by Lt.Col. GSO Ing. Vlastimil Galatfk, CSc. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and subsequently of the whole eastern block dramatically influenced the fragile balance of powers, based on mutual deterrence. After initial enthusiasm, the world faces dozens of small threats, crises and small wars, which call for rapid reaction of other states (world community). Even though new adversaries are not traditional ones, solving international security problems demands new approaches to new forms of wars. First step is an analysis of theatre, still less and less defined, covering various nations, cultures, values. "New" wars will be probably waged with highly effective, but relatively cheap weapons, which will help to balance the level of deterrence, to the level comparable with rich, technologically advanced countries. They are weapons of mass destruction, modern explosives, information science, mass communication media, culture, money and illegal narcotics (drugs). By the way, those are typical asymmetric weapons or risks. We must bear in mind that terrorists and rogue states (e.g. Iraq, North Korea, and Serbia) could come into close contact and thus make democratic countries to maintain expensive military

technology, high numbers of soldiers, and keep them in the state of constant readiness. Terrorism is the substitute of a classical guerrilla war. The core of their strategy is the terrorist action: i. e. explosion, taking hostages, etc. Terrorists refuse direct confrontation; they prefer indirect campaigns. Where is the theatre of operations? It may be connected with classical terrain, highly changeable, shifting, unstable, or it could be virtual in all directions, covering cybernetics, computer networks, psychological operations, economy systems, stock markets and so on. Long-range missiles are useless. Adversaries are among local populations, they can not be controlled. They only ought to be detected, discouraged. Discussions with them are lead with the aim to reach a compromise. Such situation needs permanent analysis of all prospective adversaries and assessments of their potential, so that we could reach our set political goals. We must take lessons from the past, when the armies were prepared for the bygone wars and were not prepared to react adequately to actual situations.

UN Peace-Support Operations (Some Institutional and Legal Problems), by Col. Ing. Rudolf Horák, CSc. The paper discusses the problems of the UN peace support operations, conducted by international organizations as the WEU, the EU, NATO, etc. This essay provides basic information about organizational structures of organizations that affect the international security architecture and legal support to the peace support operations in Europe and in other parts of the world. The roles of organizations are explained in the light of the UN laws. The article is intended to provide a general explanation to eliminate sometimes contradicting standpoints during assessing usefulness and legal framework of peace support operations, except for operations under the NATO Treaty's Article 5. The United Nations Organization is a symptomatic mirror of world's society. The better chance for historic mission of the United Nations began after the end of the Cold War. Still raising number of states agree on common (humanitarian) values, which are the base of new quality of international co-operation. This needs more effective tools or mechanism for crisis situations in emergencies and conflicts. The

UN Security Council, the WEU, the EU, the OSCE, NATO, regional and other organizations play mutually complementary roles in peace-making and peacekeeping actions. The leading part is gradually taken over by NATO and partly by the WEU. And also our republic is prepared to fulfil its duty.

Preparation and Deployment of Rapid Reaction Forces of the Army of the Czech Republic in NATO Multinational Forces by

Lt.Col. GSO Ing. František Matula. At present, this theme is very attractive, because as a NATO member, we must be prepared for possible deployment of our army abroad, as a reliable part of NATO multinational forces. The author lays his stress on Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. The command structures are multinational. Organizational structure depends on types of operation, its political importance and the potential of local (regional) army. Such forces are built in several parts of Europe, in our country, in Poland, and Hungary. The states: France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg have developed the so-called EUROCORPS, for Alliance or OSCE operations. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia form together BALTBAT. In this battalion, there are some instructors from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In 1997 common Danish-Polish-German army corps began to be built. In 1995 it was Polish-Ukrainian battalion for peacekeeping operations. And finally, based on co-operation with armed forces from Great Britain, the Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade (4. brn) began to prepare for combined actions: (a) at the level of commanders and staffs, (b) at the level of units. All soldier are able bodied, they are classified A 1 - the same qualification as paratroopers - they are physically fit (General Staff Decree 5/93) and have mandatory language capacities. The author proposes the preparation of rapid reaction force in four terms, with mixed three and five-year contracts, because their demanding preparation (training and schooling) takes a long time.

Priority Intelligence Requirements and Commander by Doc. Ing. Oldřich Horák, CSc. (Col., ret.). Command and Control are *alpha*

and *beta* of the whole military activities. It is also one of the questions we must deal with during our gradual integration into the NATO alliance. Such problems adjure wide discussion on methods of staff works, which are one of important prerequisites for the preparations of commanders and their staffs. Intelligence cycle was readjusted. Intelligence planning was abolished at the level of large units, because under previous scheme the subordinate intelligence commanders only provide means to fulfil orders. Commanders therefore lacked freedom of decision-making. Now the commander sets critical (the most important) requirements for information, related to commander's intent. Military intelligence officers form priority intelligence requirements. They outline enemy's intent and his activities. This must give a true picture of every phase of combat. We must look for the answers to those following questions: time of adversary's attack and his numbers, the point of his main blow, ways of the engagement of adversary's second line. The assessment is based upon deep analysis of battlefield and observed activities of enemy. Every requirement has its place in priority list, in accordance with its importance, time and space. After assessing adversary's intent, we must set for every intelligence requirement the point of special attention, in which intelligence information ought to be preferably collected. The article "PIR and Commander" challenges problems of creation and formulation of intelligence requirements of commander in decision-making process raising from the problems of reconnaissance. It is a summary of the changes in the work of intelligence centre and information flow, which resulted from these problems.

The Future of Special Operations. In February 2000, the US National Defence Industrial Association held its annual symposium on special operations and low intensity conflicts. The conference addressed the strategic direction, policy and planning underway by the US Defence Department's Special Operations Forces (SOF) community to prepare for future conflict in the new international operating environment (IOE). The following indicators and trends could characterize the new IOE as: (i) demographic

and socio-economic explosions, (ii) decline of national state and proliferation of failed states, (iii) new types of conflicts (e.g. warfare without conventional fighting). This article is a synthesis of the conclusions expounded at the conference, drawn by Dr. Joshua Sinai (Senior Policy Analyst, US Consulting Organization), for the Defence and Foreign Affairs journal 2/2000. This IOE involves asymmetric warfare by rogue states, irregular insurgency and terrorism, as opposed to the Cold War area's emphasis on the need to defend against a communist Soviet Union-type threat, involving large conventional forces and tactical (now we use the term *theatre*) nuclear weapons. Asymmetric threats would not present themselves only abroad, or overseas, but even on the very state territory. There will be many intelligence surprises, as it will be very difficult to track and monitor new adversaries (rogue states and terrorists). This issue impinges international organizations, such as the United Nations, as well as NATO and other allies, because much of future conflict - like current ones - is being fought by coalition warfare. Warfighting will be increasingly in the black and grey areas, as opposed to the conventional white battlefield. Thus, the right operational force structure and technological balance is needed for conventional forces and SOF to operate in the new IOE.

OPINIONS, CONTROVERSY

The Inspiration of Theoretical Thinking (*Final Theses of Graduates from the 14th Operational and Command Course of the General Staff*). A Summary by Col. GSO Ing. Milan Kubeša, CSc. These final papers, which topped off intensive 10-month studies at the Military Academy Brno, are really very inspiring. Three graduates even received the highest ratings (Col. Bilský, Col. Dolejší and Lt.Col. Klimas from the Polish Army). The titles of most interesting theses are as follows: Characteristics and Trends of Further Developments of Technological Support of Command in Operations (Col. GSO Ing. Ludvík Bilský, CSc.); Military Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics as a Part of Military Art under Contemporary Conditions and their Mutual Ties (Lt.Col. GSO Ing.

Rostislav Bureš, Ph.D.); Principles of the Management of Logistical Support and in Peacekeeping Operations (Col. GSO Ing. Jiřík Dolejší); Logistic Doctrine and Logistic Proceedings Used in NATO, their Applications with the Respect to the Czech Air Force (Col. GSO Ing. Pavel Jevula); Background Support of the Entry and Stay of Allied Forces at Host Nation Territory under the Conditions of Military Menace (Col. GSO Ing. Ota Netrval); Cover and Defence of State Territory during Military Threat (Lt.Col. GSO dipl. Mgr. Ing. Wojciech Klimas, Polish Army); The Mission and Deployment of the French Land Forces during Joined Operation in the Frame of New Strategic Context (Maj. Jean-Marie Mosele, French Army); Doctrine of the ACR Air Force (Col. GSO Ing. Jan Vachek); Management Theory and the Building of the Armed Forces (Maj. GSO Juris Vectrans, Latvian Army). The papers are in one printed copy in the academy source centre (library of the Military Academy Brno); or they are available on floppy disks at Col. Kubeša's office. All themes are opened to the argument: Milan.Kubesa@vabo.cz

Planning of Professional Training at Military Schools and their Efficiency by Lt.Col. Ing. Rudolf Urban, CSc. Planning of professional preparation of future officers and their output numbers are mutually determined, because they are tied via the transformation of the whole military education system. Schooling system of military professionals must not be rated by a volume of cadets (officer candidates), but by the content of running programmes and vocational studies. Certain indicators of the efficiency of military school system are also the numbers of teaching units. As a starting point, we must define what kind of service training is necessary for particular occupational fields (vocational courses). Thus, military school system could be specified (among others) as an accredited form of the preparation of military professionals and also as the non-accredited form of lifelong education. Actually, University Education Act enables to introduce both forms. And this - by the way - casts doubts upon the existence of military secondary schools. In our country, financial

outlays are very often overestimated and acquired military skills vs. proficiencies are undervalued. Training materiel and equipment can't be included in expenses, as they are of double use: (a) for school preparation and (b) for practical activities in time of need (emergency). The paper ends with the following statements. We must reduce outlays for military schools at MoD budget which represents the raise in the expenses of the civilian Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Training. Expenses for military students will remain at the same level, as the students are in fact officers-candidates. Training and research blocks are to be defined as double-use blocks. Their primary missions do not lie in mere schooling students in peace, but they constitute materiel and technical base for implementation of goals set by the two most important documents of our army: "Security Strategy of the CR", and "Military Strategy of the CR".

The Utilization of Information Technologies on the Base of Internet for the International Surveys by Lt. Ing. Vladimír Tučník. Today, the volume of information we need to process, is so large that a single person cannot cope this task. Let's have a look at the field of standardization. Here have we a lot of NATO standards, including additional documents, which ought to be followed by the whole Czech army. Another information flow is in the field of military science and research. The scientific work by itself is based on collecting information and their interpretation. The very important problem in this process is to connect various scientific teams. The most suitable solution of communication among individual institutions lies in the world-wide Internet network. All NATO countries have this network installed, so the expenses for the introduction are minimal. There are also other services, e. g. sharing documents with complemented organizations, the so-called Extranet. Applied services within one organization are called Intranet. The scientific worker does not need any special training; working knowledge of browsing Internet pages will be enough. Moreover, WWW pages are available even on unsophisticated computers, for example: IBM PC 386 with MS-DOS 6.0! At the Department of Automatic Command and

Information Systems, Military Academy Brno, they have an Intranet application with WWW pages in database and FTP server. The system is able to sort out information according given key words, differentiate among them and form its own copy of a file. The system is used for arranging meeting, in most suitable dates and time of the day, for majority of people. And in the end, it is used for WWW Discuss Club. Users send their presentations on WWW pages, they are organized according to individual themes. The system is open and independent from client's surrounding.

Personnel Management and Law, Law and Personnel Management by Lt.Col. Doc. Ing. Luděk Hodboď, CSc. The article informs readers about working conference, held at Military Academy in Brno (July 2000), whose main theme was the role of personnel and legal problems of career soldiers. The purpose of the conference was to confront - in theory - the work of top-officials working in the field of personnel management and law (at the level of the MoD), and ordinary commanders, officers (at the level of unit). Mr. Hodboď doubts whether narrow definition of rank, qualification for certain posts will really motivate people for their retention in the army. The career of a professional soldier in the forces is regarded only as a temporary one, not as a lifelong job. This trend is contradictory to civilian sector where most prosperous firms try to retain capable employees as long as possible. Here the author presents several examples from military bi-weekly *A-Report*. He cites long excerpts from papers of e. g. gen. Blaško, Ing. Janošec, CSc., (etc.) with many motivating ideas. The conclusions of the conference confirmed everlasting problem of the Army of the Czech Republic. It is the fact that all newly formed development concepts come out from the mere numbers of personnel, not from objects, functions and missions the army as the whole must fulfil (not mention functions of its subordinate elements). The question of personnel management is an open problem that deserves more detailed approach, similar to the leading paper by Prof. Ing. Jaroslav Jirásek, CSc. (which actually would deserve an independent place in this journal).

The Role of the Former Czechoslovakia in Soviet Strategy by Ing. Milan Štembera. This is a title of the publication that appeared among others in our book market last year. Its author, Dr. Josef Kalvoda, the late university professor and chairman of Czech Christian Democrats in exile, emigrated after 1948 evens and this fact deeply influenced his basic attitudes. It is a slow passage of our republic after 1945 into Soviet sphere that attracts his attention. Surprisingly, he has a negative attitude not only to President Beneš, but even to our First President who is blamed that he did not suppress Bolshevik forces during revolution in 1917. There are many arguable allegations Mr. Štembera opposes. (i) Firstly, it is mentioned President Masaryk and the role of the famous Czech legions in Russia. (ii) Secondly, the anti-Communist manifesto, issued under the patronage of the occupying Nazi forces - Mr. Štembera underlines - can't be presented as the real will of Czech nation. (iii) Adulterating statements concerning the Slovak National Uprising and the exaggerated importance of the so-called Army of General Vlasov during the Prague's Uprising in 1945 do not take into account their objective role in the whole context of events. (iv) At present, at the age of globalization (owning to intercontinental missiles and atomic weapons), the position of the Czech Republic is not the same as used to be in Bismarck's time. (v) According to published sources, the role of President Beneš in Marshal Tukhachevsky Affair was not so fundamental. (vi) Czechoslovak defector Gen. Šejna disclosed plans of aggression of the Warsaw Pact against West Europe. Although Šejna is usually right, but his technical details are misleading. You can't reach the Rhine River in three days. Even the high-speed carriers (not to mention tanks) do it in three weeks. The role of the Czechoslovak People's Army in the overall Soviet strategy is explained satisfactorily. The author wants to give readers this message: in the 20th century, when diplomacy and politics replaced the decisive position of armed forces, the role of political leaders of a small nation, like ours, is to play between boards set by great powers, as best as they can.

From the Symbol of Power to the Symbol of Bankruptcy? by Lt. Col. PhDr. Miloš Balabán, Ph.D. For Russia, the last ten years of the 20th century represented final stage of its dramatic evolution, which began with the accession of Mr. Gorbachov. The main Russian document *The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation* observes the decline in Russian military power. The state is not able to finance and support its army. Professional soldiers do not receive their monthly salaries, they are not able to support their families. To nourish the forces, military authorities have to consume reserve supplies, maintained for the time of emergency. Bribery, corruption, criminal groups are ordinary phenomena of the present Russian Army. Rank and file soldiers live under living conditions, similar to those of forced labour. Suicides or taking drugs are nothing exceptional. Combat capabilities have declined six times since 1991. Combat value of nuclear force is two and half lower than comparable nuclear force of the U.S. Air force declined by 70 per cent. Flying hours are only 15-20 hours, instead of required 120 hours. Combat capability of the Russian Navy declined 12 times and so on. War in Chechnya proved that land forces by themselves are not able to fulfil laid down tasks and had to be supported by airborne troops. Nevertheless, new Russian political leadership realizes political and economical limits of financial and material sources of the state. Military doctrine (released in April 2000) says that material support will be implemented within existing financial limits. Priority lies in effective nuclear potential, as the cheapest source of Russian security and its political foreign interests. Military reform is necessary prerequisite for restoring the position of Russia as a world power. But all depends on proper ratio between security interests and economy capacities of the country.

Concepts of Defence Economics for the 21st Century. A useful anticipation of defence economics must rest upon the dramatic and continuing upheaval in the function of military forces in the word of the coming century. It was an opening statement by Martin C. McGuire (Professor of Economics,

University of CA-Irvine) of his article with the same title, published in *Defence and Peace Economics* quarterly 1/2000. And it is also the motto of our editorial essay dealing with this topic. The essay tries to reflect the staggering array of new features that impact on the provision of national defence and international security, as these profoundly shape the discipline of defence economics. (In fact, the subject fit far more comfortably into the realm of political economy than it did when it originated decades ago). Defence economics must remain in the service both of efficiency in the provision of security and also of improved conflict management. Defence and the maintenance of world order need firstly managing lesser conflict. Although defence budgets around the world have been under pressure since the end of the Cold War, justifiable reduction will not be so low as to render major power vulnerable to ballistics missiles surprise, not so low as to expose them plausible disarming attack. Each major power wants to puss mutual or shared destruction off onto the adversary and its client states. A crucial objective to world powers is not to avoid war among themselves, it is also their function to manage lesser war. Accelerating globalization of commerce and finance (with increased interdependencies between hitherto isolated economies-polities) increases their vulnerabilities to any fragility of international and trade aspects of defence economics. Entering the new millennium, it seems clear that economic study of these trends is really substantial for our defence and security.

Third Form of Warfare: Paralysis of Command and Control. This article is adapted from American professional military journal "Military Review", January-February 2000. The author, James J. Schneider (who is a professor of military theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth), introduces the term of *cybershock*, which is a new form of warfare, as horses and mechanization used to be, during agricultural and industrial revolutions. Now we are at the age of the so-called information revolution. Information technology is transforming communications, command and control. This article argues that cybershock is a new kind of defeat mechanism, degrading enemy's com-

mand and control, which paralyzes its military forces as surely as successful manoeuvre exhausts it and a strategy of attrition aims at annihilation. The author outlines this "third form of warfare", relates its historical roots and explains its current application. It is the systematic paralysis of an army, through its inability to direct and control itself effectively. Understanding the concept of cybershock is important, because it offers a conceptual structure to elevate the disparate notions of command and control warfare (C2W) and information operations (IO) to the same level as manoeuvre and attrition. Historically, cybershock evolved in the wake of the emergence of the operational art. The article is also accompanied by a short description the Battle of Chancellorsville, an important engagement of the American Civil war, as it was - in author's opinion - the first operational manoeuvre in military history, but which is quite unknown to most of the Czech readers.

US Anti-Ballistic Defence and the CR by Col. Ing. František Valach, CSc. The Czech Republic is the so-called non-nuke state. The Czech strategy shares the same position as other states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: that the main purpose of nuclear weapons is political, as a means to avert violence and war. They are used mostly as deterrence, as stated in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. An armed attack against one or more of them (the Parties of the Treaty) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. We have political or diplomatic tools of solving international disputes. But owing to the reduction of sub-strategical forces, including all nuke artillery and short-range nuclear missiles etc., only conventional Alliance forces cannot secure effective deterrence. The purpose of American National Programme - NMD (National Missile Defence) is to develop capacities, which are effective and affordable, as far as their prices are concerned. The specific asset of nuclear forces is defend the Continental US, its troops overseas and the allies against the sudden attack of the so-called rogue states, to prevent unacceptable, non-predictable risk of any aggression against the Alliance. The NMD differs from the previous Strategic

Defence Initiative (SDI), because it doesn't share its components. And the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) will remain still valid. Our republic, under the Security Strategy of the CR, also participates in such activities. In view of security challenges of the 21st century, all mentioned factors belong to basic deterrence factors in the following period.

Swiss Security Policy - an Example of Calculated Stance (New Security Policy) by Lt.Col. Ing. Vlastimil Galatík, CSc. In the early 90s, Switzerland reacted very flexibly to changed international conditions. Adopted measures are the eminent example of well thought-out approach to forming new security policy of a state, with wide participation of all citizens, who identified themselves with security regulations of the government. Countries like the Swiss Confederation, similar to our country, as far as the size, geography and population are concerned, could represent a model, which we could exploit for our practice. Independent or allied actions can be introduced only limited in size and their numbers. New version of integrative principles requires wider international co-operation, of course, based on strong status of real neutrality and autonomy. Structures of all-round system of defence ought to be more open and flexible. The Swiss army has to be prepared for sort of out-of-area missions. This presupposes a psychological change of the whole Swiss population: from isolated stance to combined alliance defence. The Report 2000 says that three basic goals established in 1992 - (a) defence, (b) defence of conditions of Swiss style of life, (c) peacekeeping and crisis management - must continue. It is necessary to be prepared for managing at least two problems at the same time and support civilian population in time of natural disasters or other crises. Further task facing the Swiss army faces is its reduction. With this is closely tied the question of militia system. Go professional, or preserve traditional fashion? The problem is still opened. But under all circumstances, the Swiss government (the Federal Council of the Confederation) always strictly sticks to geographical (territorial) characterization of the country and thus implemented policy is constantly in

harmony with present-day defence and security requirements and available resources.

Modern Cryptography and its Military Applications by Lt.Col. Ing. Karel Burda, CSc.

In this article the author explains up-to-date cryptographic methods and their applications in current military communication, information and control systems. Modern cryptographic systems have extra services. Among others there are: authentication of persons and messages, information integrity control, non-repudiation and notarization services. Those items belong under the subject called applied cryptography. One of its characteristic features is the so-called Message Authentication Code (MAC). System runs like this: particular message is encoded according to a secret key, and under the same key is decoded. So, if decoding key is possible derive from coding key, than we must hold secret both keys. Such systems are called symmetric cryptosystems. Asymmetric function is another feature of modern cryptography. If decoding key can't be derived from know key, than it is asymmetric cryptosystem. That's why asymmetric systems are sometimes called public cryptosystems. In this case we must hold secret only decoding key. If this key is known, authentication function is called hash function. The message is encoded, so that only recipient could read it. MAC is constructed in such way that it is impossible to find a code with the same key. The actual problem for the Czech Army is above all the question of authentication. Its main objective is to verify, whether certain person has the right to read secret information. In practice, we use a code word (password). Another item is an authentication of messages. Integrity check-up means that we examine the message whether, or not, is changed by the adversary. And finally, notarization of message means keeping archives. With the increasing complexity of various systems, the problem of automatization is in fact the problem of their safety. The thing is to prevent system from being misused. And that's is the mission of current cryptography.

PERSONAL DATA

Brigadier General Raymund Mrázek by PhDr. Zdeněk Vališ. His military career was

not extraordinary at those days. During World War I he served in the Austro-Hungarian army. In Russia he became a prisoner of war, lately he joined the Czech Legion. As a career soldier of the Czechoslovak Army he went through many commanding and staff positions, e.g. he served as a commander of artillery battery, studied at the War School at Prague. In 1934 he became the Chief of the Staff of Inspector General of the Czechoslovak Army. In the course of mobilization 1938 Colonel Mrázek was a sub-chief of the Second Corps. During World War II he worked in the car industry and at the same time he fulfilled some intelligence tasks. In the Czech May Uprising in 1945 he was appointed the Chief of Staff of the illegal military Command Alex. After the war he became a military attaché in Moscow. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. But very shortly after that, he was withdrawn and forced to retire. Retired general, as a

dedicated anticommunist, was convinced that very soon new war would break out. He planned that - together with the former members of World War II illegal organization Alex - they would form new illegal organization that would set General Píka free (by power of arms) from communist prison. It was planned that General Píka would become a leader of anticommunist revolt. Unfortunately, in November 1948, they all were arrested. Raymund Mrázek was demoted, all medals and decorations were taken away. He was sentenced firstly to life imprisonment, which was lately changed to 25 years of confinement. In prison, he met most of his old friends, some even from the Czech Legion in Russia. He tries to revise his trial, because of insufficient evidences that served as a base for his imprisonment, but the appeals were refused. With broken health he was released only under the President's amnesty in 1960.