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Peer-Reviewed Article

Reakce české obranné politiky na dynamiku vývoje bezpečnostního prostředí

Czech Defence Policy Response to Dynamics in Security Environment Development

Josef Procházka, Lukáš Dyčka, Jakub Landovský

Abstrakt: Článek hodnotí koncepční rámec pro formulování české obranné politiky z hlediska rychlé změny bezpečnostního prostředí po anexi Krymu ze strany Ruska v březnu 2014 a v souvislosti s rostoucí nestabilitou na středním východě a v severní Africe. Příspěvek posuzuje rozhodující opatření přijatá na politické, vojenské, administrativní, ekonomické a společenské úrovni, za účelem hodnocení efektivnosti české obranné politiky. Autoři nabízejí několik zásadních doporučení pro zvýšení akceschopnosti a připravenosti českého obranného systému a ozbrojených sil jako jedné z jeho nejvýznamnějších složek, a to jak v krátkodobé, tak i dlouhodobé perspektivě.

Abstract: The paper assesses the conceptual framework for Czech defence policy formulation in the wake of a rapid change in its security environment after Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent Russian support for separatists in Ukraine's eastern provinces and growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa. The article examines key measures taken in the political, military, administrative, economical and societal domains in order to evaluate the overall effectiveness of Czech defence policy. Finally, the authors offer several strategic level recommendations to enhance responsiveness and preparedness of the Czech defence system and Armed Forces as one of its most significant components both in short- and long-term perspective.

Klíčová slova: obraná politika; ozbrojené síly; obranný systém; bezpečnostní strategie; obranná strategie; strategické prostředí; bezpečnostní prostředí.

Keywords: Defence Policy; Armed Forces; Defence System; Security Strategy; Defence Strategy; Strategic Environment; Security Environment.

INTRODUCTION

The authors of the paper argue that the Czech Republic and its allies must be **ready for predictable and prepared for unexpected situations** once it comes to safeguarding of their defence and security. It might have been easy to say but rather difficult to ensure. In this context the Czech Republic has instituted a number of significant measures in response to the rapid change in its security environment after 2014. More assertive Russia and radical Islamism as a main source of terrorism and lately also migration wave as one of the spill over effect of conflict in Syria have remained in the centre of the Czech defence policy attention since 2014. The authors' point of departure is, however, that none of these phenomena are entirely new. Each of them alone is merely a projection of a long-term evolution rather than any kind of revolution and surprise. The fact that these situations with security implications for NATO, Europe and the Czech Republic occurred simultaneously is what really is significant and this naturally evoked the necessity to reconsider the effectiveness of our defence policy and the way it is implemented.

On the surface it may only seem, that amid the growing dynamics in the strategic environment the Government of the Czech Republic has adopted several strategic documents and policies¹ as an orchestrated effort with its NATO allies. But strategic documents alone are only a "tip of the iceberg" of our response. Nevertheless, these documents create the conceptual framework for the whole range of measures in order to enhance the Czech defence and security provision both in short- and long-term timeframe.

Methodologically, this article is inspired by the so called Copenhagen School of Security Studies in terms of examining defence policy issues in a broader context by using interrelated sectors or categories.² Thus this article aims at identifying and assessment of undertaken measures in the effort of the Czech defence policy adaptation which will be divided into the following categories based on their characteristics: (1) political; (2) military; (3) administrative; (4) economical, and (5) societal. Furthermore, the authors' ambition is to offer their view on the way ahead in those areas in order to promote discussion on the future course of action of the Czech defence policy evolution. Conceptually, this text is put in context of long-term adaptation of the Czech defence policy after 1989.

1. POINT OF DEPARTURE - CZECH DEFENCE POLICY IN 2016

Czech Defence Policy has been subject to adaptation since the end of Cold War. The Czechoslovak military in November 1989 was a completely different sort of organisation than we can witness today. It was an instrument serving entirely the purpose of the communist regime.³ It was built and prepared to fulfil a grand strategy

¹ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015; The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030; Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025.

² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 1998.
https://books.google.cz/books/about/Security.html?id=j4BGr-Elsp8C&redir_esc=y

³ 82 % of professional soldiers were members of the Communist Party.

with predominantly offensive objectives of potential superpowers' conflict accompanied most likely with a massive employment of nuclear weapons. Robust military potential⁴ was kept in a high readiness mode supported by building-up plans in order to mobilize all state resources in case of war both in terms of personnel and material. In addition, the state owned economy was also organised in the way which would allow sustaining the war time military structure operating under the operational concept of high intensity military confrontation. From this perspective, it was a complex task for the new political leadership and military senior representatives after 1989 to ensure that the new style of military organization is created and in the same time it will be fit for the purpose under the new political circumstances and in a different strategic context.⁵ During the last 26 years following the end of the Cold War, Czech Armed Forces as well as Defence Policy went through numerous and seemingly never-ending reorganizations. Two of the most significant milestones were reached in 1999 (NATO membership) and later in 2004 (full professionalization of the Armed Forces).

Nowadays, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic from 2015 provides the fundamental conceptual framework for formulation and execution of foreign, defence and internal security policy.⁶ The Security Strategy clearly states that the main concern of the Czech Republic Government is economic and social development. However, one of the most significant preconditions for its prosperity today and in the future is a credible provision of security of its population, credible collective defence, fully operational defence arrangements for ensuring our sovereignty and territorial integrity and open access to foreign markets and trades with vital raw materials.

The Czech defence policy is traditionally the main focal point of the document called Defence Strategy.⁷ This document was not updated since 2012. It defines three pillars on which the Czech defence policy is currently based. These are: (1) responsible approach by the state to the defence and international commitments (collective defence); (2) capable armed forces; and (3) national defence as a civic duty.⁸ While the Defence Strategy may be seen as already outdated (in 2016) due to its time of creation, the three pillars are without any doubt valid in the long-term perspective and constitute a significant contribution to conceptual and holistic defence thinking.

Besides the strategic context Defence Strategy especially defines political-military ambitions for the development of the Czech Armed Forces (CZAF) which basically describe the size of the forces which can be deployed into operations.

Based on the situation these can be:

- [1] In the case of an armed conflict which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, **all forces and assets** of the CZAF are employed, including an option to invoke conscription.
- [2] For NATO Article 5 collective defence, the Czech Republic provides land and air

⁴ In 1989 the personnel strength of Czechoslovak Armed Forces was 120 thousand military and 80 thousand civilians.

⁵ Comparing quantitative and qualitative parameters of Czechoslovak respectively Czech Armed Forces 1989 and 2016 one can argue that military potential of Czech Republic was reduced approximately 10 times.

⁶ Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, Prague 2015. ISBN 978-80-7441-007-9. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/file/1483514/Security_Strategy_CZ_2015.pdf

⁷ The Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic, Prague 2012. Available at: http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/STRATEGIE_an.pdf

⁸ The Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic, Prague 2012.

forces earmarked to that effect in the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Process. Their core element consists of **a brigade-size task force** formed on the basis of a mechanised brigade.

- [3] Subject to a given situation, the Czech Republic is able to concurrently or gradually assign the following forces and assets for international crisis management operations: a) a **land battalion task force**, or an air force equivalent, **rotated after a six-month** period; as part of this deployment, the CZAF are able to provide a multinational task force command element for up to twelve months; b) a **company-size** land or air task force **rotated after a six-month** period; c) a **battalion-size task force** assigned for **high readiness stand-by arrangements** of NATO (NATO Response Force) or the EU (EU Battle Group).

- [4] The Czech Republic is also able to contribute to additional operations with specialised forces or expert teams, including but not limited to the Special Operations Forces and mentoring and training teams.⁹

Judging by the size of forces which could be deployed under the terms of Defence Strategy, it seems that **level of Czech political – military ambition is not precisely defined** and in the same time **not tailored to the growing demand on military capability**. Even despite significant change of our security landscape and attitudes of political elite towards defence, these ambitions remain still valid and as such require thorough reconsideration in due time.

To be more specific, there are two most significant deficiencies in our political-military ambition we can observe. The first one is the battalion size task force offered for crisis response operation under non - Article 5 scenario. The Czech Republic should be able to do more under current circumstances. It should offer a brigade level task force as it was stipulated in the Defence Strategy 2008.¹⁰ The reason for that is clear. NATO still has great value in an unstable world, including that as an anchor for Britain as it prepares to leave the European Union. As always, this value - the value of the whole - depends on the commitments of the individual nations to deliver on their promises.¹¹

The second one and even more significant is the high level of ambiguity when it comes to the scope of forces expected to defend our country - the so called **“all available forces”**. However, no one knows for sure what it means in reality. What are the quantitative parameters on which the development of the CZAF in this case should be focused? What command and force structure is actually required for providing credible defence capability for defending the country (of course) in the context of the collective defence arrangement? Frankly speaking, the Czech Republic does not have a solid and sound answer to these questions, yet. Given the unfavourable security situation this ambition should be specified sooner rather than later. A window of

⁹ DYČKA, Lukáš; MIČÁNEK, František. Challenges in the process of creating long-term strategic documents within the Czech Republic's defence sector. In: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment. Bucharest: “Carol I” National Defence University, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Bucurest, Romania, 2013, p. 167-173. ISSN 2285-8415.

¹⁰ The Military Strategy of The Czech Republic, Prague 2008. Available at: http://www.army.cz/assets/files/5819/The_Military_Strategy_of_the_Czech_Republic-2008.pdf

¹¹ Keeping NATO Relevant and United. *The New York Times*. July 15, 2016. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/opinion/keeping-nato-relevant-and-united.html?smid=tw-nytopinion&smtyp=cur&r=1>

opportunity will be open this year with the ministers of defence invitation on elaboration of the new operational concept of the CZAF - for the purpose of this text **“Cap Stone Concept”**.¹² This kind of document should provide inevitably more clarity on the two following critical questions. Firstly, how the potential employment of the CZAF might look like? Secondly, what are the capabilities in quantitative and qualitative terms required to make these employments successful?

Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Czech defence policy¹³ we can argue that the current Defence Strategy interprets a **legacy of rather questionable resource driven strategy to safeguarding defence** and provision of defence sector necessary capability.¹⁴ It does not deal adequately with the increasing urgency of security challenges, accepts insufficient financing for defence and is willing to accommodate even the high operational risks stemming from moribund defence sector capabilities and its overall rather unsatisfactory performance.¹⁵

The impact of resource driven kind of defence strategy applied in more than two and half decade is the long-term underfinancing of defence, insufficient performance of the defence sector and declined of the armed forces capabilities of almost all European allies. Shrinking defence budgets and the increasing costs of defence capabilities prevent many allies from meeting their allocated capability targets, thus widening the capability gap between US and the European allies.

The CZAF were not saved from these developments. The CZAF capabilities are considerably constrained by understaffed structures, insufficient training, aging equipment and infrastructure and limited scope of stock (especially ammunition).¹⁶

2. POLITICAL DOMAIN

After 1993 the Czech defence policy and military strategy were built on the assumption that direct military attack against the Czech Republic and its allies is not

¹² Cap Stone Concept is a term used in NATO framework for a top level conceptual document communicating parameters and circumstances on the use of military power in future security and operational environment in order to fulfil political-military ambitions and rich political and military end state as defined in security and defence national strategies e.g. Department of the Army. *U.S. Army Cap Stone Concept*. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. U.S. ARMY, 2012. Available at: <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>

¹³ PROCHÁZKA, Josef; JANOŠEC, Josef; TŮMA, Miroslav. *Obranná politika Československé a České republiky (1989-2009)*. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany - Prezentační a informační centrum (PIC MO), 2010, 230 p. ISBN 978-80-7278.

¹⁴ PROCHÁZKA, Josef. Adaptation of the Czech Republic Defence Policy - Lessons Learned. *Security and Defence*, 2015, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 15-28. ISSN 2300-8741.

¹⁵ Performance of defence sector is subject to periodical assessment within the MoD and NATO regular planning cycle. Performance is evaluated by MoD on annual basis through Report on Defence Provision and by NATO biannually in the process named as National Plans Evaluation. Performance is usually assessed across the functional areas (doctrines, organisation, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, interoperability) and against the strategic objectives and key tasks. There is enough evidence on strengths and weaknesses in the overall performance of Czech defence sector, many of them communicated in media. Gabal put like this: *‘We have been feeding cat and now she should start catching mouse again and we are surprised she is not able to do it anymore’*. Available at: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/odnaučili-jsme-kocoura-zrat-hajil-gabal-navrh-pridat-2-miliardy-armade-12a-/domaci.aspx?c=A151118_110832_domaci_kop

¹⁶ White Paper on Defence 2011 in reaction to the dramatically shrinking defence budget proposed many unpopular changes in terms of termination of some non-essential military capabilities. White Paper on Defence 2011. Available at: http://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/whitepaperondefence2011_2.pdf

probable and it will be easily predictable, which would make preparation for such situation easier. Today the situation evolved. Lessons learned from the current armed conflicts in Georgia 2008 and especially the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 proved that the growing instability of strategic environment and its unpredictability require more prudent approach to defence provision.¹⁷

The aforementioned change of the security environment served as a wakeup call for political elites both on the international and national levels. The Alliance responded by the Wales Summit Declaration¹⁸ with measures such as Readiness Action Plan, Defence Investment Pledge, etc. As this is not the main scope of this article, details may be omitted. More importantly after the long period of rather relaxed attitudes to defence issues the Czech political leadership has begun to change its political mind-set and took action.

Firstly, the renewed conceptual framework has been established by adopting several strategic documents. These include The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030; Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025 and Concept Development on Services 2025, while more documents are in the process of preparation e.g. National Armament Strategy, Strategy for Defence Industry Support etc.

The underlining theme of all of these documents is that the risk of direct military attack on the Czech Republic remains low - nevertheless, the possibility that some of the NATO or EU allies might be confronted with an immediate military threat cannot be ruled out. In this situation the Czech Republic might be called on to fulfil its collective defence commitments.

In addition the probability that the Czech Republic will be involved in the military kind of confrontation at NATO periphery is increasing and time for effective - the most likely - multinational reaction is significantly shortened (weeks or months - not years).

In order to establish once again the required equilibrium between objectives ("Ends") and resources ("Means"), in 2014 the Chairmen of the coalition parties of the Czech government signed the Agreement on ensuring defence of the Czech Republic, the goal of which is the stabilization of the country's defence budgets in the future 10 years. The defence expenditures were supposed to be progressively increased to reach 1.44% GDP in 2020¹⁹, which is a promising - but still inadequate - commitment, given the NATO recommendation to spend 2% GDP on defence.

These assumptions and already adopted conceptual framework provide demanding political guidance for the defence sector and development of the CZAF capabilities. The question which remains to be answered is if there is a strong **political will** to support the political guidance with adequate resources in longer perspective. Thus defence and military deserve stability and predictability to plan the necessary measures and implement them on time, on budget and within the required parameters. The next elections in 2017 will show the true commitment of the Czech political leadership and political parties' integrity in terms of defence and security provisions. ***Defence policy should not become a subject of political competition in modern democracy.***

¹⁷ Martin P. NATO, Russia on "colision course": A new Cold War guide. *The Globe and Mail*. July 9. 2016.

¹⁸ Wales Summit Declaration, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

¹⁹ Czech Coalition Agreement. 2014. <http://www.army.cz/en/ministry-of-defence/newsroom/news/czech-governmental-coalition-sign-agreement-on-the-progressive-increase-of-the-defence-budget-101455/>

3. MILITARY DOMAIN

In any case the new political guidance has significant military implications because it puts the armed forces in different conceptual framework - from “*light*” expeditionary sort of capabilities to the “*heavier*” capability with adequate fire power and protection for high intensity military confrontation. However this shift is far from easily achievable, because the focus on expeditionary operations was heavily favoured by political elites at least since 2007²⁰ and as a result it has also become firmly rooted in the strategic documents. It is no surprise that it also had a profound influence on military acquisitions (IVECO and DINGO armoured vehicles etc.). For example the White Paper on Defence from 2011 stated that the development of capabilities should focus on “commitment to material and equipment that will most likely be deployed in operations”²¹.

In response to this no longer valid approach and under the changed security premises the Czech Republic needs balanced and credible military capabilities within well performed defence sector including fast political decision making, mobilisation of all available resources and ensured security of supply. Furthermore, the new political guidance significantly increases requirements on preparedness and readiness. In this context, rapid augmentation of the existing professional Armed Forces is of utmost importance.

Different set of strategic assumptions influence the way the CZAF might be employed in order to mitigate a wide spectrum of potential security risks and defend the country’s vital and strategic interests.²² The CZAF are required to fulfil a whole range of military operations ranging from high intensity warfare (such as collective defence against external attack) to Support of Integrated Rescue System in crisis situations.

The mission and main tasks of the CZAF are well set out in the Act No. 219/1999 Coll., on the Czech Armed Forces and they stem from NATO and EU membership. In addition to that a capability development process of the CZAF is oriented by the political - military ambitions and multinational commitments, e.g. capability targets as an outcome of the NATO Defence Planning Process.

The military response to political tasking embraces two strands of actions: (1) Support to NATO immediate reaction to Russia activities and (2) Long-term adaptation of the Czech Armed Forces Capability.

3.1 The First Strand of the Short-Term Actions

In practical terms the Czech Republic supports the implementation of the decisions made during the Newport summit, with the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). At this moment the Czech Republic envisages providing a special operation unit and an airborne unit (roughly 150 personnel in total) with two days “Notice To Move” into the

²⁰ Armed Forces ready to enhance its expeditionary capabilities. Idnes.cz, 2007, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/armada-chce-zvysit-sve-expedicni-schopnosti-fmm-/zpr_nato.aspx?c=A071031_212201_zpr_nato_inc

²¹ White Paper on Defence. 2011. http://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/whitepaperondefence2011_1.pdf

²² Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025. MoD, Prague 2015. Available at: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/KVA_R_ve_ejn_verze.pdf

so called Very High Readiness Forces (VJTF). Further contributions will be considered once the VJTF concept is specified in NATO.²³ The CZAF also increased assignments of units to NRF (over 800 soldiers in 2016). Nearly 300 soldiers are deployed in the NATO Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, EU mission in Mali, etc. We will also participate in the so called Forward Presence in East Europe.

Capacity building with partner nations such as Iraq, Jordan or Ukraine (providing ammunition, training teams or logistics) is also increasing as well as our solidarity with allies (Baltic Air Policing or additional Air Policing mission over Iceland freeing Canadian Air Forces for mission against the so called Islamic state in 2015).

3.2 The Second Strand of the Longer-Term Adaptation

Domestic military reaction includes more long-term measures such as formation of new units (143rd Supply Battalion at Lipník nad Bečvou or Special Forces Support Centre in Olomouc etc.). The future ambition is to balance the capabilities of both existing combat brigades (4th and 7th) in order to create a brigade level task force on the principle of modularity to ensure flexibility.

In terms of the CZAF capability development the Midterm Plan is approved and only about 11% of defence budget in average will be invested in the modernisation effort which is well under the promised level of 20% of defence budget allocated to military investments. As for the material procurement, surprisingly not much has happened since 2014. But future armed forces will be less focused on expeditionary operations thus requiring heavier “hardware” and firepower. Several such projects were envisaged mainly in the Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025. The replacement of BMP-2 vehicles, procurement of mobile radars, close air support capabilities and NATO caliber guns just to name a few.

The essential component is “man power” which faces not only negative demographic trends (addressed in a separate chapter) but also constrains in the field of education and training. On the national level exercises currently rarely exceed the battalion level and mobilization mechanisms have not been checked for over two decades.

An ambitious plan is designed to recruit high number of professional soldiers (1800 new soldiers in 2016 and 2000 in 2017) as well as members of active reserves (to reach 5000 in 2025 - currently less than 1300 positions are filled). Currently over 5000 positions are not filled - some units are only at the 65% level of manning.

A critical requirement in the military domain is the ability to identify capability needs both in short- and long-term perspectives and to advocate their importance and criticality for effective operational deployments to our political leadership and all taxpayers. Furthermore, the military must be able to develop functional operational requirements which will serve as a critical guide for the acquisition process. ***We need to strengthen our defence planning and established sound process addressing uncertainty and unpredictability (variety of planning situation and scenarios),***

²³ DYČKA, Lukáš; MIČÁNEK, František. Czech Republic in NATO - From Admiration to Reliance. In: Proceedings International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment. Bucharest, Romania: “Carol I” National Defence University - Centre for Defence and Security, 2014, pp. 253-259. ISSN 2285-8318.

constrained resources (prioritisation and risks management) and long- time delivery of capabilities (long-term planning timeframe).

It is obvious that the peacetime defence posture and readiness of the CZAF must allow for building up a credible war time command and force structure and enhancement of national security and defence system capability and capacity including protection against cyber threats and misleading propaganda (addressed in the following chapters).

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN

In the area of security and defence provision the administrative domain encompasses the president, parliament, government as well as all local government bodies and municipalities responsible for safeguarding the security of the population and the defence of the country. Nevertheless, this article focuses on the internal MoD functions and structures. Lately it can be argued, that one of the underlining topics in the defence sector administration is the growing feeling that times when various reforms were implemented chiefly in order to deliver savings, is inevitably over. ***Strengthening effectiveness and performance should be the order of the day. However, it doesn't mean wasting. Strong public oversight of tax-payers money must be ensured through enhanced transparency and accountability.***

The current MoD structure is therefore an outcome of several reorganisations conducted during the last few years. The principle that "structure follows function" was notably breached in creation of two separate divisions in the area of armaments and cooperation with the defence industry. The structure was also modified after the Act No. 234/2014 (Law on State Service) was passed. Notably it introduced the position of a state secretary who is supposed to stabilise civilian servants and minimise the influence of political fluctuation in MoD. In addition, positions of political deputies of the minister were replaced by strictly non-political members of state service, but so far in reality these positions are held by the same people as before.

The fundamental function for implementation of defence policy goals is acquisition. This function has deteriorated during the years of economic austerity. Processes were not adapted properly and personnel competencies gradually declined. ***The New Armament Strategy is in the process of elaboration. It aims at implementing best practices - smart acquisition, sound project management and proper management of life cycle.*** Preferred principle for material procurement is "Government to Government". It should minimise corruption and create additional security guarantees following the proverb "By buying our weapons, you also buy our friendship".

The second most significant function is the human resource management. It should be able to implement personnel policy in its complexity and to guarantee skilled and motivated people for each function as stipulated in the Act No. 221/1999 (Law on Military Service). New career management system for professional soldiers should deal with understaffed command and force structures, lack of motivation, declining knowledge, inadequate age structure of military personnel.

5. ECONOMICAL DOMAIN

In the European context, after the end of Cold war for more than two decades

economic interests prevailed over defence issues and the peace dividend was taken irresponsibly especially in the time of economic austerity. As a result of political disinterest in military matters, the financial crisis after 2009 hit the defence sector severely. The following six years were dominated by budget cuts and most of European Ally armies were frequently seen as a source of money into such extend, that main political-military ambitions were virtually only to cut expenses.

In the Czech Republic this logic continued to prevail even up to the last elections - as illustrated in numerous debates before the 2013 parliamentary elections. The sharpest fall in expenses came in 2010 - when these dropped from 1.43% of GDP to just 1.29% in 2013. Interestingly this coincided with the new phase of the long-term documents development. The overall Czech defence budget was slashed from 2010 to 2014 by more than 30%. The bottom was hit in 2013 when defence expenditures amounted only to 42 billion CZK (1.08% of GDP) - again coinciding with the commencement of works on the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030; Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025. This may seem that reforms are carried out only in times of scarcity - which implies that such elaboration of strategic documents is always about "downsizing" rather than "conceptual developing" of the armed forces.

Balancing the requirements and resources is still a well-known resource allocation dilemma. Nevertheless, the era of doing more with less has become obsolete by Russian annexation of Crimea and its role in the Ukrainian crisis afterwards. One of the potential effects is that the total global defence spending rose by 1% in real terms in 2015. It is the first increase since 2011. The world military expenditures were 1676 billion USD in 2015.²⁴

Moreover, allocation of resources differs considerably even among the NATO nations. The European nations with the most powerful military e.g. UK, FR and DE indicate their intent to spend more on defence in the foreseen future to fulfil their defence pledge commitments made in Wales. On the other hand, smaller NATO European ally defence spending is still falling - albeit by meagre 1.3% annually. This does not apply to the Central/Eastern European NATO member states which increased their defence spending substantially by 13% in average. Yet, there are exceptions such as Poland which increased its defence budget by 22% in 2015. Thus, it seems that a new trend is set out in the Alliance. Whether this is a sign of NATO fragmentation remains to be seen. What is certain, however, this mismatch is a result of different threat perception among the allies that they face today.

To make this matter even more challenging, the European allies are under a climbing pressure from the US to spend the recommended 2% of their GDP on defence. The US alone allocates approximately 75% (in real terms 583 billion of USD) of total NATO defence expenditures.²⁵ The most often used argument is that in order to maintain solid transatlantic relations in the longer term the European pillar in NATO should do more for a credible collective defence and provide meaningful contribution to it.²⁶ Unfortunately, the cohesion of NATO is under risks, because widespread consensus has emerged in the United States that European allies fail to pay their share

²⁴ Trends in World Military Expenditures 2015. SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016.

²⁵ Defence News. *US Army Pivots to Europe As Russian Threat Grows*. February 15, 2016.

²⁶ Odehnal, J. (2015). Military expenditures and free-riding in NATO. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 21(4), pp. 479-487.

when it comes to defence.²⁷

The noticeable discrepancy between positions of NATO and the Czech Republic regarding financing was noticed on Wales Summit in September 2014. The Wales Summit Pledge on Defence Investment stipulates commitment of member states to finally increase the defence spending targeting the 2% GDP level. There is indeed a consensus among the coalition parties in the Czech government signed in August 2014 to gradually increase our defence budget - but only to 1.4% of the GDP by 2020. This time period is not only quite distant, but it is after the next elections which may result in a different ruling coalition without any need to honour even the agreed level of 1.4% of GDP on defence.²⁸ In any case spending 2% of GDP on defence as requested by NATO is simply not going to happen any time soon.

But the amount of expenditures is only one part of the equation, the unhealthy structure of defence expenditures is the other. The so called 50/30/20 formula for defence expenditures, with 50 percent of the budget going for personnel costs, 30 percent for operations and maintenance, and 20 percent for modernization is the long term goal in the Czech Republic, but the planned proportions of defence budget in 2016 are 56/33/11.²⁹ The positive trend is the reduction of personnel expenditures in the aftermath of the economic crisis which rose to staggering 62% in 2014. But even our 62% (in 2014) pale in contrast to several allied countries such as Portugal, Greece, Belgium or Italy where personnel costs are attacking 80% of their defence budget³⁰ which is a worrying trend. ***Hard decision must be made in order to support the development of the most pressing capability gaps and priorities. In practice it means predictability of defence budget addressing the NATO requirement of 2% GDP including its healthy internal structure ensuring that 20% of defence budget will be freed up for modernisation of the aging military equipment and infrastructure, e.g. helicopters, artillery, air defence, radars, and armoured fighting vehicles. The capital investment is a strategic portfolio which requires long-term outlook up to 30 years, wider political consensus and public support.***

5.1 Security of supply

While in 2015 the Czech Republic initiated an analysis of dependency of Allies on Russian equipment, its own security of supply poses unacceptable risk to our freedom of action. One of the objectives taken to mitigate this risk on the conceptual level is the newly prepared Strategy on Defence Industry Support which is currently being finalized (June 2016). Among other measures it introduces the concept of "Strategic Supplier" which will enjoy specific status in exchange for tighter control of its ownership, security of information, etc. In practice it means that such company could be directly awarded

²⁷ Mattelaer A., Revisiting the Principles of NATO Burden-Sharing. *Parameters* 46(1) Spring 2016.

²⁸ DYČKA, Lukáš; MIČÁNEK, František. Czech Republic in NATO - From Admiration to Reliance. In: Proceedings International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment. Bucharest, Romania: "Carol I" National Defence University - Centre for Defence and Security, 2014, pp. 253-259. ISSN 2285-8318.

²⁹ Rozpočet 2016. http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_5001_6000/5146/rozpo_et_J_3_m.pdf

³⁰ Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015). http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf#page=9

contract for material without competition particularly in time of crisis and armed conflict or in the situation in which essential security interests of the state are at stake. Such approach is acceptable even under Article 346 of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.³¹ On the more general level the perception of defence industry shifted from purely economic asset boosting national economy to defence instrument necessary for the CZAF support. ***The next logical step is to identify priority areas of defence industry competencies we need to keep and develop in the future.***

6. SOCIETAL DOMAIN

Technological models (and most discussions of “future war”, RMA, etc. - heavily if not exclusively technology-driven) cannot describe the real wars which we have already experienced in the post-Cold War era. The courses of these wars have in fact been driven not by technology (which remains essentially a tool), but by the complex interplay among opposing sets of popular emotions, military skills, and political calculations. The defence potential of every state is traditionally based upon the Clausewitzian notion of trinity of “people, army, and government”³². While “army” and “government” were covered in the previous chapters, it is the societal domain that is often overlooked. And although a lot has been done on conceptual level for the armed forces capability enhancement, very little for the overall improvement of **societal resilience**. Several initiatives and programmes exist from the past - albeit with questionable results - such as the so called “Preparation of citizens for the defence of the state” (Czech abbreviation “POKOS”). Numerous other activities organized mostly by the CZAF are rather PR oriented (display “Bahna” or “Cihelna”) and their potential to truly enhance societal resilience is limited. In order to make progress in this field interagency and complex approach is required, starting from primary school education. This approach, while generally accepted, bears legacy of pre-1989 period and as such it is hampered by its political sensitivity. By “resilience” we understand not only preparation for war itself in conventional terms, but also ***reinforcing awareness of society in the area of cyber space, social media and potential threat of enemy propaganda tools.***

Strategic communication has been “reactive” rather than “proactive” in the past. The result is an alarmingly low knowledge of ordinary citizens about the defence sector. Only 20% of respondents in public survey were able to correctly guess the size of CZAF or defence budget. The natural outcome is that just 43% of respondents are willing to participate in defence of the country in case of war.³³ The Ministry of Defence currently commenced work on the Strategic Communication Concept. ***One of the key preconditions is that it will be orchestrated with other ministries, but naturally it is the Ministry of Interior that has the lead in this case.***

³¹ Article 346 TFEU. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/more_on_defence_procurement_en.pdf

³² Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres. Reclaiming the clausewitzian trinity. Available at: <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm>

³³ “Armáda a veřejnost 2015” - Ministry of Defence.

An inherent part of potential scenario is also a hybrid kind of activities targeting the countries' **cyber space**.³⁴ Allies will likely agree during a summit meeting in Warsaw in 2016 to designate cyber as an official operational domain of warfare, along with air, sea, land, and space. Cyber security capability that the Czech MoD is going to maintain and develop will embrace passive, preventive and reactive measures.³⁵ Critical capability gap within the C2 domain includes also a secured line of communication in integrated national and multinational information environment which we are still unable to resolve effectively.

Despite the acknowledgment that societal resilience, cyber and strategic communication are essential elements of the Czech Republic defence capability, more needs to be done conceptually. Additionally, we should allocate more resources toward these areas and institutionalise holistic approach - clear responsibilities and organisational arrangement should be established. It seems that stove piping is not the ideal way forward because it would again create an unacceptable risk to our defence provision. Simply, we need more multinational, inter-agency, inter-services coordination and cooperation on the horizontal level in the system to achieve synergies.

Furthermore, there are several potential risks stemming from the nature of the societal domain. Firstly, the aging population and limited physical fitness of the young population constitute a heavy burden for the CZAF. Lowering overall physical requirements is undoubtedly the road to hell. More flexible recruitment policy is needed. Solution might lie in the tailored approach matching requirements to the character of the supposed soldier assignment. Additionally, in time of the growing economy the CZAF are competing with the police and fire rescue service on labour market over the same pool of candidates.

The second, even more strategically relevant, issue is the defective linkage between the professional armed forces and the rest of our society. The Czech MoD should capitalise on the positive attitude of our society do the CZAF in this regard. Even though currently 61% of population of the Czech Republic believe in the ability of the CZAF to defend successfully its sovereignty³⁶, only around one fifth of our citizens is actively seeking information about the armed forces. Thus it can be argued that for large majority of population armed forces remain mostly invisible. The motivation to join armed forces is not only question of salary and benefits but mainly that of prestige and visibility.

The armed forces must reach out to the Czech young population in a more proactive way, e.g. social media and modern forms of communication.

³⁴ At NATO Summit in Warsaw cyber space was recognised as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. Cyber defence is part of NATO core task of collective defence. In: Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016.

³⁵ The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030. Prague 2015. Available at: http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/THE_LONG_TERM_PERSPECTIVE_FOR_DEFENCE_2030.pdf

³⁶ "Armáda a veřejnost 2015" - Ministry of Defence.

CONCLUSION

The authors of this paper intended to assess the scope of changes in the pursuit of the Czech Republic defence policy adaptation to the wide spectrum of security challenges, which are both military and non-military in their nature. This assessment was conducted in the context of a wider NATO response to the dynamic change of global security environment after 2014.

This article assessed the Czech Defence policy adaptation in the following domains: (1) political; (2) military; (3) administrative; (4) economical; and (5) societal and offers several ideas for further improvement.

It seems that the Czech political leadership's attitude to defence matters has evolved dramatically over the last two years, mostly due to the Russian aggression, influx of refugees and increasing scope of terrorist activities in European capitals. Outcome of this effort might be split into several areas. First of all, the decline of defence budget has been stopped and hopefully will be reversed in the near future (from current 1.06% to 1.44% of GDP by 2020), yet still far away from the NATO benchmark of 2%. Secondly, several strategic documents were amended so they reflect new security realities and implications, e.g. the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 and Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025 are based on different sets of strategic assumptions. Thirdly, the required capability of the armed forces is subject to reconsideration in order to enhance their preparedness and readiness. In addition to that the defence system, as a whole, requires enhanced resilience and proper functioning in terms of mobilisation of all society resources, both material and human. Nevertheless, implementation of the updated Czech defence policy still faces significant obstacles. Critical is the performance of the acquisition system and recruitment of young military professionals.

Key strategic level recommendations for the Czech defence policy reinforcement encompasses following ideas: (1) thoughtful amendment of the Czech political-military ambitions inadequately stipulated in the Czech Republic Defence Strategy while properly addressing the shift in our security environment; (2) reconsideration of our armed forces posture and readiness parameters based on the sound defence plan of the Czech Republic taking in consideration variety of employment modalities stemming from the set of potential planning scenarios; (3) ensuring sustainable support for defence policy implementation through the provision of adequate resources while keeping up with the political commitments made in Wales and Warsaw; (4) putting even more emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency, overall performance, enhanced transparency and accountability.

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Peer-Reviewed Article

Transformační vojenský leadership – požadavky, charakteristika a rozvoj

Transformational Military Leadership – Requirements, Characteristics and Development

Drazen Smiljanic

Abstrakt: Aktuální bezpečnostní prostředí je rozmanitější, dynamičtější, vzájemně propojené a mnohem méně předvídatelné než kdykoli předtím. Vzhledem k neustálým organizačním změnám v ozbrojených silách západních států vyplývajících z nových úkolů se zvyšují i nároky na bojové schopnosti vojenských velitelů. Transformační leadership realizovaný veliteli, kteří ve svém vývoji dosáhli post-konvenční morální úrovně, je pravděpodobně jediným relevantním elementem, který je schopen transformovat a adaptovat vojenskou organizaci na řešení současných a budoucích bezpečnostních problémů. Tento článek analyzuje možnost použitelnosti transformačního leadershipu ve vojenské organizaci s využitím vývojových teorií v rámci koncepce rozvoje řízení ve vertikální struktuře.

Abstract: The contemporaneous security environment is more diverse, dynamic, interconnected and far less predictable than ever. As the major Western militaries undergo continuous changes in missions and tasks, as well as in the form of their organisations, the warfighting abilities of military leaders are not the only ones required. Transformational military leadership, with leaders operating from the post-conventional level of developmental action-logic, arguably become one of the most needed capacities of a military organisation. This type of leadership has to be capable of initiating and leading transformational changes, needed to respond adequately and adaptively to contemporaneous and future security challenges. This article analyses the applicability of transformational leadership to military organisations using the developmental theory and the concept of vertical leadership development as a framework.

Klíčová slova: vojenský leadership; transformační leadership; rozvojová teorie; komplexnost

Keywords: Military Leadership, Transformational Leadership, Developmental Theory, Complexity.

INTRODUCTION

The ability of a national defence to play its role becomes more and more challenging with increasing complexity of the contemporaneous security environment that may be described as a complex adaptive system. One of the key features of complex adaptive systems is that we cannot precisely predict their future states but only take action to minimise undesirable ones. The logical consequence for a military organisation is that it cannot develop all necessary capabilities and prepare for all possible contingencies. However, it may and should increase its agility¹ - strategic and operational. Increasing strategic agility requires improving a number of processes and military capabilities as well as changing intra-entity and inter-entity behaviours.² It actually requires capacity for an organisational, enterprise level, change.

Making and sustaining the military organisation effective, able to protect and advance national security objectives, is arguably the first and foremost role of the defence planning. For a national defence, it is also important to be efficient, which is a matter of not only choosing the right military end products and components (capabilities), and developing them at the least cost but also of the speed with which decisions are made and implemented (Knorr, 1968). This, consequently, emphasises the need for developing leaders' competences and their abilities in the area not traditionally seen as the military core business. Traditional command and control modalities, although historically appropriate, will not suffice in the circumstances in which the military organisation needs the capacity to adapt timely and appropriately through change.

Military leaders, seen traditionally as a part of the moral component of the military fighting power, are, along with the conceptual component and physical component, one of the pillars of an effective and efficient military organisation. However, as the expectations put on leadership have been traditionally connected with the warfighting abilities, today, and it is especially the case with the highest level of military decision-makers, the military leaders need to possess the capacity to lead against mutating and morphing threats, along with allies and partners, plan and engage collaboratively with governmental agencies, private sector and NGOs, and continuously identify capabilities needed to address and respond to new threats. For the military organisation it may require changes in certain or the majority of capabilities in the whole DOTMLPFI³ spectrum, with particular emphasis on interoperability and readiness to support shared resources⁴. Besides that, it may include changes in people's behaviour and the culture of an organisation. Satisfying these demands, different from the historical military leadership practices, and performing with excellence will require advanced and sustained development of military leaders (Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2013).

¹ "Agility is a concept that can apply to entities, systems, and material. It is the synergistic combination of robustness, resilience, responsiveness, flexibility, innovation, and adaptation." (Alberts et al., 2010)

² "Intra-entity and inter-entity behaviours" may be described as the organisational culture or the C2 level of maturity. (Alberts et al., 2010, p. 46 and pp. 263-265)

³ DOTMLPFI is an acronym that stands for Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability. It represents a paradigm that helps guiding capability development.

⁴ Some examples are: NATO Smart Defence initiative and the EU pooling and Sharing project

Official military standards for evaluation and selection for promotion usually do not necessarily recognize specific cognitive officers' abilities,⁵ particularly conceptual ones, needed for strategic military leaders. Military education systems, equally, do not have educational programs that teach the art of leadership which would be similar to *the vertical leadership development*⁶ concept. Traditional education, both civilian and military, allows gaining the knowledge and developing the skills, which serve as tools, required for what people are doing professionally. Vertical development programs, on the other hand, are built on the science of human development⁷ and therefore suit better assessing and developing leaders able to lead more profound changes in an organisation. Since that kind of development has not yet been officially introduced in military education curricula, it usually happens spontaneously.

The purpose of this article is to present concepts, methods and theories that the military organisation may use, as a possible approach, to respond to challenges from complex security environment that have an impact on defence. Through the introduction of the concepts of organisational transformation (transformational change), transformational leadership, vertical leadership development and developmental theory - leadership dimension is given an additional and crucial role of ensuring the military power to be effective and efficient through its ability to adapt.

1. METHODS AND MATERIALS

The main focus of the article is on the strategic military leadership.⁸ The author argues that their competencies and abilities are crucial to ensuring that military organisation is able to cope with and respond adequately to challenges coming from the security environment. The author introduces several theses related to the ability of the military organisation to fulfil its missions and tasks in the complex security environment:

- The military organisation has to be agile enough to undergo necessary changes and adaptations that are a consequence of uncertain and unpredictable security environment. While highly capable platforms may be crucial for winning in the conventional warfare, they are neither always the most effective nor the most appropriate security policy tool in the contemporaneous security environment.
- Leaders have to possess an adequate level of abilities to initiate, plan and conduct changes that will ensure adequate adaptation of the military organisation. These abilities cannot be acquired exclusively through the horizontal leadership development (skills and knowledge oriented) but through

⁵ Cognitive ability is described as "the ability to understand abstract concepts and ideas, to reason accurately, and to solve problems." (Pearce, 2009, pp. 75-76)

⁶ "Vertical Development refers to advancement in a person's thinking capability. The outcome of vertical stage development is the ability to think in more complex, systemic, strategic, and interdependent ways." (Petrie, 2014, p. 8)

⁷ "The Leadership Development Framework (LDF) is one such full-range model of mental growth in adulthood that describes the stages of development from egocentric opportunism to wise, timely and world-centric action." (Cook-Greuter, 2004)

⁸ However, the scope is not limited to the military leadership and may be expanded to all high-level decision makers in a national defence domain.

the vertical leadership development (capacity development oriented) as well.

- Military leadership cannot be generically defined as a universal construct but rather be considered a multi-layered, adaptive process. It is particularly demanding for the military to develop flag visionary leaders, capable of embracing forward thinking and holding the strategic perspective,⁹ as the fusion of a theorist and practitioner is rare¹⁰. The competencies and qualities of strategic military leaders have to be defined and developed differently than traditional ones which required almost exclusively warfighting abilities
- Assessment, evaluation and development of military leaders capable of conducting transformational changes require a new approach. The developmental theory provides the broad context and methods for identification of the corresponding level of an individual's stage of development.

The author puts in a relation transformational leadership concept, the organisational transformation, with its requirements and characteristics, and vertical leadership development with the developmental theory. The proposed approach is organised in the following order:

- Description of drivers of change - describes why the paradigm change is needed in coping with challenges of the security environment, and what the consequent requirements for military organisation and leadership are.
- Military leadership - provides the official (traditional) categorization and definition as well as description of specific differences between operational and transformational leadership.
- Military organisation and change - describes the culture of military organisation and limits for change. The chapter describes the general types of organisational changes highlighting the transformational change as the major and the most complex type of change, relevant for a nation's or alliance's defence posture.
- Leadership development - introduces the vertical development and developmental theory aiming to present its validity for assessment and development of leaders.

2. DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERSHIP

This chapter describes drivers that incite organisational changes and describe the requirements set against contemporaneous military organisations and leadership. Drivers of change for the military organisation are not limited exclusively to external (threats and challenges) and internal (civil-military) factors. They may be of other nature as well and be shaped by different, not only political or economic trends. NATO, for example, in its Security Foresight Analysis Report (NATO HQ SACT, 2013; NATO HQ SACT, 2015), identifies trends in five broad themes: Political, Human, Technology, Economics/Resources, and Environment.

⁹ See, for example: U.S. Navy Department. *The Navy Leader Development Strategy*. Washington, D.C. January 2013. Available at: www.usnwc.edu/navyleader

¹⁰ "La stratégie est, à la fois, un art, en tant que pratique du stratège, et une science (au sens très large), en tant que savoir du stratégiste." (Coutau-Bégarie, 2006, p. 29)

3.1. Characteristics of the Contemporaneous Security Environment

The system of international relations (IR) may be described as a complex adaptive system.¹¹ Like most others, such as the nervous system, immune system, rain forest or the atmosphere, the system of international relations may also be explained as a complex system, i.e. a complex society (Kawaguchi, 2003, p.7). What matters for any complex system matters for a complex society as well, i.e. the change in such a system does not occur in the form of simple cause and effect. In a complex system, local events and interactions among the “agents” can cascade and reshape the entire system which describes a property called emergence. Thus, the system continually evolves in hardly predictable ways through a cycle of local interactions, emergence, and feedback. In practice, change in one part of the system, whether political, economic, societal or environmental, can be both a cause and/or effect of changes in one or more other systems. Change of the whole can give rise to changes in one or more of its parts, and change in one or more parts can provoke further changes of the whole. The most symptomatic characteristic of complexity in IR is the “spill over effect”.¹² This effect describes the potential impact of conflicts in neighbouring countries, particularly those along the NATO borders, which may spread over the national borders and represent challenges for NATO members.

The most important feature of complex systems, in terms of national security, is that we cannot precisely predict their future states. National security becomes more and more complex itself and closely related to the concept of sustainability that encompasses economic, social and ecological dimension. Military organisation as an instrument of the national power is more and more seen as a means that has to be integrated with other instruments of power in order to respond to new challenges adequately.¹³

The contemporaneous security environment in which armed forces have to operate is very often described as “VUCA” - volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (Stiehm, 2002, p. 6). Whilst volatility and uncertainty are not that new, complexity and ambiguity may be considered as a development of the post-Cold War period.

¹¹ “Simply defined, complex adaptive systems are composed of a diversity of agents that interact with each other, mutually affect each other, and in so doing generate novel behaviour for the system as a whole, such as in evolution, ecosystems, and the human mind. But the pattern of behaviour we see in these systems is not constant, because when a system’s environment changes, so does the behaviour of its agents, and, as a result, so does the behaviour of the system as a whole. In other words, the system is constantly adapting to the conditions around it. Over time, the system evolves through ceaseless adaptation.” (Mitleton-Kelly, 2007, p. 167)

¹² “Spill over effect is a secondary effect that follows from a primary effect, and may be far removed in time or place from the event that caused the primary effect.” Source: Business dictionary. Spill over effect [online] © 2015, Web Finance Inc. NATO uses this term in description of Strategic Military Perspectives on security environment: “Spill over of conflict from neighbouring countries along NATO borders, interstate conflict over access to resources, state-on-state conflict including Article V situations, resource wars, frozen conflict, new spheres of influence.” (NATO Bi-SC, 2015, p. 15)

¹³ The hybrid conflicts are one example of that inadequacy: “In hybrid conflicts, armed forces are not primary a tool to exert military force: they rather serve as a means to create a scenario of intimidation... Military responses by NATO forces are not the first or most appropriated security policy tool.” (Major and Mölling, 2015)

General Denis Mercier (2015), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, describes the characteristics of adversaries NATO may face as “versatile and innovative, triggering an increasing number of simultaneous crises, developing new types of threats, which at the end, will try to impose higher costs on our Nations’ ability to constantly adapt and react.” SACT follows with description of the future security environment describing it as the one that “will require forces which are very resilient, networked and have a level of integration that generates military advantage.”

Obviously, the challenges that characterise the contemporaneous security environment require constant adaptation from national defence. The UK RAF’s strategy (2006) emphasized this point precisely: “[t]he greatest risk to the security of the UK is perhaps that the strategic environment will change faster than the UK can adapt to the change.” Armed forces are consequently forced to transform in response to a political and technological change. However, the transformation should not be just a journey from one set of capabilities to another without assessing what else has to be transformed in the organisation.

There are also many other possible challenges that may emerge from a complex security environment. These challenges, especially noticeable during the planning of operations in a military headquarters, are described as “wicked problems”. The concept of wicked problems was introduced by Rittel and Webber (1973), arising from social and urban planning. Han de Nijs (2010) describes it with the following definition:

“Wicked problems are problems that are un-bounded and ill-defined, are novel but difficult to conceive, and have multiple and conflicting goals and customers. A wicked problem is one for which each attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Wicked problems cannot be solved in a traditional linear engineering fashion, because the problem definition evolves as new possible solutions are considered and/or implemented. Most projects in organizations – and virtually all technology-related projects these days – are about wicked problems.”

Considering the abovementioned features of the security environment we may suggest that the characteristic to be primarily sought and developed in a military organisation is agility. The agility should assume the ability and capacity of a military organisation to undergo change and adapt timely, structurally and doctrinally, when necessary. Jeffrey Becker (2014) suggests that “we must understand how - in a world most agree is (as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is fond of saying) ‘complex, uncertain, and increasingly dangerous’, we cultivate the mental agility to prepare where we can, and adjust to unanticipated conditions when we must.” Either adequate preparation, regarding capabilities or adjusting/adapting will require change in certain extent. The need for a change will, therefore, certainly affect capabilities but may also require a change in strategy, doctrines or the organisational culture. The change may also affect the role of the military as it may become just one of the instruments of the national power engaged in operation.¹⁴ In that case the military will have to operate with other national and/or allied instruments of power, governmental agencies, nongovernmental organisations and the private sector.

¹⁴ This case has already been described in different whole-of-government approaches and the comprehensive approach.

3.2. Leadership Requirements

After the First Gulf War, it seemed that quick military victories could be achieved by small numbers of technologically sophisticated forces capable of launching precision strikes against enemy targets from safe distances. NATO campaign in Kosovo, in 1999, proved that approach applicable. However, this approach turned out to be false on and after the 9/11 which also created another paradigm - the one that the conventional war belongs to history.

There are many examples that show how the use of existing concepts, no matter how successful for certain purposes, may turn to be ineffective for another purpose. One example is the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. LTG H. R. McMaster (2015), who led the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq as a colonel, in 2005 and 2006, observed:

"These defense theories, associated with the belief that new technology had ushered in a whole new era of war, were then applied to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; in both, they clouded our understanding of the conflicts and delayed the development of effective strategies."

Another example, described by a retired U.S. Army general Stanley McChrystal (2015), particularly relevant to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, reveals that:

"In Iraq, we were using complicated solutions to attack a complex problem. For decades we had been able to execute our linear approach faster than the external environment could change, and as a result, we believed we were doing something different from other organisations. In fact, we were as bureaucratic as anyone else; we were just more efficient in our execution."

Simple recognition of problems in the past is, of course, not enough, as the past does not repeat itself literally. It is very important, therefore, to detect inner challenges that may lead to a failure. General David Perkins (2015, p. 114), Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, when asked in an interview about his opinion on the biggest challenges, i.e., the possible impediments, to achieving the vision for "U.S. Force 2025 and Beyond", said:

"Number one, I think, is sort of lack of imagination. Number two is a lack of willingness to take risk, to change the way we do business, everything from the way our leaders think about war to the processes, and then, therefore, a lack of risk in coming up with new and innovative concepts, and a lack of taking risk with regard to forming the process where we take a concept and form it into a capability."

The simple conclusion that may be derived from the examples above is that the strategic and operational challenges emerging in the security environment alter very often in their character. Consequently, the strategic and operational concepts and approaches to solutions have to be continuously adapted or/and changed. The examples shown above emphasise the need to approach every new major mission independently, with the great amount of creativity and imagination. They also highlight the need for leaders to make proper decisions when they encounter situations that are unforeseen. It is therefore very important for an officer in charge of leading to understanding the context within which he or she operates, and also understand the consequences that will result from the action. Bartone et al. (2007) argue that:

"The modern professional military officer must be able to take a broader view than

*past military leaders, a more comprehensive perspective on the surrounding operational, organizational, social and political domains of experience. There would also seem to be an increasing **need for military leaders at all levels** to possess what traditionally have been viewed as essential attributes for senior or strategic leaders, attributes such as broad conceptual capacity, divergent thinking, and creative problem solving skills."*

The Norwegian Military Academy's concept of leadership development (Boe, 2015) emphasises the character and intellect as essential factors in military leadership and pivotal characteristics of officer competency. Although the exact knowledge of what the character is and how the character can be developed is an undergoing project in Norway and some other countries – the very existence of an idea that recognises the need to develop officers' personal traits along with the intellect already represents a significant mindset shift. As we will see later in this article, the idea of the character development might be seen in already existing developmental theory and the concept of vertical development.

3.3 Organisational Requirements

The dynamics that may be observed in the strategic security environment since the beginning of the 21st century have brought out many new challenges for the national security and global security in general. Organisations, socio-economic and military, are increasingly faced with highly ambiguous, complex and dynamic conditions and are required to respond in less time, with fewer resources and across a larger spectrum.

Western militaries have undergone continuous changes of its organisation since its emergence two centuries ago, and are currently, according to Charles Moskos (1998), in its postmodern phase. One of the characteristics of the postmodern military is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, which is not only an internal (in-society) development but arguably the only relevant way, a demand, needed to adequately respond to emerging security challenges.¹⁵ Many countries already apply whole-of-government approach including interactions between government and non-governmental actors.¹⁶ Participation in such an endeavour represents the challenge for a military organisation as the tasks and/or the way of planning and working with other organisations and entities objectively not necessarily fit with the military "core business".

Information has become a game changer and very often made irrelevant many of the traditional constituents of the fighting power, particularly superiority in numbers (material, soldiers, etc.). Today's information environment which makes reality instantaneous and information omnipresent is difficult, if not impossible, to control. These facts represent a very high demand on a modern military organisation to improve the way their command and control model (systems and procedures) work. Even more, challenges coming from the information environment have had, and will continue to have, a profound effect on how institutions manage themselves and how they can work with coalition partners (Alberts et al., 2010).¹⁷

¹⁵ An additional emphasis may be put on hybrid threats and humanitarian crises.

¹⁶ Particular example is the Austrian "3C Roadmap" initiative, which recommends principles and aims of interaction between government and non-governmental actors for applying coordinated, complementary and coherent measures in fragile situations. (Werther-Pietsch et al., 2011, p. 5)

¹⁷ It is also worth mentioning the NATO project Federated Mission Network, "helping Allied and Partner forces to better communicate, train and operate together." (see the official NATO website

The military organisation has to be agile enough to undergo necessary adaptations that are a consequence of impact of uncertain and unpredictable contemporaneous security environment. Strategic agility¹⁸, arguably, has to be a key principle of any modern military and defence strategy and the overarching capability of the armed forces.

4. MILITARY ORGANISATION AND CHANGE

The nature of challenges emerging from strategic environment obviously requires leaders' and organisational agility, which comprises flexibility and adaptability. While it is important for leaders to possess an expanded conceptual capacity it is of equal importance for a military organisation to possess resilience that will allow adaptation across a wide range of unforeseen challenges.

4.1 The Culture of Military Organisation

In regular circumstances, the culture is the result of a complex group learning process that is only partially influenced by the leader's behaviour. However, if the organisation's survival is threatened because elements of its culture have become maladapted, it is ultimately the function of leadership at all levels of the organisation to recognise and initiate changes. In this sense, the leadership and culture are conceptually intertwined.

Military organisations are specific. They have been built for centuries around a disciplined and hierarchical structure including strictly defined pattern of interaction. The core military business, characterised by the frequent need to execute missions and tasks without the luxury of gaining consensus, reinforced high levels of power distance within the military. Despite a move away from large formations of the 20th century warfare, this cultural assumption is largely unchanged (Gerras et al, 2009). The change is not quality immanent to military organisations. Actually, when it comes to the organisational change, the literature suggests (Thornton, 2015) that "major change" only comes about through a defeat in war or through a significant civilian intervention.

Not so many organisations and institutions devote as many resources to the assimilation of their members as does the military. Elizabeth Kier (1996) argues that "what the military perceives to be in its interest is a function of its culture". Consequently, although the military's culture may reflect some aspects of the civilian society's culture - the military's powerful assimilation processes can diminish the influence of the civilian society. Probably the main internal challenge of the western militaries is a disconnect between the desired goal to have an adaptive, learning and innovative environment to deal with the complexities of today's challenges and the creation of the corresponding culture, on one side, and an old fashioned climate, on the other side.

<http://www.act.nato.int/fmn>)

¹⁸ In its simplest articulation agility is "the capability to successfully cope with changes in circumstances". The main components of agility are: responsiveness, robustness, flexibility, resilience, adaptability, and innovativeness. (Alberts, 2011, pp. 65-66)

Brigadier General David A. Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson (2004) summarise the paradoxical nature of power distance in military by observing that, “the Army’s culture has an enduring, legitimate pull between essential centralized control and necessary, decentralized innovation.”

4.2 Organisational Agility

Formalization of organizational structures and processes, necessary during the conduct of operational planning and execution of missions, on one side, and the requirement for agility on the other side, may create tensions. However, the achievement of certain level of agility should not be a linear, irreversible process. Kalloniatis and MacLeod (2010) argue that “adaptation to contingencies can, however, be achieved by manipulating the degrees of formalization, decision centralization, and distribution of skill specializations such that innovation is not suppressed.” In short, “process centricity” or the balance between military commander’s explicit and implicit intent in bounding the subordinate’s solution space may shift according to circumstances. Adaptability, therefore, may be described in terms of the structural change to maintain fitness-for-purpose against changing contingencies. Two main dimensions of it are the distribution of decision-making authority, from centralised to decentralised, and organisational departmentation, from divisional¹⁹ to functional.

As it is hard to expect that a military system will undergo radical changes while its basic mission is to keep its readiness and robustness, it is important to develop as much as possible the quality of ambidexterity²⁰ - the ability to simultaneously run and reinvent the organisation.

The ability to change and adapt to the circumstances, even during the course of a crisis or campaign, was recognised as a superior quality by Sun Tzu as well: “What enables the masses of the Three Armies invariably to withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox (*ch’i*) and orthodox (*cheng*). In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox” (Sawyer, 1994, p. 187)

4.3 Organisational Change

Understanding the change in the operating environment is essential for success and even survival. Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott, in the foreword of the U.S. Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JCS, 2016), points out that “to think about the future usefully, we must describe change in a rigorous and credible way.” However, ability to cope with changes in the environment requires changes in our own organisation.

According to Dean Anderson and Linda Ackerman Anderson (2010) there are three essential types of change occurring in organisation in relation to critical focus areas of

¹⁹ An example of departmentation would be making functional teams comprised of members of different Js (J-1 to J-9).

²⁰ “Organizational ambidexterity refers to an organization’s ability to be efficient in its management of today’s business and also adaptable for coping with tomorrow’s changing demand.” Source: Wikipedia, available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambidextrous_organization. The U.S. JCS document Joint Operating Environment 2035 states: “As the ultimate guarantor of the safety and security of the United States, the Joint Force **must simultaneously adapt and evolve** while neither discounting nor wishing away the future reality of strife, conflict, and war.” (JCS, 2016)

content, *people* and *process*. They are: developmental, transitional and transformational - where each of them has some implications for *change leadership*²¹ and for *change strategy*.²²

Successful organisational transformation requires simultaneous attention to all three areas. The **content** is a synonym for *what* and it refers to the strategy, structure, systems, processes and technology. When compared to the elements of fighting power (Figure 4) this area encompasses the conceptual and physical component. The second area is **people**, which refers to the human dynamics and includes mind-set, commitment, engagement, communication, politics, resistance, emotions. This area, obviously, corresponds to the moral component of the fighting power. The third area, **process**, is a synonym for *how*, and relates to the way in which change is planned, designed, implemented and governed and course corrected.

While the concept described above is designed initially for civilian organisations, basically companies (businesses), it may be applied to the military organisation as well, taking into consideration its specifics.

4.3.1 Developmental Change

Developmental change is the least profound and “dramatic” among the three types of changes. It represents the improvements, generally incremental, of existing skills, methods, performance standards, or condition that for some reason does not satisfy current or future needs. These changes may be described as improvements “within the box”, as shown in Figure 1, of what is already known or practised. They represent adjustments and corrections that improve performance aiming at attaining new performance levels.




Figure 1. Developmental change

Source: Anderson and Ackerman-Anderson, 2010

There are two primary assumptions in developmental change: (1) people are capable of improving, and (2) they will improve if provided the appropriate reasons, resources, motivation, and training. When it comes to leadership requirements for this

²¹ “Change leadership is the ability to influence and enthuse others through personal advocacy, vision and drive, and to access resources to build a solid platform for change.” (Higgs and Rowland, 2000)

²² The change strategy is the strategy that shapes the organisational change - the change process leader is responsible for the overall change strategy. “A successful organization transformation requires a change strategy and process plan that organizes and integrates all of the change processes and the activities within them into a unified enterprise-wide process that moves the organization from where it is today to where it wants to be.” (Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2010, p. 7)

type of changes, they may use the existing goal - setting and reward systems to improve motivation and behaviour. In the military environment this type of changes is probably most visible on the tactical level (training, procedures etc.) or the staff work (business processes).

One of the findings listed in the RAND Corporation's report (Crowley et al., 2013) "Adapting the Army's Training and Leader Development (ATLD) Programs for Future Challenges" describes the current management processes in the U.S. Army as not conducive to major changes. Namely, the report concludes that the processes "were developed to sustain and make incremental improvements to successful, well-understood, and generally stable ATLD strategies." An important conclusion of the report was that "there are no systemic processes in place to integrate training and leader development strategies and programs for overall readiness benefit."

Using Andersons' typology, it can be said that the report points out that developmental (incremental) change, no matter how important, is not comprehensive enough to satisfy all the needs of an organisation coping with the complexity of security environment.

4.3.2 Transitional Change

Transitional change is more complex than developmental as it requires more significant shifts in order to succeed. This type of change begins when leaders recognise that something in the existing way of work needs to be changed or be created in such a way as to better serve current or future demands. This type of change encompasses a design of a more desirable future state that an organisation aims to achieve. It also assumes that the old way of operating will be dismantled and emotionally let go while the new state is being put in place.




Figure 2. Transitional change

Source: Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2010

Some examples of this kind of change are the reorganisation, restructuring (e.g. the Peace Establishment change), or installation or integration of new systems, processes, policies, doctrines, etc. These types of changes are similar to projects - they have a specific start date and end date, and a known outcome. People dynamics is more complex than in the developmental change and often requires from them to acquire new knowledge and change or develop new behaviour. However, there is no need to change their mind-set.

4.3.3 Transformational Change

“Transformation is a radical shift of strategy, structure, systems, processes or technology, so significant that it requires a shift of culture, behaviour, and mind-set to implement successfully and sustain over time” (Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2010, p. 60). In this type of change, the end state is not as certain as it is in the transitional change. The outcome of a change and the process to get there often emerge along the way, which makes the change process very non-linear, with numerous needs for course corrections and adjustments. Management of such an unpredictable and emergent process cannot be done in a traditional sense of the word - it can be, at best, facilitated.




Figure 3. Transformational change

Source: Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2010

The reason why the transformational change is so “fluid” is that, when the change begins, it is impossible to predict all aspects of local interactions and feedbacks, within the organisation and between the organisation and the environment. It does not mean, however, that the change process itself is chaotic and out of control, rather that it requires a clear roadmap²³ and constant adaptations.

The good example of an institutionalised military transformation process nowadays is NATO military transformation that encompasses transformation of national military capabilities²⁴. The concept of NATO transformation has some similarity to the

²³ Linda Ackerman Anderson and Dean Anderson explained their roadmap model thoroughly in their book “The Change Leader’s Roadmap”. (Ackerman Anderson and Anderson, 2010)

²⁴ NATO ACT - Allied Command Transformation. *What is transformation? An introduction to Allied Command Transformation*, 2015.

transformational change but is more focused on the capability development than mind-set and culture change. What is particularly similar between the two concepts is that both concepts deal with the continuous adaptation to a complex environment in order to avoid irrelevance and ineffectiveness, which symbolically means the death of the organisation.

Brigadier General David A. Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson (2004) are very clear when they define “competitiveness” in a strategic and operational environment:

“For the military, this notion of relentless competition has a special significance. Our ‘competitors’ are living, thinking, and adaptive adversaries who mean to destroy us and the society we defend. Our choice is quite clear: ‘Adapt or Die.’ Failure does not mean Chapter 11 and an updated resume. Failure means death and destruction for ourselves, our comrades, and all that we cherish.”

NATO transformation represents essentially a continuous and proactive process, without a defined end state, by which forces adapt to the rapidly changing security environment to ensure that they are fully capable of meeting upcoming challenges with the equipment and training that is needed, at a price that can be collectively afforded. The most important link between the two is a notion of the extent of change. According to Roger Forder (2010), “a defence transformation is a major change in a nation’s or alliance’s defence posture that substantially affects all or most defence lines of development.”

For a military organisation it is of utmost importance to be able to hear “the wake-up call” (see Figure 3.) and undergo appropriate changes. In coping with the complex security environment national defence, in general, and military organisations, in particular, have to be prepared to expect surprise and to reduce uncertainty. They should “collect signals, detect patterns of change, and imagine plausible outcomes - and take actions to minimize undesirable ones” (Reeves et al., 2016). The better military organisation is in this process, the less profound change will be necessary to eventually re-emerge in relevance and capability.

One example that illustrates the inability to hear *the wake-up call* is the French defeat in 1940. Elizabeth Kier (1996) scrutinises the French defeat through the cultural impact on the French military doctrine which, in the 1930s, was defensive, reduced spontaneity to a minimum, tightly centralised control over operations and did not allow initiative and flexibility. At the same time, the French army had the (functional) need for a different type of doctrine, the money, the ideas and freedom from civilian ideas.

Radical change in content requires a change in human awareness, mind-set and culture²⁵. The transformation effort is therefore immensely challenging, requiring constant attention, a shared commitment to embrace change and a willingness to accept risk. Transformational change, obviously, would not be so desirable for the military since it seems hard to control and manage.

Since the military transformation includes radical changes, it consequently requires a balanced approach to short, medium and long-term planning, which is not always

²⁵ “Culture is the mindset of an organization, the pattern of widely shared assumptions (often unconscious), beliefs and values that form the basis of people’s ways of being, relating and working, and the organization’s interaction with its environment and its success in it. Organizational culture is also a force in itself. It creates a context and ‘gravitational pull’ that exerts a force on individual mindset, behavior, performance and outcomes, influencing the teams, relationships, and individuals that are touched by it.” Source: Being First Inc. *Culture*. 4Sight Participant Manual Session 4, May 2013, p. 11.

easy to achieve when there are often more immediate and visible challenges, creating a natural inclination to commit resources to the present rather than the future.

5. MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The main role of military leadership has traditionally been perceived as inextricably linked with the military core business, which is warfighting. Along with the evolution of human societies,²⁶ science and technology as well as the appearance of new trends that shape security environment - the role of military leadership has expanded. Strategic military leadership is more and more responsible not only for engagement of armed forces in the most effective way but also to ensure armed forces are fully capable of executing their missions and tasks. This kind of organisational capability includes preparations for unknown and unforeseen and, therefore, requires from military organisation increasing its resilience, adaptive ability and innovativeness.

The type of military leadership that is capable of perceiving challenges and opportunities in the strategic and operational environment, understands the need for change in the military organisation and is able to lead the process of transformational change may be called the transformational military leader. To be more illustrative, whilst accepting the high level of simplification, it may be said that, comparing to the traditional role of military leadership, which is basically designed to “manage the violence”, i.e. to destroy the enemy - transformational leadership, basically, develops and builds, i.e. transforms its own organisation.

5.1 Operational Leadership

Since the warfighting is the core business of any military, the possession of warfighting abilities is critically important for tactical and operational leaders. Generally, the notion of military leadership is associated with organizing and leading people in a battle (harm's way) and is crucial to the moral component of fighting power (Figure 4).

The traditional approach to the definition of military leadership is a very tactical and operational level-focused. Liddell Hart (1998) claims that “a commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination when required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and keep a cool head in applying it.”

Milan Vego (2015) claims that the quality of one's leadership cannot be quantified in any meaningful way as it is essentially intangible.²⁷ Nevertheless, military leadership is

²⁶ The postmodernism is one of the paradigm of the contemporaneous world.

²⁷ However, Vego describes personality traits of commanders at any echelon as those comprising “strong character, personal integrity, high intellect, sound judgment, courage, boldness, creativity, presence of mind, healthy ambition, humility, mental flexibility, foresight, mental agility, decisiveness, understanding of human nature, and the ability to communicate ideas clearly and succinctly.”

usually defined as the art of influencing others and environments directly and indirectly and as the skill of creating conditions for sustained organisational success to achieve desired results.




Figure 4. Components of fighting power

Source: DCDC, 2014, p. 25

This article, however, analyses requirements for leadership that encompass all three components and influences, affects and decides on all of them.

Samuel Huntington (1998, p. 11) describes the social role of leadership, which remains separate from the political system and focuses on developing expertise in the profession of arms, the body of knowledge embodying the “management of violence”. Military leaders are viewed as invested only with the authority to exercise the state’s monopoly on violence and, in doing so, strictly controlled by politics, whereas other aspects of military leadership are given less attention.

Nevertheless, the human factor remains to be the key element in analysing the situation at any level of war, especially at the strategic and operational levels, that are, as Vego (2009) argues, “those levels at which a war is won or lost.” The fact is that the higher the level of war, the more complex the interactions are among various intangible elements.

The challenges relevant to the strategic levels of military leadership, being it a war, crises or more or less imminent threats, certainly require different, more comprehensive set of responses and actions than those at tactical and operational levels of leadership. Whilst the lower levels of military leadership have to be able, primarily, to embody warfighting abilities and ensure a moral cohesion of their units, according to existing strategy, those at the strategic level have to be able to create the strategy and lead the whole organisation towards achieving strategic ends.

5.2 Transformational Leadership

While operational leadership is essential for the military to be able to achieve national political objectives effectively, another type of leadership is required to maximise its fighting power and efficiency. This type of leadership is the transformational leadership, and it should be the one that can lead the whole

organisation through the change, particularly transformational change. Referencing Figure 4, transformational military leadership should be able to lead the change in all three components that constitutes military/fighting power simultaneously. Simply said, the operational leadership is designed to fight the enemy or to engage the military in executing tasks in the whole spectrum of missions.²⁸ On the other hand, the transformational leadership should be able to prepare the organisation, which arguably includes the organisational change, to be able to maximise its power, i.e. its capabilities. Transformational military leadership should be able to do the best with available and given resources and transform them into effective warfighting and/or support capability. Thus, the military effectiveness becomes the outcome of the resources provided to the military (Tellis et al., 2000).

The term “transformational leadership”, was first coined by James Victor Downton (1973), and, as a concept, was further developed by James MacGregor Burns. Burns introduced the concept of transforming leadership in 1978, in his descriptive research on political leaders. According to Burns (1978), transforming leadership is a process in which “leaders and followers help each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation”. Another researcher, Bernard M. Bass (1985), extended the work of Burns by explaining the psychological mechanisms that underlie transforming and transactional leadership. Bass (1990) used the term “transformational” instead of “transforming” and added to the Burns' initial concepts by helping to explain how transformational leadership could be measured, as well as how it impacts follower motivation and performance. According to Bass, transformational leadership contains four components: charisma or idealised influence (attributed or behavioural), inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration. Bass puts a strong emphasis on charisma and high moral standards of transformational leadership and therefore leadership behaviour.

Theoretical and empirical developments in the leadership literature related to transformational leadership concept appeared more extensively in the 1990s. The concept was later used in different contexts and served as a source of inspiration for other concepts. It also evolved into the concept of authentic leadership development. Namely, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) as well as Avolio and Gardner (2005) distinguished authentic transformational leaders, who persuade others on the merits of the issues, from pseudo-transformational leaders, who set and control agenda to manipulate the values of importance to followers often at the expense of others or even cause harm to them. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) describe transformational leadership as “predicated upon the inner dynamics of a freely embraced change of heart in the realm of core values and motivation, upon open-ended intellectual stimulation and a commitment to treating people as ends, not mere means.”

According to Avolio et al. (2009, p. 423) transformational leadership involves “leader behaviours that transform and inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization”. The central premise of Avolio and Gardner (2005) is that through increased self-awareness, self-regulation, and positive modelling, authentic leaders foster the development of authenticity in followers. In turn, followers' authenticity contributes to their well-being and the

²⁸ Military missions include peacetime and short of war operations as well. See an example of the spectrum of conflicts at: VEGO, Milan. *On Naval Power*. Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 50, 3rd quarter 2008.

attainment of sustainable and veritable performance.

Obviously, there are some similarities between the traditional notion of military leadership and transformational leadership - they both articulate leadership as a means of influencing others. The fundamental difference is that the transformational leadership comprises a capacity of influencing people to change, in terms of core values and motivation. These two types of leadership are also useful in different circumstances. Traditional military leadership functions in the realm of survivability (individual or national) or ethno-centric domain of protecting national interests. Transformational leadership aims to mobilise inner human forces for the good of the organisation in a more creative way. Another difference is that, in terms of military leadership, people (troops) are means to achieve ends (tactical, operational, strategic or political, which by the way may include people, i.e. population). Transformational leadership is committed to treating people as ends and is consequently more suitable for application in an internal organisational change that will improve inner capacity (communication, distribution of information and knowledge, etc.) of an organisation.²⁹ This type of leadership is, therefore, specific in the way it tends to build the capacity for change in subordinates and does not rely exclusively on the authority of the ranks. In that way transformational leadership is very close to the idea of leading through maximization of human potential.

Transformational leadership capacity, as explained above, is primarily understood in terms of a relation between the leaders and those who are led. An essential factor in defining the leadership is, therefore, the relation of power i.e. how the power is executed and eventually distributed. William Torbert (2010) introduced the meaning of power³⁰ into the concept of Transforming Leadership. According to him, leaders must be able to exercise four different types of power: “unilateral power”, “diplomatic power”, “logistical power”, and “transforming power”. Most importantly, Torbert argued that these must be blended differently at different times, with different people, if leaders are to succeed in cultivating growth and transformation among individual organisational members and in **overall organisational strategies, structures and systems**. This is particularly important for a military organisation where the relation of power is, traditionally, unilateral - directed from superior towards subordinated. Torbert’s approach, therefore, does not require a total change in the military leaders’ behaviour and organisational culture but a proper application of power.

The power executed by leaders in a transformation process has to be different. David Rooke and William Torbert (1998) claim that:

“The key paradox of transformational praxis - that developmental theory highlights and that the action inquiry approach to practice enacts - is that no kind of power (coercive, referent, legitimate, or expert) can generate personal or organizational transformation when it is exercised unilaterally. Only power exercised in a mutuality-enhancing, awareness-enhancing, empowering manner can generate wholehearted transformation.”

Obviously, the transformational change process requires leaders who are, first of all,

²⁹ This type of change may be suitable, for example, for raising the level of maturity of an organisation. See Alberts et al., 2010.

³⁰ Note that, in the originally published document, in 1991, the author used the John P. French and Bertram Raven’s Six bases of power typology. See, for example: RAVEN, Bertram H. *The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence*. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 8(1), 2008, pp. 1-22.

able to see the need for change (i.e. hear “the wake-up call”) capable and willing to undertake it. A successful transformation must be a conscious, well-planned effort, prepared as a roadmap. Linda Ackerman Anderson and Dean Anderson (2010, p. 34) created comprehensive and generic change leaders roadmap model that may be used as a basis for any organisational transformation. It basically represents a life cycle model of a change process consisted of following phases: preparing the ground to lead the change, envisioning the organisational objectives and creating commitment and capability, planning and organising implementation, implementing the change and course correcting, if necessary.

6. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Spain et al. (2015) proposed that U.S. Army should raise the profile of its human capital³¹ and the culture that empowers it. The authors recommended that “the Army critically examine and potentially change the manner in which it accesses, develops, selects, and sets the culture for future leaders. Doing so is especially important in order to foster officers’ conceptual abilities.” Both the need to foster officers’ *conceptual abilities*, seen as an ambition in the U.S. military education system, and the character, as seen in some European countries (e.g. Norway Military Academy), suggest that the traditional model of military education does not adequately develop military leaders for the challenges of the current and future strategic and operational environment.

Leaders who can prepare and lead organisations to adequately responding to challenges of the complex environment are those who can deal with constant ambiguity, notice the key patterns, and look at the world through multiple stakeholder perspectives. The question is: how to develop military leaders able to respond to complex challenges? The author adopts the approach that argues that there are really only two types of leadership development: horizontal and vertical.




Figure 5. Horizontal and Vertical Development

Source: Anderson and Ackerman-Anderson, 2010

³¹ Spain et al. (2015) defined an organization’s intellectual human capital as “the sum of conceptual assets of its people and represents the organization’s potential to create value.”

Horizontal development is oriented toward learning and refers to acquiring new knowledge or learning new behaviours, skills and methods. Most of learning, training and development is oriented towards expanding, deepening, and enriching a person's current way of meaning-making. It's like filling a bowl to its maximal capacity. In horizontal development, however, one's worldview and mental models remain the same.

Vertical development describes a sequence of how worldviews and mental models advance over time. Vertical development is the essence of personal growth, and is always driven by a fundamental expansion of mind-set and worldview. The main difference between the horizontal and vertical development is that the former is skills-based leadership development whilst the latter is capacity-based development. The vast majority of leadership development work today focuses on horizontal development.

6.1 Developmental Theories

To properly understand the concept of vertical development it is necessary to enlighten the model upon which the concept has been built. Namely, while the concept of horizontal development is well known and institutionalised through different levels and degrees of formal education - the ways and means of assessment of the current and measurement of the achieved level of vertical development are less known. There are several prominent scholars who articulated and described stages of vertical development in the framework of developmental theory, among others: Robert Kegan, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik H. Erikson, Jane Loevinger, William Torbert, Susanne Cook-Greuter.

Developmental theories provide a way of understanding how people tend to interpret events, and therefore how they are likely to act in a certain situation. However, the level from which a person operates is not fixed. People may use several perspectives throughout the day but they tend to respond spontaneously with the most complex meaning-making system, perspective, or mental model they have mastered. This preferred perspective is called a person's "centre of gravity" or their "central tendency" in meaning-making (Cook-Greuter, 2004), or "action logic" (Rooke and Torbert, 2005).

Most developmental theorists agree that what differentiates leaders is not so much their philosophy of leadership, their personality or their style of management but their internal "action logic". The action logic is the way people interpret their surroundings and react when their power or safety is challenged.

The action-logic levels are presented in Table 1, from the least (at the bottom) to the most complex (at the top) meaning-making system levels.³² However, there is nothing inherently "better" about being at a higher level of development as every level mastered embraces levels below. This theory does not promote any kind of prestige.

³² Another, more comprehensive, list may be found in Barret Brown's (2012) article. The article describes (in Table 1) "The eight most prevalent action logics amongst US adults, framed for sustainability leadership."

Table 1: Action-logic of the Leadership Maturity Framework - LMF

	Action-Logic	Qualities & Capacities	Strengths
Post - Conventional	Alchemist	Generates social transformations; simultaneous focus on short and long term; global perspective; aware of paradox	Creates learning organizations; leaders of society-wide transformations
	Strategist	Fosters organizational and personal transformations Understands interdependencies among systems and can perceive systemic patterns; adaptive in multiple & overlapping social systems; leaders with “fierce resolve & humility”; knows his/her strengths yet acknowledges vulnerabilities; deep appreciation for human differences in capacity and development	Effective as transformational leader; brings strategic orientation to complex initiatives
	Pluralist / Individualist	Explores assumptions & cultural conditioning of his/her socialization process Recognizes multiplicity of possible meanings & interpretations of events Strives to integrate personal & organizational values & goals	Effective in consulting & entrepreneurial ventures
Conventional	Achiever	Achieves strategic goals through teams; interested in self-improvement through feedback & introspection; future-oriented; comfortable in logical world of linear causality	Action & goal-oriented; well suited to managerial role
	Expert	Values expertise & logic; seeks rational efficiency	Productive as individual contributor
	Diplomat	Loyal; respects existing norms; avoids overt conflict	Helps create harmony in working groups
	Opportunist	Focus on winning at any price; manipulative; focus on self-survival	Good in sales opportunities and emergencies; performs well in the short-term

Source: adapted from Cook-Greuter, 2004; Rooke and Torbert, 2005

Regarding the military organisation, the tactical and operational imperatives that drive military leaders early in their careers and, to some extent, senior leaders in theatre combat operations and campaigns, do not require from them to possess or master post-conventional perspective. The very nature of “mastering the violence” is, at best, the level of an expert or an achiever.

When it comes to the leadership at the strategic level things are different. The research findings clearly demonstrate that the later stage vertical development leads to greater success in leading transformation which is the common denominator of the ten percent of successful change leaders. Conscious change leaders understand that their next stage of development will provide greater perspective and enable them to perceive, understand, and respond to the dynamic challenges of transformation more effectively (Anderson and Ackerman Anderson, 2010, p. 60).

William Torbert’s published³³ the results of an empirical study which examined the proposition, derived from the developmental theory, that only persons who transform to the Strategist action-logic or beyond, reach the capacity to reliably support organisational transformation.

“This is so because only at these late action-logics do people regularly (and more and more intensively) inquire about and transform their own action for greater efficacy, and also because only at late action-logics do people seek to exercise shared commitment-enhancing, mutually-transforming powers, not just unilaterally-forcing types of power that gradually erode others’ trust and commitment.” (Torbert, 2013)

An interesting fact related to this study is that not only the action logics of CEOs were examined but also the action logic of the lead consultants’. The study confirms that the higher the combined CEO/Lead-Consultant action-logic score, the more successful was the transformation.

William Torbert (2004) offers a method that leaders in organisations of all types can use to increase the timeliness and effectiveness of their actions - the action inquiry. Action inquiry is a lifelong process of transformational learning that individuals, teams, and whole organisations can undertake, if they wish to become, among other goals, increasingly capable of performing in effective, transformational, and sustainable ways.³⁴

Torbert and Taylor (2008) suggested “that action inquiry is a practice and as such is as much a voluntary, subjective, aesthetic choice and a mutual, inter-subjective, ethical commitment as it is an intergenerationally-sustainable, objective, epistemological science.” This fact suggests that the action inquiry is more an art than a science.

6.2 The Concept of Vertical Leadership Development

Vertical development is often referred to as “ego development” and describes how a person’s internal “meaning-making system” develops across levels or stages. Each new level contains the previous one, but in the next stage, awareness both expands and deepens to take in greater perspectives of wholeness and integration. In vertical

³³ “A Quantitative, Third-Person Study of Organizational Transformation in Ten Cases”. This study was first published in clinical case detail in 1995, by Fisher and Torbert, then with statistical results by Rooke and Torbert, in 1998, and most recently with an expanded analysis, including new clinical and the quantitative results in Torbert & Associates, in 2004.

³⁴ William Torbert’s web pages, available at: <http://www.williamrtorbert.com/action-inquiry/>

development, the adult's perspective on things like their purpose of life, values, needs and goals, changes and evolves.

Vertical development, in general, refers to supporting people to transform their current way of making sense toward broader perspectives. In terms of leadership, the stage from which a person thinks and acts matters a lot. Nick Petrie (2014, p. 8) observes that "to be effective, the leader's thinking must be equal or superior to the complexity of the environment."

Susanne Cook-Greuter (2004) explains the vertical development as the approach that allows us to learn to see the world from an objective perspective, change our interpretations of experience and transform our views of reality. "It describes increases in what we are aware of, or what we can pay attention to, and therefore what we can influence and integrate." The most importantly, the vertical development, through "transformations of human consciousness or changes in our view of reality, is more powerful than any amount of horizontal growth and learning." The vertical development is, therefore, tightly related with what developmental theorists call the "ego development".

Manners and Durkin (2001) provided a critical review of the validity of the theory of ego³⁵ development, integrating different researches, presented the growth and validity in several domains: cognitive functioning, personal & interpersonal awareness, understanding of emotions, accurate empathy, character development, intelligence and few others.

An example of the vertical leadership training and development courses may be found at the Being First Inc., a U.S. company with long term experience in educating, mostly civilian, change leaders³⁶. Some of the outcomes of the vertical leadership development, in their program, include abilities: to detect inter-dependencies and connections across boundaries to identify distant inputs and impacts; to differentiate progressively larger contexts of influence, further into the future, perceiving delayed impacts and the inter-dependencies of past and future events; and to predict emerging trends more effectively. Besides that, their program deepens insight into human dynamics (a deeper interior dynamics of emotions, mindsets, beliefs, assumptions and values), not only of people a leader works with but also his own.

When compared to the standard military education, the concept of vertical development is rarely, if at all, seen in curricula. NATO, for instance, describes education as "the systematic instruction of individuals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge and skills, and develop competencies, and support lifelong personal development."³⁷ Being a national responsibility in NATO, education is more or less defined in a similar way in most of the NATO members. This definition, however, highlights its "horizontal" or "lateral" direction of development. The "vertical"

³⁵ "The ego is a holistic construct representing the fundamental structural unity of personality organization. It involves both the person's integrative processes in dealing with diverse intrapersonal and interpersonal experiences, as well as the consequent frame of reference that is subjectively imposed on those life experiences to create meaning." Authors used Jane Loevinger's definition.

³⁶ Being First Inc. *Vertical development* [online]. Being First Inc. © 2016 [cit. 2016-05-01]. Available at: <http://www.beingfirst.com/vertical-development/>

³⁷ NATO Bi-SC 75-7 Education and Individual Training Directive (E&ITD), March 2013. Available at: http://www.difesa.it/SMD_EntiMI/ScuolaNBC/Documents/controlloQualita/NATO_BI_SC_%20075_007_2013.pdf

dimension is usually considered as a side effect or a natural, expected, outcome. Vertical development, however, refers to supporting people to transform their current way of making sense towards broader perspectives. It, therefore, has to be carefully designed and attractive to people. Finally, horizontal and vertical development should be seen as two sides of the same coin, each of them serving a specific purpose.

6.3 Professional Military Education and Military Leadership Development

Most military officers receive their post-commissioned education through the system of professional military education. The most important levels of the professional military education for the strategic military leaders are joint command and staff level, and, particularly, war college level of education, including national defence university level.

In USA, for example, definition of outcomes of war colleges is of such importance that they are concern of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the U.S. Congress. General Martin Dempsey, former U.S. CJCS, prescribed “intellectual agility”, in terms of expected outcomes of War Colleges. According to the U.S. Department of the Army’s (2013) “Army Leader Development Strategy 2013”, Army officers must have the intellectual agility not only to survive, but to thrive in an increasingly complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly changing, and transparent operating environment, characterised by security challenges that cross borders. The document puts a focus on intellect and moral character of leaders to improve judgment and reasoning and hone the habits of the mind: agility, adaptability, empathy, intellectual curiosity, and creativity.

In reality, though new concepts of military leaders development are promising, whether they are focused on “the intellectual ability and moral character” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013), “the conceptual ability” (Spain et al., 2015), “the cognitive ability” (Pearce, 2009) or “the character and intellect” (Boe et al., 2015; Boe, 2015), they all still struggle with questions on how to define, assess and measure the main elements of concepts. Don Snider (2011), argues that the USMA West Point's mission to educate “commissioned leaders of character”, articulated in a doctrine, “is almost silent on how such an element of character is ‘embodied’-developed and sustained.” The Norwegian concept (Boe, 2015) also emphasises the need of undertaking an independent project, “intended to provide valuable knowledge on what character means, how it is developed, and which personalities are amenable.”

Arguably, attributes on which the new leaders’ development concepts are focused are an integral part of the vertical leadership development. Manners and Durkin (2001) in their study quoted Jane Loevinger’s description of ego development, which encompasses four domains, as representative and inextricably interwoven aspects of the ego: character development, cognitive style, interpersonal style, and conscious preoccupations.

While these attributes may be possessed by some people, others have to develop them. Conventional education, based on the horizontal development, can hardly do that, especially if it is additionally constrained by the bureaucracy and cultural rigidity.

Implementation of the vertical leadership development in formal curricula would be a great leap in enriching the military leader’s capabilities. This kind of development is particularly important for the joint staff and war college levels of military education.

It may be overly ambitious to expect advancements at higher levels of action logic

(i.e. post-conventional) as a result of the inclusion of the vertical leadership development into the curricula of the bachelor degree level of the study. On the other hand, it is certainly a good period to work with young people in directing them to advance in conventional stages. One study performed by Bartone et al. (2007) in the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, launched in 1994, showed that the college students were generally functioning at an earlier developmental level than previously assumed. It was nevertheless clear from these findings that significant psychosocial growth did occur during the college years for many of them. “Of these West Point cadets followed over time, 47% evidenced a significant increase in developmental level across two time points. For this college age group, psychosocial growth (in Kegan’s terms) mainly involves the transition from a stage 2 ‘Imperial-individualistic’ to a stage 3 ‘Interpersonal-social’ mode of constructing and making sense of experience. Few students in the present sample showed any evidence of stage 4 ‘autonomous’ thinking.” A comparison of stages according to Robert Kegan and stages according to William Torbert (Table 1) may be seen in the Table 2.

Table 2: Summary of Kegan’s developmental stages, and comparison to Torbert’s stages in developmental theory

Kegan	Stage 0 Incorporative (birth~2)	Stage 1 Impulsive (2~6)	Stage 2 Imperial (6~15)	Stage 3 Interpersonal (15~24)	Stage 4 Institutional (24~40)	Stage 5 Interindividual (40 +)
Torbert		Impulsive	Opportunist	Diplomat	Achiever	Strategist and alchemist

Source: own, adapted from Bartone et al., 2007

The results of the study show advancements of the USMA’s students but the fact is that those advancements happen as a side-effect of the traditional curricula aligned with individual maturity process. This is to say that the results might have been even better if the vertical development was more consciously and systemically implemented.

Since military leadership development begins with the formal education, schools, colleges and universities are currently the most important environment in which the necessary theoretical knowledge may be transferred and leadership made qualified for coping with the challenges of the “real life”. As long as the vertical development programs are not implemented in curricula, this kind of development may be practised as a specialised course with the competent organisations and institutions in the private sector or academia.

Professional military education should ensure that leadership should not be considered as a universal construct but rather be approached as a multi-layered, adaptive process. Introduction of vertical development in curricula may ensure adequate support for leader development according to achieved stages of ego development.

CONCLUSION

This article describes a broad context in which the contemporary and the near future military leadership will work and cope with the strategic and operational challenges. The author, however, has neither tried to predict threats nor to provide identified or emerging challenges for which military leaders will have to prepare their organisations. Rather, instead of describing symptoms, the author emphasises the most fundamental characteristic of the contemporaneous security environment, which is its complexity.

The complexity, being described as a generic challenge, requires from any organisation, any system willing to survive in it, ability to adapt, which implies undergoing the change. The author adopted the approach that describes the three fundamental types of change, requiring less or more radical change of some formal elements of the organisation. Even more, as the environment constantly changes, the organisation should do the same, in order to adapt. This continuous process of adaptation of capabilities is already known in Western militaries as transformation. Transformation in the military, however, should be understood as a much broader process, sometimes incorporating a more radical aspect of change, including the organisational culture.

This imperative of continuous change through adaptation sets new requirements for military leadership and military organisation. However, the traditional military culture does not provide the appropriate ground for profound changes. The culture, therefore, has to be considered along with the existing military transformation, which is currently mainly focused on long-term capability development.

The type of leadership able to embrace all these requirements and lead the people and military organisation through the change, particularly transformational, is called a transformational military leader.

This article is primarily focused on the highest (strategic) military leadership levels but refers indirectly to lower levels as well, since the bottom of the chain of the command's hierarchy pyramid represents the pool of the future highest military leaders.

The author argues that military leadership should not be generically defined as a universal construct but rather be considered a multi-layered, adaptive process. It encompasses different levels of execution (tactical, operational and strategic) as well as different areas of leading (military missions and tasks, and defence management). Most importantly, in the domain of development of military leaders, vertical leadership development has to be involved in the programs of professional military education.

The vertical leadership development provides a model, a tool, to an organisation, to develop leaders capable of strategizing and conceptualising, leading people and supervise the change process, leaders with desired character, capable of leading organisational transformation, in other words, transformational military leaders.

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Peer-Reviewed Article

Problém “černého pasažérství” v Alianci

Free-Riding Problem in Alliance

Jakub Odehnal

Abstrakt: Dlouhodobé snižování vojenských výdajů evropských aliančních zemí zapříčinilo rozevírání nůžek uvnitř Aliance projevující se nerovnoměrným sdílením vojenského břemene a chováním označovaným jako tzv. černé pasažérství. Cílem příspěvku je vymezit možné přístupy k identifikaci tzv. černého pasažérství a analyzovat vývoj vojenských výdajů ve vazbě na závěry a doporučení summitu NATO z roku 2014. Výsledky analýzy vojenských výdajů identifikují jen velmi malou skupinu zemí dlouhodobě plnících alianční doporučení ve formě alokace odpovídající částky jako podílu na HDP země a ve formě doporučené struktury vojenských výdajů.

Abstract: Long-term cuts in military expenditures of European allied countries caused growing differences within the Alliance which can be seen in uneven sharing of military burden and in behaviour called free-riding. The aim of this contribution is to define possible approaches to the free-riding identification and to analyse military expenditure development in relation to conclusions and recommendations declared at the NATO Summit in 2014. The results of military expenditure analysis identify only a small group of countries which, from a long-term point of view, follow the recommendations of the Alliance in the form of allocating a corresponding amount as percentage of GDP and in the form of a recommended structure of military expenditures.

Klíčová slova: vojenské výdaje; obranný rozpočet; černý pasažér

Keywords: Military Expenditures; Defence Budget; Free Rider

INTRODUCTION

The conclusions presented at the NATO Summit in Wales confirm that the European allied countries are supposed to be responsible for their own security in the form of a wide consensus in gradual increase of military expenditures. Current changes in security environment of many European countries, which in the post-cold war time were not threatened by traditional military power and naturally existed in an illusional environment of a long-term peace time, enhanced pressure on increasing military expenditures due to the current security crisis. Unfortunately, military expenditures used to be systematically undervalued by many, especially, European countries in the long run. Apart from the perception of real security threats, the decreasing trend of military expenditures of allied countries was caused by difficult economic situation of the countries, economic systems which had to face consequences of economic and especially fiscal crisis. Different development of determinants which influence the amount of military expenditures in individual countries causes uneven sharing of military burden of allied countries' economies, which can be seen in deepening differences within the Alliance and in behaviour which is in the economic theory called free-riding.

ECONOMIC THEORY OF FREE-RIDING IN NATO

In spite of the fact that military expenditures of the Alliance member countries represent the majority of world military expenditures, it is important not to believe blindly in safe Europe, and, via responsible defence policy provide sustainability and development of allied forces. Military expenditures of allied countries were and currently are constantly influenced by economic¹ and security environment development² resulting in fiscal and security risks.


By comparing the absolute values of the amounts of military expenditures of Alliance member countries in the time after the terrorist attacks in the USA, there can be seen apparent dominance of military expenditures of the USA shown in Graph 1. It describes proportional share of military expenditures of the USA in the total military expenditures of the Alliance. The dominant position of the USA can also be seen in mutual comparison of the amount of military expenditures as a share in GDP of the country identifying only a small group of the Alliance countries (Greece, Great Britain, and the USA) which spend (in the long run) the required amount of military expenditures in the form of political obligation, i.e. 2% of GDP, to provide security.

The cause of the long-term undervaluation process in the field of defence, in relation to the Alliance's recommendations, that can be seen in uneven sharing of military expenditures, results from the nature of defence itself as the so called public good³.

¹ NIKOLAIDOU, Eftychia. The demand for military expenditure: evidence from the EU15 (1961–2005). *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 21, No. 3, 2008, pp. 273–292.

² DUNNE, J. Paul, Eftychia NIKOLAIDOU, and Nikolaos MYLONIDIS. The demand for military spending in the peripheral economies of Europe. *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 14, No. 6, 2003, pp. 447–460.

³ SANDLER, Todd and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297–327.



Graph 1: Defence expenditures (million US dollars, constant prices)

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015⁴

In economic theory, the existence of a public good is connected with market failure. Providing a public good such as e.g. the defence, is one of the functions of fiscal policy implemented by a government of a given country. In order to secure the country from both possible military and non-military threats, finances called military expenditures⁵ are used under the terms of the process of allocating sources from the state budget.

The current concept of a public good coming from the typology published by Samuelson⁶ represents classification of a public good based on the general characteristics, i.e. they are so called non-excludable and non-rival. Via these characteristics, it is possible to create a classification for a private good, which is characterised by its excludability and rival consumption, and for a public good, characteristics of which is that it is not possible to exclude anyone from its consumption. At the same time, it is true that a growing number of consumers does not decrease the ability of other consumers to consume the good. Hampl⁷ critically points out a lot of hidden problems included in the approach of Samuelson's theory⁸, when, e.g. he disproves the absolute non-rival ability of the defence. As an example he takes the army which, due to its war time activities, gains new territories as an example of war booty together with the growing number of population. Without

⁴ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015, <http://milexdata.sipri.org>

⁵ The SIPRI definition of military expenditure includes all current and capital expenditure on the following activities: the armed forces (including peace-keeping forces), the civil administrations of the military sector (defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence activities), paramilitary forces (non-regular armed forces to be trained, equipped and available for military operations) and military space activities. Such expenditure should include the following components: personnel, operations and maintenance, arms procurement, military research and development (R&D), military construction, and military aid.

⁶ SAMUELSON, Paul. *The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure*. Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI, 1954, pp. 387-389.

⁷ HAMPL, Mojmír. Trojí přístup k veřejným statkům. Finance a úvěr. 51(2), 2001, 111-125.

⁸ SAMUELSON, Paul. *The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure*. Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI, 1954, pp. 387-389.

additional expenditures, the army will not be able to defend the new inhabitants due to the number of soldiers, vehicles and equipment (which was planned for the original size of the territory) and the number of population. Similarly, Murdoch and Sandler⁹ consider the characteristics of defence to be rather a mixed good.

If we consider the collective defence, provided by e.g. the military NATO Alliance consisting of 28 member countries, to be purely a public good, the expected utility for individual members have to, according to Samuelson¹⁰, be non-rival and non-excludable. An example of a non-rival character of the NATO collective defence was the policy of intimidation executed via strategic nuclear weapons located in the Alliance member countries. The weapons were able to intimidate the adversary regardless of the number of member countries or the number of inhabitants. Non-excludability of the utility comes from the Alliance collective defence characteristics when any attack launched against the Alliance members is perceived as an attack against the whole Alliance. The Alliance is, then, obliged to protect the member countries. It is not possible to exclude any member country from the defence. According to Murdoch and Sandler¹¹, the collective defence provided as a public good, which relies on the policy of intimidation, necessarily leads to uneven sharing of military burden among the Alliance members, which is disadvantageous for big member countries. This leads to the behaviour called free-riding¹².

At the same time, authors Murdoch and Sandler¹³ point out the fact that the defence can appear in the form of a mixed good or a private good. The mixed good can be in the form of a good, nature of which is characterised either by excludability from the utility consumption or by rivalry. In case of excludability from the utility consumption coming from the joint collective defence, it is possible to use the example given by Murdoch and Sandler¹⁴ who describe the behaviour of conventional allied troops guarding the boundary line of a perimeter at a certain territory of the Alliance. The decision to guard this territory partially excluded the ally, at grounds of which the troops were not deployed, from consuming the utility. At the same time, it is even possible to illustrate a potential rivalry in consumption, when the joint allied troops, guarding the borders between the member and non-member states of the Alliance, significantly enhance the hazard of vulnerability of the non-guarded territory of the Alliance. The result is the existence of rivalry in consumption. The private good that is utilized for a particular country of the Alliance but not for the Alliance as a whole is, for example, the effort of Great Britain during the process of terrorist activities elimination in Northern Ireland, or during the Falklands War, where Great Britain was the only

⁹ SANDLER, Todd and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

¹⁰ SAMUELSON, Paul. Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation. In: Margolis, J. D. Guitton, H. (eds.): *Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their Relations to the Private Sector*. London, Macmillan, 1969.

¹¹ SANDLER, Todd and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

¹² OLSON, Mancur, and Richard ZECKHAUSER. *An economic theory of alliances*. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1966, pp. 266-279.

¹³ SANDLER, Todd and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

¹⁴ SANDLER, Todd, and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

country which profited from it. Similar example of defence as a private good can be seen in the behaviour of Turkey and Greece in their cause of the long-term dispute over Cyprus.

From the general classification of the public/private good point of view, it is possible to consider the Alliance defence to be purely a public good in the era of Cold War, when the strategic conception of Forward Defence and severe multinational retaliation using the U.S. nuclear weapons to protect all member countries was realized. Combination of defence production as both a private and public good can be labelled as defence in the form of a mixed good, mostly used by NATO in the 70's, in connection with the concept of the so called Flexible Response leading to enhancing the significance and putting into practice conventional weapon systems under the terms of providing defence to NATO member countries. In the current concept of NATO, it is characterised as a sort of a club good; however, it is still possible to observe inhomogeneity in the willingness of individual member countries to finance this good (as a result coming from the existence of real non-excludability), which is mainly seen in the long-term undervaluing of the allied troops. This lies in continuous non-fulfilment of recommended values of the amount of military expenditures as a share on GDP, or in a recommended structure of spending the military expenditures.

MEASUREMENTS OF FREE-RIDING (EMPIRICAL ANALYSES)

According to a general definition used by authors¹⁵, the free-riding can be defined as behaviour of a member country which gains more utility from the membership than the money it spends on the matter of defence. From a general point of view, possible approaches toward the free-riding identification within the Alliance can be defined as follows:

- [1] Approaches coming from utility and expenditures quantification (see general definition of free-riding);
- [2] Approaches coming from analysis of the relationship between military expenditures and economic power of a country (so called hypothesis of exploitation);
- [3] Approaches coming from the estimate of military expenditures demand;
- [4] Alternative approaches toward free-riding identification.

Approaches coming from the utility and expenditures analysis¹⁶ were addressed by the authors¹⁷ analysing the behaviour of 27 member countries of the Alliance in 2007-

¹⁵ JANELIŪNAS Tomas and Martynas ZAPOLSKIS. Lithuania as a Rational Free Rider in NATO. In Robert Czulda, Marek Madej. *NEWCOMERS NO MORE? Contemporary NATO and the Future of the Enlargement from the Perspective of "Post-Cold War" Members*. 1. vyd. Warsaw - Prague - Brussels: International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw, 2015. ISBN 978-83-62784-04-2.

¹⁶ SANDLER, Todd and Keith HARTLEY. Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2001, pp. 869-896.

¹⁷ JANELIŪNAS Tomas and Martynas ZAPOLSKIS. Lithuania as a Rational Free Rider in NATO. In Robert Czulda, Marek Madej. *NEWCOMERS NO MORE? Contemporary NATO and the Future of the Enlargement from the Perspective of "Post-Cold War" Members*. 1. vyd. Warsaw - Prague - Brussels: International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw, 2015. ISBN 978-83-62784-04-2.

2012. The authors of the article use the above mentioned approach based on expenditure quantification related to the Alliance membership and utilities coming from this membership. Those countries which acquire more utilities than expenditures in the Alliance are called free riders. Apart from the analysis itself, the authors designed the so called NATO burden sharing index for all member countries. The index lies in the rate between the quantified expenditures and utilities. If the index value is lower than 1, the authors characterise the country to be a free rider. The authors use three indicators for the quantification itself: the amount of military expenditures of the ally, contribution to the NATO operation in Afghanistan (number of deployed troops, number of casualties, financial and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan), and commitment compliance. In order to quantify the utilities coming from the Alliance defence, the authors use the amount of GDP and number of population as a variable defining the size of the Ally respecting the economic theory of the Alliance¹⁸, when the authors assume that especially small countries have bigger utility coming from the Alliance membership due to lower real ability to provide external security by merely their own military forces. The last variable characterizing the utilities is the length of external border reflecting geo-political position of the country, where especially eastern allies (countries which have common borders with Russia) acquire bigger utility from the collective defence than the countries geographically localised in Western Europe. From the results of the constructed index it is apparent that within the analysed years, based on the comparison of utilities and expenditures coming from the Alliance membership, countries such as Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Turkey, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Luxemburg, and Albania can be characterized as the so called free riders.

The same approach as in the previous case is taken by the authors¹⁹ who analyse behaviour of 15 allies in 1970-1998 via expenditure quantification (size of the so called military burden as a size of military expenditures of the country as a share on the entire military expenditures of the Alliance) and utilities (the authors perceive the utilities in the form of defence provided for the population, economic base, and country's border expressed as a proportional share on the total size of the given aggregated variable of the Alliance). From the results of the last analysed year (1998) it is apparent that the authors include the following countries in the group of free riders, i.e. countries which gain more utility than expenditures: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Canada.

The authors²⁰ analyse the uneven sharing of military burden caused especially by different sizes of economic systems of allies. They use the example of 18 allied economic systems in 1988-1999. By way of correlation analysis, the authors analyse the hypothesis of a positive relationship existence between the amount of GDP of a country and the share of military expenditures on gross domestic product. The authors' aim is to prove the so called hypothesis of exploitation that lies in uneven

¹⁸ SANDLER, Todd and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

¹⁹ SANDLER, Todd and Keith HARTLEY. Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2001, pp. 869-896.

²⁰ SANDLER, Todd, and MURDOCH, James. C. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond. *Fiscal Studies*, 21, 2000, pp. 297-327.

sharing of military expenditures, which can be seen especially in the big allies' economic systems. These countries carry unevenly bigger economic burden of defence than the economically weaker allies. Relatively low and statistically insignificant values of Spearman's correlation coefficient estimated for each year suggest that in the time of the post-cold war period less economically developed countries did not exploit the more developed ones. However, the authors warn that in the case of accepting new countries in the Alliance (there are 9 possible scenarios), based on the correlation analysis results, there is a probable increase in uneven sharing of military burden between allied economic systems of traditional member countries and new member countries, which is characterised by the behaviour called free-riding.

Increasing disparities between traditional member countries and new member countries were analysed e.g. by Odehnal. The author²¹ confirmed that the Alliance is not mainly an economically homogenous body and individual economies thus allocate a significantly different amount of GDP for the needs of the armed forces in dependence on political priorities of individual governments, public finances or overall economic condition of national economies. However, the results of the classification model reveal the fact that group of countries identified as core states of the "traditional" NATO member states do not allocate the long-term recommended amount of military expenditure of 2% of GDP. These countries are suspected of dangerous free-riding. The approach of free-riding identification based on demand for military expenditures estimate can be seen in the article²² where military expenditures of Spain are described as a function of economic and security variables. In this concept, the variable identifying free-riding is described as an economic variable expressing the sum of military expenditures of allied economic systems, excluding Spain, and its link to military expenditures of Spain. The results of econometric model characterizing determinants of military expenditures suggest that in the analysed period (1977-1997) there was an increase in military expenditures of Spain (especially after Spain joined the Alliance). Nevertheless, this increase was lower when compared with the development of military expenditures of other analysed allies. Thus, the authors confirmed the hypothesis of free-riding of Spain in 1983-1997.

An alternative approach towards the allies' economics evaluation can be seen in the article by Plumper, Neumayer²³ who use quasi-spatial approach to testing augmented predictions of the free-riding. An alternative interpretation is based on the premise that incentives to free ride are a function of the safety level of NATO members. Changes to this safety level are triggered by the growth in US spending on the one hand and growth in Soviet spending, if in excess of US spending, on the other hand. From the results it is apparent that in the analysed period 1956- 1988 the authors confirmed the existence of free-riding of 11 allies (Canada, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark,

²¹ ODEHNAL, Jakub. Military Expenditures and Free-Riding in NATO. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* Vol. 21, No. 4, 2015, pp. 479-487.

²² DE LA FE, Pedro GONZALEZ, and Daniel MONTOLIO. Has Spain been free-riding in NATO? An econometric approach. *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 12, No.5, 2001, pp. 465-485.

²³ PLÜMPER, Thomas, and Eric NEUMAYER. Free-riding in alliances testing: An old theory with a new method. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2014.

Turkey) and they refused the hypothesis of free-riding only in the case of Portugal, which was characterised this way only in the period of Salazar's and then Caetano's government dictatorship. In the time of democratic government, Portugal is, as well as other Alliance economic systems, characterised as a free rider. At the same time, however, the analysis results confirm that the level (intensity) of free-riding mainly depends on the location of the country. The allies located geographically closer to the Soviet Union showed lower intensity of free-riding than the countries bordering with other European countries. Conclusions of the above mentioned studies are shown in Table 1.


Table 1: Past studies of defence burdens and free-riding

<i>Study</i>	<i>Methods</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Results (free riders)</i>
<i>Tomas Janelūnas, Martynas Zapolskis. Lithuania as a Rational Free Rider in NATO</i>	Defence burdens and benefits	2007 2012	Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Turkey, Estonia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Luxembourg, Albania
<i>Sandler T and Hartley K (2001) Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action</i>	Defence burdens and benefits	1970 1998	Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Canada
<i>Sandler, T., Murdoch, J. (2000) On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990's and Beyond</i>	Corelation	1988 1999	During 1990-99 there is no evidence of disproportionate burden sharing, where the large allies shoulder the burdens of the small.
<i>Gonzalez, P., Montolio, D. (2001) Has Spain been free-riding in NATO? An econometric approach</i>	Regression	1983 1997	Spain
<i>Plümper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. "Free-riding in alliances testing: An old theory with a new method</i>	Quasi-spatial approach	1956 1988	Canada, Great Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Portugal, West Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Turkey

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Results of the empirical research which analysed the behaviour of the Alliance countries' economic systems confirm the existence labelled as free-riding, which can be seen in a long-term not-following the recommended amount of military expenditures spent on providing defence of individual allies and in deepening the differences between the amount of military expenditures of the USA and the European allied economic systems, which gradually leads to moral and technological slowdown of European allied armies. Decrease in military expenditures of the allies was significantly influenced by the economic crisis, which was seen in the drop of the

amount of GDP of 24 allied economic systems in 2009. By comparing changes in military expenditure development (constant prices) in 2009-2014 (see Graph 2) it is apparent that most of the allies significantly decreased their military expenditures in the time of the economic crisis escalation. Apart from Estonia, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, the rest of the allies were not able to reach at least identical amount of military expenditures in 2014 in comparison with 2009, i.e. the year of economic crisis escalation.




Graph 2: Changes in military expenditures (constant price) in 2009-2014 (%)


The Alliance's response to reducing military expenditures was, apart from other things, its declaration as one of the NATO Summit conclusions in Wales, 2014. The recommendations themselves, coming from the declaration, that lead to averting the trend of further military expenditure cutting, were formulated in the following way:

- Aim to increase defence expenditure (minimum 2% of GDP on defence);
- Aim to spend more than 20% of defence budgets on major equipment, including Research and Development.


Meeting the current requirement i.e. to follow the recommended amount of military expenditures as a share of 2% on country's GDP and more than 20% of military expenditures on major equipment, including related Research and Development, is shown in Graphs 3-9. The pictures clearly show the effect of economic crisis, characteristics of which is the reduction in military expenditures in all countries of the Alliance. As a result, there is a concentration of individual objects in Graphs 3-9 (the scatter points represent individual countries), especially in the bottom left hand part, which shows values lower than 2% of the GDP and lower than 20% of expenditures on major equipment, including related Research and Development.




Graph 3: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2009)




Graph 4: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2010)




Graph 5: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2011)




Graph 6: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2012)



Graph 7: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2013)



Graph 8: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2014)



Graph 9: Defence expenditures vs. equipment (2015)

The more detailed analysis of military expenditure development as a share on GDP
58

and a share of investments on the amount of military expenditures confirms the decrease in military expenditures of the Allies. In Graph 3 it is apparent that in 2009 five allies (France, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and the USA) followed the Alliance's guideline. The countries are shown in the right upper part of the graph. In the following years (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014) it was only Great Britain and the USA, in 2012 the USA only, and in 2015 the USA, Great Britain, and Poland. The position of Poland as the only representative of the "new" allies confirms the responsible approach of Poland toward the defence of its own territory and toward the Alliance's obligation which lies in a long-term growth of military expenditures as a share on the country's GDP.

The Wales NATO Summit conclusions, which expressed the willingness of the Allies to stop the trend of reducing military expenditures (apart from Poland), are followed by further 18 Alliance economies (the Czech Republic²⁴, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Portugal) which interannually increased the amount of military expenditures and thus approached rationally and responsibly the defence of allies in the time when current security situation in Europe and Russia's activities in the east of Ukraine lead the Alliance back to its roots, i.e. the ability to defend the allies against military threat.

CONCLUSION

The current security situation in Europe and Russia's activities in the east of Ukraine lead the Alliance back to its roots, i.e. the ability to defend the Allies against military threat. Low probability of a direct military assault on the Alliance territory after the end of the Cold War era made the allied countries' governments reduce the investments in their own security, which can be seen in the behaviour called free-riding. From the long term point of view, only a small group of the NATO countries fulfil the recommended values of allocating minimum 2% of GDP to defence. Nevertheless, 18 NATO countries followed the NATO Summit conclusions to stop this trend of reducing military expenditures. In 2015 these countries agreed to increase military expenditures, which represents a responsible approach toward both their own and collective security. Not respecting and ignoring the requirement to increase military expenditures would lead to further increasing the differences among the Alliance countries, as well as between the Alliance and some non-member countries which

²⁴ More detailed description of development of military expenditures in the Czech Republic is presented by: MIČÁNEK, František, HOLCNER, Vladan, ODEHNAL, Jakub, OLEJNÍČEK, Aleš, ŠULC, František, Zdrojové zajištění obrany České republiky: Perspektivy a možnosti, *Vojenské rozhledy*, 2014, vol. 23 (55), no. 3, pp. 9-21, ISSN 1210-3292 (tištěná verze), ISSN 2336-2995.

BRIZGALOVÁ Lenka, *Vojenské výdaje a jejich vyhodnocení ve vybraných zemích Evropské unie*, *Vojenské rozhledy*, 2012, vol. 21 (53), no. 4, pp. 111-121, ISSN 1210-3292.

MIČÁNEK, František, a kol., *Zpráva o stavu zabezpečení obrany ČR v roce 2014 - mýty a realita*, *Vojenské rozhledy*, 2014, vol. 23 (55), no. 2, ISSN 2336-2995 (on line), available at <http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/aktuality/2-uncategorised/66-zprava-o-stavu-zabezpeceni-obrany-cr-v-roce-2014-myty-a-realita>

PROCHÁZKA, Josef. *Adaptation of the Czech Republic Defence Policy - Lessons Learned*. Security and Defence, 2015, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 15-28. ISSN 2300-8741.

significantly increase their military expenditures and thus become more powerful with the potential to influence both regional and global events. The policy of the long-term reduction of military expenditures of some Alliance member countries would be a significant security threat of a continuous internal character, however, resolvable by responsible policy toward both own and collective security.

Author

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Peer-Reviewed Article

Metody strategické analýzy využívané při zpracovávání strategických dokumentů resortu obrany

Methods of Strategic Analysis Used by Strategic Documents Processing in the Ministry of Defence

Monika Grasseová-Motyčková, Jiří Richter

Abstrakt: V resortu obrany ČR jsou nejčastěji využívanými metodami při zpracovávání strategických dokumentů skupinová diskuze, brainstorming, rozhovor a analýza zainteresovaných stran. SWOT analýza a další jsou zastoupeny v méně než pětině případů. Z výsledků výzkumu vyplývá, že některé metody jsou používány metodicky nesprávným způsobem a že nejčastější metodou je intuice založená na zkušenosti. Realizace strategické analýzy naráží v resortu obrany ČR zpravidla na řadu bariér. Článek popisuje výsledky průzkumu v této oblasti a představuje některá doporučení ke zlepšení stavu, zejména synergické využívání metod, tzv. multimetodologie.

Abstract: The most frequently used methods during strategic documents processing at the Ministry of Defence are group discussion, brainstorming, discussion and analysis of stakeholders. SWOT analysis and other methods are represented in less than a fifth of cases. The research results show that some methods are used in methodologically wrong way, meanwhile, the most common method used is intuition based on experience. Implementation of strategic analysis usually encounters at the Ministry of Defence a lot of barriers. The article describes the results of research in this area and presents some recommendations for improvement, particularly synergistic use of methods called multi-methodology.

Klíčová slova: dotazníkové šetření; strategické řízení; strategická analýza; metody; resort obrany.

Keywords: Questionnaire; Strategic Management; Strategic Analysis; Methods; Ministry of Defence.

INTRODUCTION

The paper deals with the strategic analysis in the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, and in particular with the use of the methods of strategic analysis which are inseparable from any analytic procedure. The research focuses on the use of these methods while processing strategic documents that addresses the organisation's development. The authors of the article perceive the strategic document in accordance with the methodology as any document setting the vision, goals or measures in a set area. A strategy, conception, action plan, development plan, etc. can be seen as a strategy.¹ Together with the methods' application, also the significance of intuition is explored when solving this problem. The processing of these documents can be seen as a significant problem which the Department members often encounter. At the same time it can be assumed that in order to accomplish a quality solution to such a problem, it is necessary to follow a certain procedure which uses, among others, the methods of strategic analysis.

Based on the data acquired within the research "Solving Unstructured Decision-Making Problems in the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic" in the previous years it is obvious that the utilisation of the strategic analysis methods in the Defence Ministry is not at a high level. Based on the carried out research there is a lack of utilisation of the methods, little knowledge about their proper application and a number of barriers which complicate their effective use. The issue of the current conditions is addressed in details later in the paper.

The aim of the article is to inform about the current state of the strategic documents processing in the CR Defence Ministry, and propose changes to be made in order to eliminate the identified problems, in particular in relation with the use of the methods of strategic analysis.

The analysis of use of the methods of strategic analysis with solving unstructured problems in the CR Defence Ministry was analysed, being based on the semi-structured interviews which were carried out in 2015,² practical experiences of the research team and a questionnaire survey from 2012. Based on the interviews from 2015, the practical experiences gained by cooperation on departmental strategic documents elaboration and on the discussions with the participants of special and career courses, it can be stated that there is no shift in the use of methods and that the current state corresponds to the results of questionnaire survey. The results of the survey were confirmed as actual by the stated methods. The use of analytical methods in the strategic documents elaboration is being analysed in these days. The preliminary findings show a very low level of reporting of analytical methods in the final documents and the consequent need to conduct a further research in this area. 19 semi-structured interviews were performed. The respondents were mainly the members of the general staff course (KGŠ) and senior officers course (KVD). From the perspective of the frequency of rank representation, the most frequent ones were major (42%), colonel (37%) and civil employee (11%).

¹ MINISTERSTVO FINANČÍ ČR. Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií [online]. Praha, 2012, 16. 2. 2014, p. 100 [cit. 2013-05-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/4ebb3cc7-6f5c-4f37-ad1f-97054a212483/metodika-pripravy-verejnych-strategii_listopad-2012.pdf

² GRASSEOVÁ-MOTYČKOVÁ, Monika a Jiří RICHTER, SWOT analýza v rezortu obrany České republiky – současný stav a doporučení pro aplikaci, Vojenské rozhledy, 2016, 25 (57), n. 2, pp. 36-52, ISSN 1210-3292 (printed), ISSN 2336-2995 (on-line). Source: www.vojenskerozhledy.cz

1. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS - METHODS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

General methods of strategic analysis are used for collecting information about an organisation's environment, and for creating an adequate strategic framework that is expected to bring improvement of the organisation's situation. While processing strategic documents, the methods of strategic analysis shall serve as tools for analysing the internal and external environment, and for creating a framework for future development and appropriate strategies. Furthermore, the basic and frequently applied methods, which can be used while processing the documents, are characterised in this chapter. The partial recommendations for the use of strategic method optimization can be stated based on the theoretical definition of the methods and on the comparison of these methods with their practical realization. These methods are as follows: **Analysis of interested parties**, **SWOT analysis** and **an Objective tree**. Among the methods of the external environment analysis these were selected: **DELPHI method**, **PESTLE analysis** and **Method of future scenarios**. As for analysing the internal environment the following can be used: **Benchmarking**, **Process analysis and/or EFQM model or Common Assessment Framework (CAF)**.

Analysis of interested parties is a general framework for identifying the interested parties (i.e. persons or groups that are interested in running an organisation), detecting their interests and fulfilling these interests of organisations.³ The analysis is typically carried out in the sequence of identifying the interested parties, contacting the representatives, determining the means of communication and goals, and securing the mutual communication with the interested parties. When there are more interested parties identified, the method becomes rather demanding as for administration and time. The advantage of the method, while processing the documents, is that there is information provided from the outside of an organisation, which would be, under different conditions, inaccessible.

SWOT analysis uses the findings of the internal and external environmental analysis, and by means of combining the identified factors it serves to generate alternatives to strategies.⁴ SWOT analysis can be considered one of the fundamental and most frequently used methods for creation of strategies, whose form does not significantly alter.^{5,6} It always includes identification of strengths and weaknesses of the internal environment, and opportunities and threats of the external environment of an organisation. These factors are quantified, and relative significance is assigned to them, and the strategy alternatives are generated by means of a systematic procedure of combining the most significant factors. However, according to Haberberg⁷, SWOT

³ GRASSEOVÁ, Monika, Radek DUBEC and David ŘEHÁK. Analýza podniku v rukou manažera: 33 nejpoužívanějších metod strategického řízení. 2. ed. Brno: BizBooks, 2012. ISBN 978-80-265-0032-2.

⁴ HILL, Terry and Roy WESTBROOK. SWOT analysis: It's time for a product recall. Long Range Planning [online]. 1997, 30(1), 46-52 [cit. 2016-03-07]. DOI: 10.1016/S0024-6301(96)00095-7. ISSN 00246301. Source: <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0024630196000957>

⁵ PORTER, M. E. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New York: Free Press, 1980.

⁶ KOTLER, Philip and Kevin Lane KELLER. Marketing management. Praha: Grada, 2013. ISBN 978-80-247-4150-5.

⁷ HABERBERG, A. Swatting SWOT. Strategy (Strategy Planning Society), September, 2000.

analysis is often processed only in a form of unstructured lists of factors of internal and external environments, lacking any further systematic application. The process of the analysis creation itself is relatively complicated. It can be under the influence of subjective views of assessors, and in case of processing by multiple assessors (managers) it encounters time and organisational difficulties.⁸ SWOT analysis is currently a subject of modifications aiming at suppressing the subjective perception of assessors. The majority of authors employ here a fairly high degree of mathematical and statistical methods, in the phase of quantification and assessment of the selected factors in particular.^{9, 10}

An **Objective tree** is a method of strategic planning and it is used for formulating objectives at individual partial levels. The method is based on a general rule, which says that the constituents at a lower hierarchical level specify the higher hierarchical level. In the case of objectives it refers to an organisation's vision and mission specification by means of the top strategic objectives which are further broken down into specific and operational objectives.¹¹ The method shall be used for creating strategic documents for the breakdown of objectives at individual organisational levels.

The aim of a **Process analysis** is, as its name implies, an analysis of processes and their optimisation through removing weaknesses. As a rule, the analysis is based on a complete process map that should reflect a real condition of organisational processes (therefore it is not an ideal).¹² It can be assumed that the optimisation of the current processes is not a part of the majority of strategic documents' creation. On the contrary, the documents are rather based on clearly codified process standards.

The **DELPHI method** is used for acquiring prognostic information or opinions of experts in order to forecast development of future events. By adding information from experts, the method can be supportive when there is a lack of data. The major advantage of the DELPHI method can be found in the process of structuring a panel communication. The method is especially convenient in cases when bringing everyone together for a group discussion (a meeting) would be time consuming and financially demanding, or in cases when it is more appropriate to use subjective opinions of assessors rather than analytical procedures.¹³ As for the document processing it is necessary to have the DELPHI system already implemented and set up so that it is possible to acquire the desired data within a reasonable time.

PESTLE analysis serves as a method for examining those external factors which affect an organisation, and which cannot be significantly influenced by an organisation

⁸ VALKOV, Alexander. Ten Mistakes at the Usage of the SWOT-Analysis in the Strategic Marketing Planning in the Healthcare Institutions. *Economic Alternatives*. 2010, Issue 1, pp. 93-103.

⁹ WHELEN, Thomas L and J HUNGER. *Strategic management and business policy*. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, c2002. ISBN 013065132X.

¹⁰ KURTILA, Mikko, Mauno PESONEN, Jyrki KANGAS and Miika KAJANUS. Utilizing the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in SWOT analysis - a hybrid method and its application to a forest-certification case. *Forest Policy and Economics* [online]. 2000, 1(1), pp. 41-52 [cit. 2016-03-07]. DOI: 10.1016/S1389-9341(99)00004-0. ISSN 13899341. Source: <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1389934199000040>

¹¹ GRASSEOVÁ, Monika, Radek DUBEC and David ŘEHÁK. *Analýza podniku v rukou manažera: 33 nejpožívanějších metod strategického řízení*. 2. ed. Brno: BizBooks, 2012. ISBN 978-80-265-0032-2.

¹² RAMESH, G. Applying Business Process Improvement Concepts to Academic Advising: A Case Study on the Efficiency Improvement Approach. *Competition Forum* 2014. 2014, 12(2), pp. 102-110.

¹³ LINSTONE, Harold A. and Murray TUROFF. *The Delphi method: techniques and applications*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Advanced Book Program, 1975. ISBN 0201042932.

itself. The analysis has multiple variants, depending on how many and what types of factors of the external environment are to be examined. Kotler classified six factors among which there are the following impacts: political, economic, social, technological, legislative, and ecological.¹⁴ The aim of the analysis is to identify the factors which significantly affect an organisation, the way this impact is manifested and what development is expected for the future. In order to achieve those analytical objectives a MAP technique (an acronym for a procedure of mapping, analysis and prediction of environmental factors) can be applied.

The **Method of future scenarios** generates descriptions of a possible future situation, reflecting a current state, an expected chain of events and a final state. While creating the scenarios, it is critical to determine key constituents which are incorporated into the scenario, and also estimate their future development. Due to the uncertainty of an environment, more scenarios are typically created. The next problematic step is a scenario classification for acquiring a smaller group of more probable scenarios. This method is highly demanding in terms of quality data and information.¹⁵ Cornelius et al.¹⁶ quotes that planning by means of scenarios is useful for researching the future, however, it is indeterminate with the question of which scenarios shall be taken into consideration. The most straightforward reaction to such doubts is to apply SWOT analysis for assessing each scenario.

The principal rule of **Benchmarking** is a comparison of selected elements of an organisation with different organisations. The selected organisations are usually of comparable levels or, on the contrary, they are “the best”, offering the opportunity to learn from them. According to Nenadál benchmarking can be carried out in terms of a comparison with competitors or processes and functions of organisations of various fields and domains.¹⁷ In case of the Ministry of Defence benchmarking can be used for learning in the selected areas and for modernisation or improving effectiveness in the problematic areas. As for processing the strategic documents the method can be used for optimising the very process of a document’s creation and implementation.

EFQM and CAF models serve as tools for a self-assessment of organisations’ performance. Both are often used by public sector organisations in the Czech Republic to improve their organisational quality and performance.¹⁸ Both models include 9 assessed criteria of the internal environment, but they differ in the amount of sub-criteria, in assigning weights as well as in the way of assessing the sub-criteria. The execution of the self-assessment requires a relatively big effort, skilful managers and enough time for a complex assessment of all the criteria. In the case of the document processing it can be referred to the outcomes of previously executed self-assessments rather than starting with this method while the document is already being processed.

¹⁴ KOTLER, Philip and Kevin Lane KELLER. Marketing management. 14. ed. Praha: Grada, 2013, 814 p. ISBN 978-80-247-4150-5.

¹⁵ GRASSEOVÁ, Monika, Radek DUBEC and David ŘEHÁK. Analýza podniku v rukou manažera: 33 nejčastěji používaných metod strategického řízení. 2. ed. Brno: BizBooks, 2012. ISBN 978-80-265-0032-2.

¹⁶ CORNELIUS, Peter, Alexander Van de PUTTE and Mattia ROMANI. Three Decades of Scenario Planning in Shell. California Management Review. 2005, 48(1), pp. 92-109. DOI: 10.2307/41166329.

¹⁷ NENADÁL, Jaroslav. Měření v systémech managementu jakosti. 2. ed. Praha: Management Press, 2004. ISBN 80-7261-110-0.

¹⁸ GRASSEOVÁ, Monika (ed.). Efektivní rozhodování: analyzování, rozhodování, implementace a hodnocení. 1. ed. Brno: Edika, 2013. ISBN 978-80-266-0179-1.

2. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS - INTUITION

A role that **intuition** plays within the execution of strategic decision making is by no means negligible, whether managers admit using it or not. Being perceived from various angles, the term intuition is not comprehended consistently by either professionals or the lay public. Nevertheless a large number of authors agree on the fact that intuition is formed by many years of experience and learning.^{19, 20, 21, 22} The fact that it is appropriate to relate intuition with experience is supported also by Burke and Miller,²³ who carried out semi-structured phone interviews with 60 professionals of different specialisations working at middle and top managerial positions in the US businesses. They focused on the perception of intuition among managers, and found out that majority of respondents had based their intuitive decision making on experience and/or feelings. Intuition comprises also a number of facts, patterns, terms, techniques, abstractions, and generally all that is referred to as formal knowledge or conviction which affects human mind (Barnard, quoted in Simon²⁴).

In the frame of the conducted research the concept of intuition was used as is quoted by Matzler et al.: *"Intuition is a highly complex and highly developed form of reasoning that is based on years of experience and learning, and on the facts, patterns, concepts, procedures and abstractions stored in the decision maker's head."*²⁵

According to Gerard et al.²⁶ there is growing agreement about intuition and its relationship in the management area with the following:

(1) Capacity for achieving direct knowledge or comprehension without any apparent use of rational thinking or logical conclusion;

(2) It is neither the opposite to rationality, nor a random process of guessing, intuition reflects thoughts, conclusions and choices that have been largely or partly created through unconscious mental processes;

(3) Acquired assessments which arise thanks to fast, unconscious and complex associations.

Shapiro and Spence²⁷ quote that it is appropriate for effective managerial decision making to be combined with a rational analysis and intuition. The solutions shall be first obtained by using intuition, and after that put through the rational analysis

¹⁹ SIMON, H.A. Making Management Decisions: the role of intuition and emotion. Academy of Management Executive. 1987, 1(1), pp. 57-65.

²⁰ AGOR, W. H. Intuition in organizations: Leading and managing productively. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990.

²¹ PARIKH, J. Intuition: The new frontier of management. Oxford: Blackwell Business, 1994.

²² MATZLER K., BAILOM F. and MOORADIAN T.A. Intuitive decision making. Management Review. 2007, 49, pp. 13-15.

²³ BURKE L.A. and MILLER M.K. Taking the mystery out of intuitive decision making. Academy of Management Executive. 1999, 13, pp. 91-99.

²⁴ SIMON, H.A. Making Management Decisions: the role of intuition and emotion. Academy of Management Executive. 1987, 1(1), pp. 57-65.

²⁵ MATZLER K., BAILOM F. and MOORADIAN T.A. Intuitive decision making. Management Review. 2007, 49, pp. 13-15.

²⁶ GERARD P. Hodgkinson, Eugene SADLER-SMITH, Lisa A. BURKE, Guy CLAXTON and Paul R. SPARROW. Intuition in Organizations: Implications for Strategic Management. Long Range Planning. 2009, 42, pp. 277-297.

²⁷ SHAPIRO, S. and SPENCE, M. T. Managerial intuition: A conceptual and operational framework. Business Horizons. 1997, 40(1), pp. 63-68.

because intuition helps the decision maker better understand the system structure. However, Agor²⁸ suggests a contrary procedure. First, carry out the analytic decision making, and then use intuition for a synthesis of the information. In the view of the article's authors this was aptly summarised by Bergson²⁹ who quotes that both approaches, analytical and intuitive, shall complement each other.

Based on his study, Agor³⁰ identified conditions under which managers shall prefer intuitive decision making which are as follows: a high risk value, impossibility to use and/or unavailability of analytical data, lack of previous experience (precedents), and absence of a preferred solution. The use of intuition with the lack of information is also addressed in a publication Department of the Army³¹: Using the informed intuition can help commanders achieve an effective decision under uncertain conditions by overcoming the uncertainty arising from the situation. Khatri and Ng³² found out in their empirical research that it was exactly at the time of uncertainty and indefiniteness when the intuitive decision making proved to have better results among managers. These authors quote that for the effective intuitive managerial decision making it is necessary to have years of experience and perfect comprehension and understanding of a problem situation.

Using analyses and/or intuition have advantages and disadvantages. The pros and cons of both approaches are described by Mintzberg³³ from the perspective of time and costs. While analyses are slower and more expensive, the intuitive decisions are immediately available. However, this applies only to operational costs. Capital costs of intuition are much higher due to the fact that intuition is based on experience and knowledge which is acquired over many years. A good analysis is of course ready to be executed any time if there are quality quantitative data available for an analyst. In our view, another advantage of analyses is also the fact that they enable analysts to document and justify the executed decision-making process.

The areas with the most frequent intuition use were covered by Parikh³⁴ as a part of the outcomes of the research which included 1312 managers and directors of big private sector industrial businesses from nine countries. The respondents used intuition most frequently in the following areas: creation of business strategy, planning, marketing, public relations, human resources development and research.

²⁸ AGOR, W. A. The logic of intuition: How top executives make important decisions. *Organizational Dynamics*. 1986, 14(3), pp. 5-18.

²⁹ BERGSON, H. *Duchovní energie*. Praha: Vyšehrad, 2002.

³⁰ AGOR, W. A. The logic of intuition: How top executives make important decisions. *Organizational Dynamics*. 1986, 14(3), pp. 5-18.

³¹ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. *Field Manual 3-0. Operations*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2001.

³² KHATRI, N., NG, H. A. The role of intuition in strategic decision making. *Human Relations*. 2000, 53, pp. 57-86.

³³ MINTZBERG, H. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. New York: Pearson Education, 2000. 458 p. ISBN 978-0-273-65037-9.

³⁴ PARIKH, J. *Intuition: The new frontier of management*. Oxford: Blackwell Business, 1994.

3. THE CURRENT STATE OF USING THE METHODS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The carried out interviews and other stated methods of data collection show that the problem of *processing a strategic document dealing with the organisation's development* is most frequently addressed by the commanders at the tactical command level (34%), and strategic level (34%), and least frequently at operational level (32%). The median of the document processing in the last five years is nearly two and therefore it is not a routine nor regular activity.




Figure 1: The use of methods for document processing

The figure above illustrates the use of the methods with document processing. The most frequent methods are Group discussion (68%) and Brainstorming (52%), then Interview is also significant (50%) and SWOT analysis (36%). Process analysis (20%) and others are represented by less than one fifth of the cases. Benchmarking and PEST(EL), EFQM and CAF were not used once, in other words, they were not used at all. It is alarming that in order to create a strategic document, the most frequently used methods are those which are not primarily intended for a strategic analysis, but solely for data collection (Discussion, Interview) or idea generation (Brainstorming). Moreover, based on the performed interviews, there is an aggravating fact about brainstorming where the majority of commanders understand Brainstorming just as a slightly structured discussion about opinions, which does not observe the standard requirements nor generate the same outputs. The interviews showed that the reason for preferring Discussion to Brainstorming is mainly the promptness of output generation. At the same time, it is surprising that the method of Questioning is scarcely applied (5%), though it can be considered highly effective in terms of acquiring quantitative data from multiple resources. Quite a surprise regarding the nature of the documents, which are focused on the distant future, is also an infrequent use of the method of Future scenarios (18%).




Figure 2: The use of methods of strategic analysis for document processing

The use of methods of strategic analysis is illustrated separately in Figure 2. The most frequently used method is SWOT analysis (36%), then Process analysis (20%), Future scenarios method (18%), and Analysis of interested parties (16%). And then, there is an Objective tree (11%) and Benchmarking (2%). The question remains about the purpose of executing a process analysis method while processing a document. Based on the existing findings it can be assumed (though it has not been verified) that it is carried out in the form of a description rather than in the form of an analysis as mentioned above. This assumption is supported by another certain findings from the interviews, where a respondent considers the process analysis to be an external audit. Another respondent describes it as an internally codified analysis which must be carried out across the entire Department, but at the same time the other respondents do not use this method at all. PEST(EL) analysis, DELPHI, EFQM and CAF were not used by the respondents a single time. The finding in case of Benchmarking is acceptable, since it is a tool designed for a competitive environment, which the Defence Ministry does not belong to. In any case, one of the interview participants quoted that he/she uses Benchmarking as a form of education abroad, and so as a specific modified approach this method is usable. Yet the remaining not-applied methods belong to standard and highly beneficial tools, and in the case of CAF it is even a method that was deliberately designed for the use by public sector organisations. With PEST(LE) analysis, as found out in the interviews, the problem of ambiguity of the external environment was mentioned, which does not usually correspond with the PEST specification. Furthermore, it is important to realise that, in general, the methods of strategic analysis are scarcely used for the strategic document implementation. Theoretically, it is possible that almost 70% of the documents are not based on any standardised method of strategic analysis. On the contrary, it may be the case that for

each document there is maximally one method used, which is still, from the perspective of quality, relatively insufficient. These reasons can be mainly associated with the fact that the use of the strategic analysis methods is not required in any form at all.

In the course of the interviews we focused on the ways the selected methods of strategic analysis are used. Generally, these methods are mainly used for mere data collecting, and as a rule they are not used by the Department members for analysing nor assessing. For instance, there is a repeatedly mentioned use of SWOT analysis in a way that only a commander or a manager makes up an overview of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats just as a mere list without any further methodical work.




Figure 3: Sources of familiarisation with the methods

For the purpose of analysing the use of the strategic analysis methods it is appropriate to know where the Department members meet the methods. The results are shown in Figure 3. Although basic standardised methods are used for the document processing only a few Department members met them, according to their opinions, in the previous education. In this perspective the most successful are Career and specialised courses UO (34%). Then, Doctoral and master's studies (27%), Career course abroad (16%), very little representation of Bachelor study (7%) and Specialised courses at educational institutions in the Czech Republic (5%). The problem that the methodology of strategic analysis is not anchored in the Ministry's regulations becomes evident here by the fact that the very last place of the respondents' choices goes to an Internal regulation (5%). On the contrary, the Department members meet the used methods most frequently within the Service at the staff (61%) and Self-study (50%). Based on the above it can be assumed that the university graduates adopt the standard analytical methods as they are used in the units, not using their knowledge acquired through the study. Furthermore, they do not observe the procedures from regulations, but rather follow local customs and traditions. It is probable that they come to a sufficient understanding of the issue of strategic analysis in the course of time when participating at career courses, where they are able to meaningfully interconnect the work methodology with the practical experience from the units.

To be able to propose an appropriate methodology for the strategic documents

processing, it is necessary to analyse the barriers that hinder the commanders' effective strategic analysis, and also the factors that they consider significant for this work.




Figure 4: Barriers of decision making

Figure 4 illustrates the most significant barriers that hinder commanders' decision making and processing the strategic documents. More than a half of the commanders consider Unclear task assignment to be problematic (70%), then Lack of time for processing (66%) and Lack of information (52%). Absence of methodologies for the document processing is considered problematic by one third (36%) of the interviewed commanders. On the other hand, only 20% of the commanders view Unfamiliarity with the methods as a barrier. It can be inferred that even though the commanders are familiar with the necessary methods, there are more important factors which do not allow them to carry out the selected methods appropriately or at all. The interviews have also revealed that the barrier Lack of information is often manifested in an unclear assignment of the addressed problem when the problem solvers are forced to inquire about additional information within a task assigner. This additional research is rather time-consuming, and usually takes place at the time reserved for a problem solving, which synergistically causes another barrier Lack of time. Therefore, there is necessity to adjust the current methods of strategic analysis in a way that they are more usable under the conditions of the Defence Ministry.




Figure 5: Factor significance for effective problem solving

With the method modification it can be referred to the information shown in Figure 5 which illustrates the significance of selected factors for effective processing of a strategic document. The factors are arranged in order from the highest mean rating, and because of a different frequency of rating, also complete scales are shown. The commanders consider the Sufficiency of information for a task solving to be the most significant (the mean of 4.59), Clear problem assignment (4.55) and the Personnel's reliability and responsibility (4.05). The fact is that these factors reflect the set system of work and task delegating (orders, delegating) rather than the applied methods. But still, it is possible to focus on the methods of the lower time consumption, because the question of time for the processing appears both here and also as a significant barrier. Additionally, the multimethodology of the document processing can include the methods of collecting such information that can help decrease the impact of this factor on an effective analysis. Let us make an assumption that the currently most commonly used methods of interview and group discussion do not necessarily have to be among those most effective ones (as far as the information quality and time consumption). Also this question indicates a relatively insignificant role which the commanders assign to the Knowledge of methods (3.47), the Existence of methodologies (3.30) and the Software support for the problem solving (2.86). On the other hand, there was an opinion expressed during the interviews, saying that the software support could help solve the problem of the lack of well-structured data and information, which are neither available in time nor in appropriate quality. To discuss the future and the software it can be considered in terms of both analytic tools and databases. Unfortunately, after having all opinions examined, it seems that the commanders and managers feel that the effectiveness of the strategic documents processing is not so much influenced by the methodology of processing, but rather by the working mode itself.

4. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE USE OF THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS METHODS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS

Within the comparative analysis there was good practice identified with creation of strategies in the Czech Republic, particularly the use of the analytical approach which is based on the following.³⁵ An organisation begins the work with defining the problem that is to be solved by the strategy, and the analyses of legislative framework and comparative analyses with abroad are carried out. In the next phases, the methods such as Brainstorming or SWOT analysis are used. Last but not least, the strategy's impacts are modelled, for example the impacts on the very institution that creates the strategy, other institutions of public sector, economic sector or the society as a whole. There are a large number of methods used abroad within the partial phases of creating the public strategies.³⁶ These are, for instance, environmental analyses, such as SWOT and PESTLE analyses (Great Britain, Austria, Denmark), Problem analyses (Great Britain, New Zealand, France), Analysis of interested parties (Great Britain, New Zealand, Austria), Analyses and modelling of impacts (Great Britain, New Zealand), Scenario creation for strategic prognoses (France, New Zealand), Future development prognoses (Great Britain, New Zealand), budget analyses (Denmark), Cost-benefit analyses (Great Britain, New Zealand, Austria), Multi-criteria analyses (Great Britain), and more (mostly Great Britain, New Zealand).

In the Czech Republic the methodology for public strategy preparation exists.³⁷ This methodology is usable with creation of various types of strategic documents. While processing the strategic documents the governmental personnel and the managers of central state administration bodies are required to observe the mentioned methodology by the Government resolution.³⁸ At the regional level the methodology's use is recommended.

Let us look at the selected foreign countries. The methodology for public strategy preparation exists in Great Britain and New Zealand, but its use is not legally binding. In the countries where no methodology for strategy preparation exists (e.g. France, Denmark and Austria), the approach of strategy creation is usually determined at the beginning of the individual strategies' preparation.

Frequent mistakes, identified by ERNST & YOUNG³⁹, within the analytic and

³⁵ ERNST & YOUNG. Projekt Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií: Komparativní analýza přípravy veřejných strategií v zahraničí a v České republice. Praha, 2011. [cit. 2015-07-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/5da3e96b-bbcd-4d0f-b7d5-7893393ef28c/komparativni_nalyza_111031_final.pdf

³⁶ ERNST & YOUNG. Projekt Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií: Komparativní analýza přípravy veřejných strategií v zahraničí a v České republice. Praha, 2011. [cit. 2015-07-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/5da3e96b-bbcd-4d0f-b7d5-7893393ef28c/komparativni_nalyza_111031_final.pdf

³⁷ MINISTERSTVO FINANČÍ ČR. Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií [online]. Praha, 2012, 16. 2. 2014 [cit. 2013-05-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/4ebb3cc7-6f5c-4f37-ad1f-97054a212483/metodika-pripravy-verejnych-strategii_listopad-2012.pdf

³⁸ ÚŘAD VLÁDY ČR. Usnesení Vlády České Republiky ze dne 2. května 2013 č. 318 k Metodice přípravy veřejných strategií. Praha: 2013.

³⁹ ERNST & YOUNG. Projekt Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií: Komparativní analýza přípravy veřejných

prognostic phase of the strategic document processing (see Figure 7) are as follows:

- Subjective execution of analyses;
- Inconsistent identification of causes of problems;
- Working with inadequate data;
- Careless execution of the analysis of existing solutions, abroad in particular;

Incorrect application or insufficient knowledge of analytical methods.

5. THE USE OF INTUITION IN THE DEFENCE MINISTRY

In order to evaluate the total extent of the use of intuition by the Department members, the answers to the individual questions about their attitudes towards intuition were averaged and merged into a single variable. This was used for the division of the respondent group into two clusters: *intuitive commanders* - cluster 1 and *rational commanders* - cluster 2. For the division into the clusters, *k*-means clustering was used. The classifying variable ranged within the interval of 1 - 5, the formed final cluster centres reach the value of 3.44 with cluster 1, and 2.47 with cluster 2.

Based on the measurement of the extent of the intuition use for decision making by the Department members it is evident that the Department members use intuition due to the lack of time, information and knowledge to the same extent, and not quite unambiguously. On the contrary, the use of experience is very frequent with decision making. Here it seems that experience really is a part of the intuitive approach to decision making, and that it does not involve any expert use of rational methods. But on the other hand, the Department members preferred rational decision making to a large extent. This indicates that as long as there are verified procedures and experience available, the commanders prefer them. However, if the Department members have to make decisions with the barriers affecting them, such as the lack of time, lack of information and lack of personnel, they rather choose intuitive decision making stemming from their experience.

While identifying the character of the more or less intuitive commanders and managers no significant differences were found between the two groups. From the perspective of the management levels there is a significant finding that the extent of the intuition use is practically equal at all management levels.




Figure 6: The use of strategic analysis methods depending on intuition

Figure 6 illustrates the use of the strategic analysis methods for the document processing, presenting also the information whether the respondents belong to the intuitive or rational group, as it is outlined above. The data show that most of the methods are used approximately equally by both the rational and intuitive members of the Department. As for Benchmarking, it is necessary to remind that it was used by only one respondent. In total, the extent to which the methods are used is larger with the rational Department members, except for the case of the analysis of interested parties with a ratio of 50:50. The rational respondents predominate most in case of the Objective tree method (75:25). The intuitive approach can be used with all the presented methods to a certain extent. However, the truth is that the Objective tree in particular requires logical and rational links among the individual constituents.

5. PROPOSAL OF METHODS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED PHASES OF STRATEGIC DOCUMENT PROCESSING

Based on the identified good practice in creating strategies in the Czech Republic⁴⁰ the authors of the article recommend primarily the use of the methodology for creating the public strategies as a source for the proposal of a methodological procedure - see Figure 7. As far as the use of the methods is concerned, the methodology is relatively general, without any specification of the use of appropriate methods for individual activities of given phases within the strategy creation. The use of the methods of strategic analysis is desirable in phases 1 and 3 as shown in Figure 7. In our view, in terms of the use of analytical methods these phases overlap to a certain extent. This is probably caused by the fact that phase 3 is presented in the methodology as a continuous phase. For activity 1.3 and 3.3 it is possible to use, **for the analysis of a current state of a given organisation or its component** that a strategy is being created for, one of these methods: **Benchmarking, Process analysis**

⁴⁰ ERNST & YOUNG. Projekt Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií: Komparativní analýza přípravy veřejných strategií v zahraničí a v České republice. Praha, 2011. [cit. 2015-07-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/5da3e96b-bbcd-4d0f-b7d5-7893393ef28c/komparativni_nalyza_111031_final.pdf

and/or EFQM model or Common Assessment Framework (CAF). The presented methods are briefly characterised in terms of the use in the introductory part of this article. For activities 1.3 and 3.4, or more precisely **the prognosis of future development**, it is possible to use the following methods: **DELPHI method**, **PESTLE analysis** and **Method of future scenarios**, which are also characterised earlier in this article. It is also appropriate, for the purpose of prognoses, to use the quantitative prognostic methods which are described in details for instance by Makridakis et al.⁴¹ As for the **synthesis of analytical findings** (basically it is activity 3.5) we recommend the use of **SWOT analysis** whose outcomes are usable for activity 4.1 as well as activity 5.3. To carry out phase 4 it is suitable to apply the **Objective tree. The analysis of interested parties** can be carried out primarily within activity 1.3 and subsequently also within phase 2. The methodology determines, as one of the operations of activity 1.3, an operation of analysing a problem (which shall be solved by the created strategy) in order to define it. For the problem analysis there are successfully used methods of issue tree and/or dimensional analysis, which are further described also in this publication.⁴²




Figure 7: Strategy creation phase with activities of the given phase

Source: Modified according to the methodology⁴³

⁴¹ MAKRIDAKIS, Spyros, Steven C. WHEELWRIGHT, and Rob J. HYNDMAN. Forecasting: Methods and Applications, 3rd ed. John Wiley and Sons, 1998. 656 p. ISBN 978-0-471-53233-0.

⁴² GRASSEOVÁ, Monika (ed.). Efektivní rozhodování: analyzování, rozhodování, implementace a hodnocení. 1. ed. Brno: Edika, 2013. ISBN 978-80-266-0179-1.

⁴³ MINISTERSTVO FINANCÍ ČR. Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií [online]. Praha, 2012, 16. 2. 2014 [cit. 2013-05-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/4ebb3cc7-6f5c-4f37-ad1f-97054a212483/metodika-pripravy-verejnych-strategii_listopad-2012.pdf

In the methodology⁴⁴ there is only a list of the frequently used analytical and prognostic methods for phase 3. We have supplemented the list of the methods below with the information of the activity or operation within the strategy processing for which we recommend the method in terms of the purpose of the use.

- Business Impact Analysis, BIA - we recommend this method to be used for activities of all phases except for phase 3, in particular for activity 4.2 and/or 5.4 where the given proposals (variants) shall be evaluated by a single criterion.
- Cost-benefit analysis, CBA - we recommend using this method for activities of all phases except for phase 3, namely for activity 4.2 and/or 5.4 when the given proposals (variants) shall be evaluated by a single criterion. In the case of a multiple criteria evaluation of the proposals it is appropriate to use one of the methods of the multiple criteria variant evaluation, for example a direct expert assessment or Saaty's method - for further details see the publication.⁴⁵
- Mind maps - provide clarification and comprehension of the context by means of problem visualisation. For this purpose they are suitable for the use with activity 1.3.
- PEST(LE) analysis - suitable for activities 1.3 and 3.4 in order to identify opportunities and threats from the organisation's external environment within the analysed areas of the external environment.
- Issue Tree - usable for activity 1.3 in order to identify and analyse problem(s) in the area which the strategy is created for.
- Feasibility studies - are designed to assess practicability of an investment intention in terms of all perspectives which are significant for the project achievement. A study includes technical, financial, resource, time, risk and strategic assessments of the intention.⁴⁶ Due to the tendency to cover all the important parts of a project, a feasibility study goes through all phases of strategy creation.
- SWOT analysis - useful as a synthesis of findings of activities 1.3, 3.3 and 3.4. Subsequently it is effective to use the method as a basis for carrying out activities 4.1 and 5.3.

Then, the methodology presents a list of prognostic methods, which is identical with the contents of a publication by Potůček et al.⁴⁷ The prognostic methods are divided into three groups: universal methods (e.g. Brainstorming; panel of experts), procedural methods (e.g. DELPHI method; Scenarios), and structural methods (e.g. System approach; Cross interactions) without further information or clarification on the purpose of the methods.

⁴⁴ MINISTERSTVO FINANCÍ ČR. Metodika přípravy veřejných strategií [online]. Praha, 2012, 16. 2. 2014 [cit. 2013-05-12]. Source: http://www.mmr.cz/getmedia/4ebb3cc7-6f5c-4f37-ad1f-97054a212483/metodika-pripravy-verejnych-strategii_listopad-2012.pdf

⁴⁵ GRASSEOVÁ, Monika (ed.). Efektivní rozhodování: analyzování, rozhodování, implementace a hodnocení. 1. ed. Brno: Edika, 2013. ISBN 978-80-266-0179-1.

⁴⁶ PITAŠ, Jaromír; ŠTOFKO, Hubert. Projektové řízení. Brno: Edika, 2013, pp. 296-317. In Efektivní rozhodování: Analyzování - Rozhodování - Implementace a hodnocení. 1. ed. ISBN 978-80-266-0179-1.

⁴⁷ POTŮČEK, M. et al. Manuál prognostických metod. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2006.

6. DISCUSSION ON OUTCOMES AND RECOMMENDATION TO APPLY SELECTED METHODS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Based on the above mentioned findings, a general partial conclusion can be made: The methods of strategic analysis are often used in the Defence Ministry in different ways than they were originally intended. The Department members use them most frequently in the way they learnt from their colleagues in practice, or study them on their own. Based on the collected data, among the quoted frequent mistakes there are subjective execution of analyses, incorrect application and insufficient knowledge of the methods, which correspond with the above. It has been also found out that due to the lack of time and information, which are the most frequent barriers to decision making, the Department members use a number of analytical methods in considerably simplified forms. A typical example is that of SWOT analysis, which is often reduced into a mere formulation of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. As the research revealed, the Department members tend rather to a collective way of solving, since they most frequently use the methods of Group discussion, Brainstorming and Interview while creating the strategic documents. This fact suggests that this particular working style shall be maintained, and only modified into more effective and faster decision making.

For the most of the recommended methods it is suitable to use structured data, out of which a part should always be of historical character (new documents are created according to the current state of an organisational environment). Because of this, it is appropriate to process and store the data in a form that allows a repeated use within the future activities. Although the methods of a Group discussion and Interview are able to generate a great amount of information, the most of it is usually lost (it is not further utilised within a decision-making process). If this is the case, a greater extent of using the written formalised interviewing can be recommended. By means of this method it is possible to repeatedly acquire the identically structured data that can be easily processed, evaluated and repeatedly used. A similar function, which supports working with adequate data, is secured by building local expert databases which allows for the use of the DELPHI method. The Department members may rely on the fact that an expert in a given problem should suggest a solution in a shorter time than a layman. In addition to that, since the DELPHI method is usually carried out in a written form, it is less time-consuming than face-to-face meetings and discussions. Another finding promotes the DELPHI method, showing that during the research the respondents identified insufficiently competent personnel as one of the most significant barrier, but paradoxically, despite this fact they solve most problems with the same personnel in discussions.

According to the research by Ernst & Young a frequent mistake is working with inadequate data and low analysis of existing solutions and working with them. Also these reasons support the above mentioned principle of data processing in a structured and written form. This can be further supplemented with recommendation, where the partial outcomes of the analytical methods shall be (in terms of membership) freely accessible and quickly traceable. The following can be recommended with the particular methods which are most frequently used:

- SWOT analysis - the lists of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, related to a particular environment. In the case of creating repeated strategic documents, a certain organisational component can be used as historical experience and a basis for the follow-up analysis.

- Process analysis - elaborated process maps for the processes that enter into the activities described by a document. As it was outlined above, an analysis and optimisation are time-consuming activities. Therefore, it is highly effective, for the individual document creation, to work with current and easily accessible process maps. At present, there is a process model of the Department available within the environment of Staff information system (ŠIS), which contains descriptions of processes as far as the level of activities.
- Future scenarios method - overviews of the created scenarios, including those not carried out. In the case that it is possible to use some of the not carried out scenarios in a modified and updated form, it shall bring considerable time savings within the problem solving when compared with creating a completely new scenario.
- Analysis of interested parties - as a rule, the interested parties are not often changed with the individual organisational components, and a once compiled list of the interested parties, consisting also of their main characteristics, will do for the future with just updating it, saving time instead of creating the same documents repeatedly.
- EFQM and CAF methods have a high added value, though they were not used among the respondents at all when preparing strategic documents. As it was mentioned in the text above the methods of the internal environment analysis are not a necessary part of a strategic document, but they can serve as a valuable informational basis. And now it is again appropriate to remind the frequent problems of inaccurate identification of the problems' causes, processing of inadequate data and insufficient execution of the analysis of existing solutions. These problems can be also interconnected with the barriers of a lack of time and lack of information. At the same time, the outputs of EFQM and CAF provide a systematic and detailed overview of the current state of the organisation's internal environment, and if well processed they also help identify the problem areas together with their causes. Because of this reason these analyses can be recommended in the Department at the level of partial components (units) for "preventive" reasons. The outputs of such analyses can be stored, as it was suggested with the previous recommendations, as an accessible source of quality information, which is ready to be used for the document processing. Also in this case, it is necessary to keep this database regularly updated.
- A peculiar situation is within the question of methodically correct use of the analytical methods. The available findings reveal that the Department members have insufficient knowledge of the methods (not only "what" to do, but especially "how" to do it correctly). They have second-hand knowledge of the methods from the practice and from their self-study, and they do not use their knowledge acquired through the master's studies sufficiently. At the same time, they do not consider the unfamiliarity with the methods to be a significant barrier, and they even do not consider the knowledge of the methods and existence of methodologies to be a key factor for effective problem solving. However, from the external perspective it is obvious that the methodically incorrect analytical work leads to conclusions which are difficult to be used, making the existing barriers (especially the lack of quality information) even more serious. For this reason, it seems appropriate to suggest at least some of the key

principles, which are the most neglected in practice, with the most frequently used methods of strategic analysis while preparing a document:

- SWOT analysis - a set of factors entering the matrix and stemming from the analysis of internal and external environments. It is highly desirable when the units have their environment at least generally analysed, and thus it is not necessary, in terms of executing SWOT analysis, to waste time with a complex environmental analysis. Then, the aim of the analysis is to generate strategic variants that are based on the identified environmental factors. There is no need to use SWOT analysis for a mere list of strengths and weaknesses of an organisation.
- Process analysis - it can be used both as an informational basis about the current state of an organisational environment and as a working aid in case of preparing extensive strategic documents. In the cases when the document processing is an activity demanding a lot of time, personnel and other resources, it is effective to devote some time during the preparation phase to the determination of the basic processes within the document creation. The aim here is to avoid duplicating the work (lack of time), and to achieve a complex processed issue (subsequent lack of information).
- Future scenarios - subjective forecast of probable development of an environment can be objectivised by means of multiple persons engagement, and a systematised (i.e. quantitatively evaluated) forecast of the environmental development can lead to a fairly precise forecast of the probable development. With the scenarios it must be clearly specified by which assumptions and prerequisites their execution is determined.

CONCLUSION

The article's focus was the evaluation of use of the methods of strategic analysis while creating strategic documents in the Ministry of Defence in the Czech Republic based on a conducted research. The research "Solving Unstructured Decision-Making Problems in the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic" revealed that the methods of strategic analysis are used very little during the preparation of documents, which can impact the real quality and usability of the documents. Due to this reason, the authors proposed possible ways to improve the use of the methods.

An analysis of the methodology for creating the public strategies from 2012 was conducted within the article. This analysis results in recommendations for the utilization of concrete methods of strategic analysis primarily in the phase of strategy creation, analytical and prognostic phase and in the phase of strategic orientation setting.

Furthermore, the barriers affecting the decision-making and the most common decision making mistakes have been described and based on these factors, further recommendations for the use of methods of strategic analysis have been formulated. The essence of these recommendations is the higher standardization of data collection and replacement of the Interview and Discussion methods by higher structured DELPHI or Questionnaire methods. The optimization of SWOT analysis, Process analysis, Method of future scenarios and other methods has been recommended. At the same time, more frequent use of the EFQM and CAF methods is suggested.

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Information

Analytická podpora dlouhodobého obranného plánování v Norsku

Analytical Support to Norwegian Long-Term Defence Planning

Sigurd Glærum, Alf Christian Hennum

Abstrakt: Hlavní výzvou v obranném plánování je vytvoření transparentního propojení mezi bezpečnostními výzvami, politickými ambicemi a strukturou ozbrojených sil. Tento článek popisuje metodiku plánování založeného na schopnostech a scénářích s využitím softwarového nástroje s názvem JDARTS, který umožní systémově řešit propojení bezpečnostních výzev a odpovídající struktury ozbrojených sil. Bezpečnostní problémy jsou výzvy, které představují úkoly, vyplývající ze scénářů, které jsou porovnány s možnostmi sil a strukturou jednotlivých prvků. Takové porovnání slouží k výběru nejvhodnější a nejméně nákladné varianty. JDARTS tuto metodu podporuje. Přestože budoucí vývoj je nejistý, úkolem plánovačů je příprava podkladů pro strategická rozhodnutí a pro stanovení priorit, které vychází z ekonomických omezení, připravenosti k obraně země a plnění mezinárodních závazků.

Abstract: A major challenge in defence planning is to establish a clear audit trail between security challenges, political ambitions and the recommended force structure. This paper describes a capability- and scenario-based methodology combined with a software toolset called JDARTS that gives long term defence planners a systematic approach to create links from high level security challenges to force structure recommendations. The security challenges are represented by mission types exemplified by scenarios which give concrete requirements. These requirements are represented by capabilities which are matched against the capabilities of force structure elements. The matching is a selection process where the outcome is the cheapest set of the force structure elements that fulfil the requirements. The JDARTS-software supports this method. Even though the future is uncertain, the defence planner's job is to help decision makers prioritize between economic constraints, national preparedness and international commitment.

Klíčová slova: obranné plánování; dlouhodobé plánování; schopnosti; scénáře; výstavba ozbrojených sil.

Keywords: Defence Planning; Long Term Planning; Capabilities; Scenario; Force Development.

INTRODUCTION

One of the main problems in long-term defence planning after the end of the Cold War has been to establish a clear link between security challenges and political ambitions on the one hand and the recommended force structures on the other. What - specifically - should our forces be able to do and which platforms and units are needed to do it?

Due to a lack of clear methodological foundations, defence planning has in many nations centred on financial challenges and the urge to maintain as many of today's capabilities as possible under tight budget constraints. In this paper we will present an approach that gives decision makers explicit choices in the trade-offs between economic concerns, force structure capabilities and level of ambition. The method will throw light on the consequences of these choices. It is systematic, provides an audit trail, is repeatable and - perhaps most importantly - is feasible from a practical point of view.

BACKGROUND

A main element of Norwegian defence planning has been the so-called Defence Studies, initiated by the Chief of Defence. The methodological approach applied by these studies has not been completely consistent, but the studies have nonetheless been the main driver for a hard, but necessary, transformation of the Norwegian Defence.

The nineties were characterised by a completely new security environment. The Cold War was over and the one scenario that had dominated the Norwegian defence planning - invasion from the East - was less relevant. It was therefore necessary to reconsider the tools and methods that had been employed up until then. Although collective defence is still a central mission (and more so than it was just a few years ago) the threats and challenges today are complex and multifaceted.

Especially in times when defence budgets were declining (at least in terms of purchasing power), the focus will often shift to the preservation of current capabilities as far as budgets allow. The view in the long-term, the identification of future challenges and the (new) capabilities needed to handle them will often suffer as a consequence.

There is, in other words, a tendency to concentrate on today's solution to today's problems, with the economic constraints as the main parameter for the planning process. Since today's problems are radically different from those prevalent during the Cold War, this has not stopped the transformation process. We will, however, maintain that it is necessary to base defence planning on an investigation of the long-term challenges in order to build defence forces that are robust with respect to an uncertain future.

GOALS

A method for long-term defence planning should in our view fulfil the following:

- It should identify and specify the challenges in the security environment the nation may face in the future, in peace, crisis and war - in our immediate neighbourhood and farther afield.
- It should give an internally consistent and traceable path from the security environment assessment and defined level of ambition to the recommended force structure.
- It should be capability based, i.e. seek to establish the required defence capabilities before explicit solutions in terms of platforms and units are specified.
- It should identify the most cost effective force structure and allow trade-offs between cost and level of ambition.
- It should identify a force structure which is robust and flexible with respect to a changing security environment, uncertain future budget levels and shifts in policy.

In this paper we will outline a method that seeks to satisfy these criteria. The method has been used at FFI in support of the long term planning process in the MoD and a number of Defence Studies carried out by the Chief of Defence over the last ten years. The main inputs to the studies have been gap analysis of the current and planned force structures and the development of a number of alternative force structures with a long term view.

THE FRAMEWORK

The method we present in this paper is what could be loosely called "capability based planning". It has certain similarities to what NATO employs in its Capability Requirements Review (CRR) and also to the framework defined by SAS-025 "Handbook on Long Term Defence Planning", but with some national adaptations. This paper does not, therefore, present fundamentally new research, but rather the implementation of an established approach in a national context.¹

The term capability is in this context synonymous with the operational ability to perform a certain task. In a capability based approach a number defined capability categories (collection or package of capabilities) is used both to express requirements derived from scenarios and the abilities of units and platforms. This gives us flexibility in matching units and platforms to requirements and avoids zeroing in on specific solutions too early in the process.

Figure 1 illustrates the process flow and basic components of the method. There are two main lines of analysis. The bottom one, the force structure analysis, is a bottom-up process that aims to identify the capabilities and costs of the current and future force structure. The upper one, the scenario analysis, is a top-down process where we

¹ Although one of the authors took part in the development of the CRR while employed by the NATO C3 Agency. He was also in charge of the development of the JDARTS toolset described below.¹

develop capability requirements from the national security situation, future challenges and strategic aims.




Figure 1: The scenario- and capability-based analysis process

MISSION TYPES, SCENARIOS AND CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

The derivation of capability requirements is based on an analysis of the national security situation, future challenges and national strategy. The critical factor of the derivation is to be as open-minded as possible. It is a classical mistake to depend too much on projections of trends or probabilities - such prophecies usually end up being wrong. What we aim for instead is a set of mission types which spans - to the greatest extent possible - the space of potential future challenges to national security. The mission types are generic scenarios, which mean that they do not contain specifics with regard to parameters such as time, place or opponent. Examples on mission types could be "Collective Defence" or "Crisis Containment". To develop a complete set of mission types we have to take into account both national and international challenges.

The mission types are not specific enough to be used for the derivation of meaningful capability requirements. It is therefore necessary to develop concrete situations where geography, actors and time lines are defined. These are called scenarios and are detailed examples of the mission types described above. To represent the different aspects of each mission type, at least three scenarios should be developed and analysed. Figure 2 gives an example of a specific scenario.

The scenario analysis consists mainly of a decomposition of each mission type into objectives, tasks and subtasks. The subtasks are then analysed to determine the capability requirements for each of them. This can be accomplished through war-gaming, simulation models, the application of doctrine, etc. It is important to note that this is not a troop-to-task analysis, as we at this stage are only interested in capabilities. The mapping of forces against requirements is done later in the analysis.

The capability requirements derived for each subtask is mission type specific and applied to each scenario of that mission type. The details associated with each scenario will influence the size of the capability requirements (some of which may be zero), but not the type of capabilities required. Another way of putting this is that the concept of operations is determined at the mission type - not the scenario - level.

LEVEL OF AMBITION

One of the more important benefits of a structured defence analysis is that it entails a concrete formulation of the level of ambition with respect to a national defence policy. In a perfect world this level of ambition should be defined by high level political decision makers. This is, however, very rarely the case. The alternative is to demonstrate and clarify the level of ambition that is actually achieved with respect to any given force structure. This is the approach taken in FFI's support to the Defence Study, initiated by the Chief of Defence, and also in the MoD's long term planning process.

There are several aspects of the ambition level that must be defined:

- A level of ambition with respect to a given scenario, i.e. a course of action, degree of dependence on allied forces, etc.
- A level of ambition with respect to what specific scenarios and/or mission types the force structure must be able to handle.
- A level of ambition with respect to what scenarios and mission types that the force structure must be able to handle simultaneously.

The level of ambition, as defined above, will, together with a force structure cost analysis, give a precise description of the consequences of the strategic choices and trade-offs. The level of ambition, together with the capability requirements from the scenarios, gives the total capability requirements the force structure must fulfil. These requirements can be used to either develop a cost-effective force structure from given building blocks or to test an existing one for shortfalls and excesses.

FORCE STRUCTURE REPRESENTATION

In order to establish how well a force structure matches the requirements it is necessary to express these entities using the same units of measurement, or capability categories.

A force structure consists of elements that are qualitatively different. Some of these can have the same or similar capabilities. A Coast Guard ship and a P-3C Orion can, for instance, both do maritime surveillance. To be able to compare the surveillance capability of these two platforms we need a yardstick to measure it with. This yardstick is called a reference unit which then defines a unit of performance (or capacity) for that particular capability category. The reference unit for the capability category maritime surveillance could either be defined as a certain performance level (the ability to survey a certain area with a certain resolution within a defined period of time) or it could be defined to be equal to the surveillance performance of a known platform, such as the P-3C. All platforms and units having a given capability must then be evaluated in terms of performance relative to the reference unit of the capability category, as illustrated in Figure 3.

The performance evaluation aims to identify the 'replacement value' of a certain platform/unit relative to the reference unit. A value of e.g. 2 means that one platform can do the same job as two reference units. It is difficult to be exact in such measures since relative performance will vary with the type of scenario, geography, weather, threat, and other external factors and so a good measure of judgement must be

allowed. Since the purpose of the analysis is an analysis at the level of national force structures, however, the required resolution and accuracy is limited. Techniques that can be used include military judgement, lessons-learned, doctrine, simulation models and more.




Figure 2: The capabilities and capacities of a unit are given as the sum of multiples of a number of generic units, each with a given set of capabilities and capacities measured against reference units - here illustrated with the Norwegian frigate KNM Fridtjof Nansen.

In a defence analysis looking twenty years ahead it will also be necessary to assess the impact of new technologies. Some of today's solutions may become irrelevant and it may also be possible to develop entirely new capabilities. Long-term planning must therefore integrate a technological view in order to analyse alternatives to the traditional force elements.

COST ANALYSIS

Cost estimates are part of the overall analysis at two different stages. One is the total force structure cost analysis, which we will return to below, the other is the life cycle cost analysis with regard to individual force elements. In order to evaluate the cost effectiveness of a particular unit or platform compared with any other then both its capabilities and its costs must be estimated. This can be a very challenging task, since costs associated with, for instance, future technologies are uncertain and because it is not trivial to decide which parts of the support structure should be assigned to and costed as part of a given operational unit before the total force structure is defined. Our experience is, however, that this is not a critical problem since it is not necessary to have very precise cost estimates at this stage of the analysis. The main focus here is at the relative differences between units and platforms - it is only at the total force structure level that absolute costs become important. At that stage the overall support structure will also have been defined and the assignment problem goes away.

SYNTHESIS

After the capability requirements have been analysed and the cost and capabilities of the potential structural elements have been satisfactorily represented, we need to match the two strands of the process depicted in Figure 1. In practice this is done as a Mixed Integer Programme (MIP). This is a mathematical and deterministic algorithm which - given the inputs like costs, capabilities, level of ambition and capability requirements - finds the force structure that fulfils all requirements at the lowest possible cost. The result therefore represents the most cost effective answer to the challenges posed by the level of ambition, under the constraints implied by what is identified as potential structural elements.

The results of the structural analysis cannot be of better quality than the quality of the inputs it is based on. The scenario analysis and the capability and cost evaluations are both, at least at some level, based on judgement and uncertainties and inaccuracies will play a part. The answers can therefore not be represented as any kind of objective, scientific 'truth'. The strength of the analysis is, on the other hand, that the audit trail is very clear and that the effect of all assumptions can be quantified and tested.

GAP ANALYSIS

A main application of the process described in this paper is to evaluate the capabilities of an already existing or proposed force structure. By matching the capabilities of the force structure to the capability requirements derived from the scenarios and level of ambition, the method gives an explicit quantification of what the structure is lacking with regard to capabilities, capacities and readiness. Gaps identified can then either be rectified or a choice can be made to accept the - again explicit and quantifiable - risks associated with leaving gaps unfulfilled.

If, on the other hand, there are elements in the force structure that are not matched against any requirement then the necessity of those elements should be investigated. The reason why they were not selected could either be that its capabilities are not required in any of the scenarios or that there are other elements with sufficient, overlapping capabilities that represent more cost effective solutions. It is of course premature to draw hard conclusions with respect to force elements identified as surplus to requirements. There may be other reasons to include them that cannot be extracted from a scenario analysis, such as overriding political priorities or requirements stemming from the Defence Forces' wider societal responsibilities.

FORCE STRUCTURING

Another and in many ways more powerful application of the method is to use it in a constructive manner. If we take as a starting point a great number of potential structural elements - representing both legacy units, potential acquisitions and radical new technologies - the method will construct a force structure which represents the most cost effective fulfilment of the capability requirements posed by the scenario

analysis and the selected level of ambition.

A total force structure will not be fully defined after the first run-through of the process described here. The path from the current structure to the target structure must be defined, total cost for both the force and support structure must be analysed, the risk of incorporating new untested technologies evaluated, and specific constraints and guidelines may need to be incorporated. A number of iterations will need to take place where it may well turn out that the level of ambition must be adjusted, if for instance the total cost of realising the original ambition level turns out to be unrealistically high.

In this way, we may converge towards a defence structure which is acceptable with policy makers, but which is also in a certain sense internally consistent and for which a clear audit trail from the level of policy and security environment assessment down to the specific force structure elements is available.

IMPLEMENTATION – J-DARTS

The method as it is described above is rather similar to the method that is used within the NATO's cyclic Capability Requirement Review (CRR)-process. To support this process a tool set called J-DARTS (Joint Defence Analysis and Requirements Tool Set) was developed by the NATO C3 Agency (now NCIA). A big advantage with J-DARTS is that it is generic in the sense that it supports the method only. It can therefore be used to support national defence planning processes as well as the CRR-process.

To be able to use J-DARTS for national purposes, it was necessary to remove most of the NATO data and develop national capabilities, mission types and planning situations. It was of course also necessary to analyse the Norwegian forces with respect to capabilities and costs.

In the figure below we have sketched the overall structure of the main elements in J-DARTS.




Figure 3: J-DARTS

CDR

CDR stands for “Central Data Repository” and is a set of databases. All applications can connect to and can utilize this. All mission types, scenarios, decompositions, levels of ambition, task scripts, force elements, costs, etc. are stored in the databases. It is not only a support tool, but also a complete documentation of the analytical process. J-DARTS is a distributed system where the CDR is placed on a central server. The user interface to the CDR is through the applications described below.

D-MIST

D-MIST stands for “Defence Planning Mission Study Tool” and is used to develop and store the mission types. The hierarchical task decomposition is defined here. The lowest level of the decomposition is the basis for the next analysis in the other applications. The scenarios are also created in D-MIST, where we find a textual description of each scenario. It is also possible to link parts of the text to the decomposition to ensure consistency and increase traceability.

D-CALC

D-CALC stands for “Defence Planning Capability Assignment Logic Calculator” and is used to develop and run small scripts which generate capability requirements. The scripts can be simple rules of thumb, outputs from simulations, or static numbers depending on what task is analysed. In this tool we also aggregate the requirements over tasks, phases and geography in each scenario. The rules in D-CALC are mission type specific, but all scenarios must be run through to get the total capability requirements.

D-SIGN

D-SIGN stands for “Defence Planning Scenario Information and Geographical aNalysis” and is used to develop and document the scenario specification. D-SIGN is built upon Maria from Teleplan which is a cartographic tool. All the planning situation parameters which are needed by D-CALC must be stored in D-SIGN. This can be geography, start and end times of each phase, distance from home base, etc. The capability requirements that are generated in D-CALC can also be found here. This helps to visualize the concept of operations, threats and other aspects of each scenario.

D-RUM

D-RUM stands for “Defence Planning Requirements and Unit Matching” and has three main uses:

1. Gather capability requirements from all scenarios and combine them into the so called benchmarks in accordance with a specified level of ambition. Each benchmark represents a combination of concurrent scenarios.
2. Store all forces with the necessary capability and capacity data together with user defined rules for how a force can be used within a force structure.

3. Generate a force structure with the help from D-EFT (see below) and a user interface for parameters and rules for the optimiser, together with a set of reporting and visualisation tools for the generated force structure.

D-EFT

D-EFT stands for “Defence Planning Extended Fulfilment Tool” and is an optimisation program based on the CPLEX-algorithm. It generates a force structure by matching different benchmarks against the capacity of the potential forces. D-EFT searches for the force structure that can meet the capability requirements with the lowest possible cost, taking into account all the user defined constraints.

CONCLUSION

What the future will bring is always uncertain. It can therefore be argued that to plan a defence structure with a 20- to 30-year perspective is an exercise in futility. It is, nevertheless, the task of political and military leaders to make investment decision with impact over just such a time perspective based on the imperfect knowledge we have today.

It can be tempting, given the uncertainties of the long term, to make plans based on today's challenges and present capabilities. The role of the long term planning is, however, to take account of these uncertainties and to make clear the prioritisations that must be made between economic constraints, national preparedness and international commitments. There is certainly a lot more to be done with respect to incorporating flexibility and adaptability concerns in defence analysis, but the first priority must nevertheless be to introduce a small measure of analytical rigour in the process.

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Peer- Reviewed Article

Tvorba globální bezpečnostní strategie EU

Výzvy plynoucí ze zamrzlých konfliktů ve východním sousedství EU

Drafting EU Global Security Strategy

Challenges Arisen by Frozen Conflicts in its Eastern Neighbourhood

Cristina Bogzeanu

Abstrakt: Přestože *Bezpečnostní strategie EU* se zaměřuje na několik úrovní a domén, článek se věnuje problémům, které mají svůj původ ve východních oblastech Unie. Argumentace uvedená v článku prezentuje teoretické aspekty Strategie a charakterizuje bezpečnostní prostředí v oblasti Černého moře, představuje trendy vývoje v oblastech „zamrzlých“ konfliktů a postoj EU k těmto problémům v celém kontextu. Autorka dospěla k závěru, že EU dnes čelí z východu vážným hrozbám, vyplývajícím z historie jejich vzniku a vývoje a z absence jejich dosavadního řešení ze strany EU. Tato situace vyžaduje řešení a existuje riziko, že nově vytvářena Bezpečnostní strategie EU je dostatečně nezohlední a že nový bude mít jen obecnou povahu, s malou praktickou hodnotou.

Abstract: Although the EU global security strategy has to offer orientation on multiple levels and domains, the present paper approaches the challenges emerging from the Union's eastern neighbourhood. The argumentation includes theoretical aspects of strategy, main characteristics of the Black Sea security environment, trends of frozen conflict evolution, and the EU's approach in this entire context. The study concludes that the serious challenges the EU faces nowadays in its eastern vicinity are the result of phenomena with a consistent history and deficient management by the EU. In our opinion, this train of events makes the project of a new EU security strategy so challenging that it could become a new document of an over-general character, with little practical value.

Klíčová slova: Bezpečnostní strategie; zamrzlé konflikty; strategická samostatnost; politika východního sousedství.

Keywords: Security Strategy; Grand Strategy; Frozen Conflicts; Strategic Autonomy; European Neighbourhood Policy.

INTRODUCTION

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is expected to provide a European Global Strategy by the end of June 2016. A new security strategy has never been more necessary and, at the same, it has never been so challenging to be drafted. The dynamic of international security environment, the changes occurred within the European security environment and within the EU itself are unbeatable arguments standing for the necessity of a new strategic document at this level.

1. THE OVERALL CONTEXT

The latest EU strategic document dates from 2003. Ever since, the number of EU member states has increased from 15 to 28, and a new Treaty on the Functioning of the EU has been issued, including new institutions in the area of security and defence. European actors passed through a disconcerting economic and financial crisis with serious economic, political, and social repercussions. It was also the moment when the EU's main strategic partner - the US - announced its strategic interests pivoted to Asia-Pacific region, meaning that as long as its European partners would not face a vital threat, its resources will be focused on that area. It was also the period of the "Arab spring", which was not only an opportunity for the EU to prove its ability of acting as a security provider in its southern vicinity, but also revealed its limits in this respect.

Nevertheless, the most self-evident token that the EU had to forge a new strategic approach, based on a realistic assessment of the security evolution and of its own interests and resources was the Ukrainian crisis. During 2013, Brussels and Moscow were engaged in a process of attracting states in their common vicinity to enhanced integration formulas - the EU through the Association Agreements and Russia to the Eurasian Union. The subsequent events, culminating with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the separatist war in eastern Ukraine stand as a proof that the European way of acting on the international arena, based on idealist rhetoric, on its normative power, focusing on promoting European values and standards can determine geopolitical effects.

Even more, the same events revealed that the EU's idealist rhetoric, based on the promotion of human rights, liberal democracy, free market, economic welfare is not an adequate manner of approaching international relations. In our opinion, this characteristic of the EU's vision on foreign affairs turned out to have two major deficiencies. Firstly, beyond its liberal discourse, there is also a lack of realism, of adapting its approach to the specific of the other actors of the international arena and, secondly, it also served as one of the justifications for putting security and defence matters on the lower places of Brussels' priorities.

In fact, there are opinions in the academia according to which the EU lived, until the Ukrainian crisis, in a "post-historical" moment,¹ acting on the international arena taking

¹ Russell Walter Mead: The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of Revisionist Powers. *Foreign Affairs* [online]. May/June 2014 [cit. 2016-05-20]. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics>.

as a premise F. Fukuyama's thesis published in "The End of History and the Last Man". However, states in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the former Soviet states, still live in an era marked by geopolitical calculi, in an era where the illegal annexation of Crimea, the separatist war in Donbass are only the latest in a list of events including the preservation of frozen conflicts and the Russian-Georgian war (2008). In other words, Brussels, like most of western actors, acted as if geopolitics and power politics had ceased to exist,² trying to approach international relations beyond the geopolitical issue of territory and beyond military power. All of these also turn out the failure of the EU's security strategy and, especially, of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Beyond this unexpected awakening to a realistic paradigm of thinking international relations, clashing with the EU's idealist manner of approaching international affairs and security matters, there is a more ample and significant shock. The US strategic shift toward Asia-Pacific also implies the need for the European allies to get involved and to invest more in the security of their immediate vicinity, to develop "strategic autonomy", a term mentioned by Catherine Ashton in 2013, referring to the EU's need of becoming a security provider especially and firstly in its own neighbourhood.³ Strategic autonomy supposes the capacity of initiating actions, of taking the initiative, at least, at regional level, with the support of the US, but not relying on its major contribution.

It is also noteworthy that strategic autonomy hasn't been thought exclusively in relation with the European Union, but with European states. In this respect, one shall only consider the following series of events: US announcing the pivot of its strategic interests to Asia-Pacific (2011/2012) - the launch of "pooling and sharing" (EU) and "smart defence" (NATO) initiatives (2012) regarding the increase of European states' financial contribution to their defence through these mechanisms - the reactions to the "Arab spring" (2012).

The main idea emerging from all these facts was that Europeans had to increase their responsibilities for their own defence, emphasizing the importance of guaranteeing stability and security in their neighbourhood, namely of that space whose major destabilization could directly and seriously reverberate on the European security environment. In this line of thought, the conclusion could only be that the chosen institutional framework to reach this objective - NATO or EU - wasn't as important as the responsible engagement in meeting this request, respectively in developing the necessary capacity of acting as a security provider in the neighbourhood.

Therefore, acting under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aegis was just one of the available roads opening for the European states in this context. Nevertheless, developing strategic autonomy at the EU's level has raised in Brussels' top priorities, especially in the context of the acute political and military crisis in its Eastern borders.

The need for strategic autonomy had been acknowledged even before the Ukrainian crisis, which demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the failure of ENP. This means that

² Sven Biscop: *Geopolitics with European Characteristics. An Essay on Pragmatic Idealism, Equality and Strategy*. Egmont Paper 82. Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, March 2016, p. 6.

³ Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence. Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy. Brussels, October, 15, 2013 [cit. 2016-05-18], p. 2. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.

currently, the EU is in course of projecting a new strategic document, under the need of developing its strategic autonomy (also including the military dimension), in the context of a proved failure in approaching security in its neighbourhood and of a still undergoing political-military crisis at its borders. Along with all these, there should be also considered the significant political, diplomatic, and economic degradation of its relations with its most notable neighbour in the east - the Russian Federation - as a consequence of the EU's reaction to Moscow's decision to annex Crimea and get involved in the separatist movement in Ukraine. All of these make it hard to imagine a more challenging context for the drafting of a new strategic document.

2. EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD SPECIFIC: FROZEN CONFLICTS AND EU'S APPROACH

Broadly speaking, frozen conflicts refer to situations in which, despite overcoming the highest point of escalation, conflicts cannot be considered resolved because peace negotiations haven't led to a solution acceptable for all the parties involved. The causes of these conflicts are apparently situated in ethnic, ethnic-territorial and even identity domains. Even if they usually carry such dimensions, their specific lays in their geopolitical and geoeconomic value. Actually, frozen conflicts in Eastern Europe take place in former Soviet republics and have at their roots minority communities' claims of independence. Usually, these minorities are Russian, pro-Russian or Russian supported.⁴

The frozen conflict's geostrategic and geoeconomic valence can be clearly understood in a parallel analysis of the map of these conflicts and of the main pipelines ensuring hydrocarbon transport from Russia to Europe. Countries experiencing such conflicts carry a high importance both for Europe's energy security and for the maintenance of Russia's energy monopoly. Even more, the Russian Federation plays a major role in most of these conflicts, usually by supporting separatists and by keeping military presence on the territory of the countries marked by such conflicts.

In EU's eastern neighbourhood, there are four main frozen conflicts as follows: Transdnister (the Republic of Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan - Armenia). To all of these, Ukraine's Donbass region can be added. Even though it is not frozen yet, the conflict between Kiev and Donbass separatists is much similar to the other conflicts in the region if considering the following aspects: ethnic dimension, geopolitical and geoeconomic value, Russian involvement on the separatists' side,⁵ resulting in new political entities aspiring to gain autonomy and independence in relation to central authorities of the state. Even more,

⁴ Alexandru Grumaz: La Marea Neagră este liniște (?!). *Adevărul* [online]. April, 12, 2016 [cit. 2016-05-09]. Available at: http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/la-marea-neagra-liniste--1_570c79215ab6550cb8e479e2/index.html

⁵ Although the Russian Federation denies its involvement in the separatist war in eastern Ukraine, most of western references to these events call for Russia to cease offering support to separatists in Ukraine across the border. For instance, see: Office of the Spokesperson: *Russia's Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine's Efforts Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability*, Fact Sheet [online]. July 14, 2014 [cit. 2015-12-16]. Washington. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229270.htm>; *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales* [online]. 5 September 2014 [cit. 2015-12-06]. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_11_2964.htm?mode=pressrelease

the consequences of the future Kiev's foreign political trajectory foreshadow to be similar to the other states experiencing frozen conflicts - continuous instability, economic stagnation, and paralysis in developing viable institutions, impossibility of implementing reforms necessary for the integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures.

Additionally, one shall also take into account that frozen conflicts can be defined as those having reached a fragile "no peace, no war" state, as a result of the military victory of separatists, with foreign support⁶. However, their independence is not internationally recognized, remaining the subject of the international law infringement⁷. This manner of defining frozen conflicts reveals one of their main characteristics: they do not consist necessarily in a conflict's freeze, but especially in freezing the peace processes. This even more as the history of these conflicts reveals a tendency to unfreeze, to melt down on a periodic basis.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is eloquent in this respect that ever since the Minsk II Agreement was signed (February 11th, 2015), its provisions have been repeatedly broken on an almost daily rate, as there are sources according to which there are at least 400 killed since the parties assumed to implement its conditions⁸.

Failure to implement the Minsk II Agreement also equals to one of the greatest challenges the EU faces when drafting a new security strategy - establishing the guiding lines for the relations with the Russian Federation. As mentioned before, after the illegal annexation of Crimean Peninsula, the EU imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. Lifting those sanctions is conditioned by the compliance with the provisions of the Minsk II Agreement. In December 2015, the EU Council decided to extend these sanctions until July 31st, 2016.⁹ In our opinion, the chances for this to happen in the near future are even shallower as the Russian Federation denies the accusations that they have sent troops and weapons to support separatists in eastern Ukraine.

The document the EU is set to draft is the European equivalent of a grand strategy. A grand strategy is usually considered to be the attribute of great powers, with extended vital economic, political and military interests. Having a grand strategy supposes keeping in mind long-term objectives, while continuously adapting to present difficulties.¹⁰ Also, having a grand strategy is an assertion of one actor's status as a major power in the international arena.

Setting guiding lines for future relations with Russia is both of major importance and extremely challenging. The diplomatic crisis following the Ukrainian crisis is just one

⁶ Natalie Tocci: *The EU and conflict resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard*. Routledge Publishing, New York, 2007, pp. 2-3.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Carla Babb: Pentagon: Despite Minsk II, More Than 400 Ukraine Troops Killed. *VOA News* [online]. March, 2, 2016 [cit. 2016-05-15]. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/pentagon-ukraine-russia-minsk/3217502.html>.

⁹ Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months, Press release [online]. December, 21, 2015 [cit. 2016-05-15]. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/21-russia-sanctions>

¹⁰ Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, James Lacey (eds.): *The Shaping of Grand Strategy. Policy, Diplomacy, and War*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 1-7.

side of the problem. Another important component of this equation lies in the issue of EU's and Russia's common neighbourhood. The EU's approach was mostly based on the economic, social and political dimensions, being oriented toward the development of the self-governance capacity of states in this region, toward their long-term stabilization (Table no. 1). ENP, Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy included these components to a large extent.¹¹ Regarding the financial support of the ENP countries, we choose to focus on the data for the 2007-2013 timeline, when this support was granted through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument - ENPI (2007-2013). Afterwards, a new program was scheduled: European Neighbourhood Instrument: 2014-2020. However, given the fact that the present paper is focused on the flaws of the EU's approach in its neighbourhood and the change of this approach in the light of the Ukrainian crisis and of the new EU's strategy, the data is considered relevant for the purpose of this approach.

Table Nr. 1: Comparative table of the EU's actions in the states in its eastern neighbourhood experiencing frozen conflicts

	The Republic of Moldova	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Programs benefitting from bilateral EU financial assistance through ENPI, 2007-2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Development of democracy; - Development of the rule of law; - Respect for fundamental human rights; - Economic reform and improvement of living conditions; - Increasing the mutual trust between Kishinev and Tiraspol. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening the rule of law; - Respect for fundamental human rights; - Sustainable economic development; - Development of legal system; - Resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; - Building trust between the government in Tbilisi and the two breakaway republics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reform of judicial area; - Modernization of public finances; - Trading reform plan; - Educational reform. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Energy policy reform; - Rural development and agriculture; - Financial sector management ; - Legal system reform.
Financial support (2007-2013) in relation with the population of the beneficiary state¹²	EUR 560.9 mil. / 3,546,847 inhabitants	EUR 452.1 mil. / 4,931,226 inhabitants	EUR 281.5 mil. / 3,056,382 inhabitants	EUR 143.5 mil. / 9,780,780 inhabitants
EU CSDP Missions	EUBAM	EUJUST Themis EUMM	-	-

¹¹ For an extended analysis of the efficiency of the EU's actions in its neighborhood, see: Cristina Bogzeanu: *Rolul UE în gestionarea conflictelor închețate din vecinătatea sa. "Carol I"* National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2015.

¹² The identification of the estimated number of the population for July 2015 used the data provided by CIA World Factbook [online] [cit. 2016-04-30]. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

	The Republic of Moldova	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
EU status within peace negotiations	Observer in “5+2” negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Main negotiator of the Agreement in 6 points - Co-chair of Geneva Talks 	-	-
Mandate of the Special Representative	EU Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova a) Contribution to the peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and the implementation of a viable solution, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders; b) Contribution to strengthening democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights for all citizens of Moldova; c) Promoting good relations between Moldova and the EU based on common values and interests; d) Supporting the fight against trafficking in human beings, arms and other goods from and through Moldova; e) Contribution to strengthening stability and security in the region; f) Enhancing the efficiency and visibility of the EU in the region.	EU Special Representative for South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia: a) Contribution to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, including the crises in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh; b) Encouraging regional cooperation; c) Enhancing the efficiency and visibility of the EU in the region; d) Contributing to strengthening stability and security in the region.		
AA/DCFTA	2014	2014	-	-

Even though they were included in areas of cooperation between the EU and the states experiencing protracted conflicts, frozen conflicts haven't played a central role in these frameworks, even though the economic, political, social, technocratic measures undertaken by the EU verged toward providing stability and security, which, in the case of these states, also means, in the long term, the resolution of protracted conflicts. One of the most important reason for this being the difficulty of approaching Russia's major interests in the region.

In fact, this was one of the major reasons for the ENP failure - the focus on “low politics” (economic and technical cooperation) instead on “high politics” (diplomacy and military), due to the difficulty of negotiating relations with Russia in this respect.¹³

¹³ Sven Biscop: *Game of Zones - The quest for influence in Europe's neighborhood*. Egmont Paper 67, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Academia Press, June 2014, p. 7

Even in these conditions, Moscow's vision on western, including the EU, politics in its common vicinity is marked by a competitive attitude. Therefore, finding a middle way, on the basis of a farsighted win-win approach is one of the most concerning issues which should be approached within the new European strategic document.

3. FROZEN CONFLICTS: RECENT TRENDS

As mentioned before, one of the distinctive characteristics of frozen conflicts is the fact that they have the tendency of re-bursting regularly. The formation of a new frozen conflict in the eastern neighbourhood has a high potential of destabilizing the fragile stability in the region. Equally relevant in this respect is the Russian Federation's role in the context of these conflicts. Moscow's special interest in maintaining influence in this area has already become a cliché in specialty studies. Presently, Russia has a 3,300 personnel military basis in Gyumri (Armenia), 1,500 peacekeepers in Transdníester (Republic of Moldova), and 7,000 militaries in Georgia (a military base in Gaudata, Abkhazia and another one in Djava/Tskinvali, South Ossetia)¹⁴. Given its success in Ukraine, there were many analyses arguing that "Kremlin may be inspired (...) to repeat the venture in other post-Soviet states".¹⁵

Beyond Russia's play in maintaining instability in this space, there are also serious endemic vulnerabilities, shared by all the states experiencing protracted conflicts - separatist movement on ethnic basis, endemic corruption, economic and social instability, etc. Hostile relations between the majority and minority communities already have a consistent history dating back to the end of the Cold War. Therefore, frozen conflicts involve an inherent great complexity as they imply various issues to be taken into account: internal economic, social, political problems and the overlapping interests of major regional actors.

One of the most recent reminders of the conflict-prone character of the actors in the Black Sea region are the violent clashes with major strategic relevance that happened this year in Nagorno-Karabakh. On April 2nd, 2016, there were reports of resuming military activities between Armenian and Azeri military forces on the Line of Contact (Nagorno-Karabakh's border), resulting in the death of dozens of military and civilians. During the confrontation, Azeri military forces occupied a series of strategic locations. Hostilities ended on the 5th of April 2016, as sides agreed to a ceasefire, although clashes continued on the Line of Contact. This area has been often described as the most dangerous militarized area in Europe. The major strategic importance of the violent events happened in early April 2016 is also related to Russian Federation's role in the frozen conflict context. Nagorno-Karabakh is the only protracted conflict in South Caucasus with no direct Russian involvement, having as main parties not a state and a separatist entity within the state, but two distinct national actors - Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, Moscow has close relations with both Erevan and Baku. In 2013, Armenia renounced to the Association Agreement with the EU just after completing negotiations in this respect for joining the Customs Union. Also, Russia is Armenia's main strategic partner and the modernization and maintenance of its military forces is highly dependent on Moscow. At the same time, Russia sold military equipment worth

¹⁴ According to The Military Balance 2015, Routledge Publishing house, UK, pp. 175, 180, 184.

¹⁵ H. Reisinger and A. Golts: *Russia's Hybrid Warfare. Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence*. Research Paper no. 105. November 2014. Research Division - NATO Defence College, Rome, p. 10

4 billion \$ to Baku only in 2012.

Despite the ceasefire, the situation remains extremely volatile and presents a high risk of destabilizing the entire region. Russia's key relations both with Baku and Erevan, Turkey's support for the Azeri, the reported use of heavy weapons, artillery and rockets, Iran's economic and social ties with the parties involved, as well as Azerbaijan's energy relevance can be listed as important arguments in this respect.

Stability and security in the entire region can be characterized by highly volatile and inflammable hostility as, Armenia aside, all former Soviet states enhanced their partnership with the EU. Despite Russia's pressures to attract them to its own consolidated integration formulas and given the overlapping Russian and western interests in the region, the diplomatic crisis between Russia and western actors, the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia, the reassurance measures undertaken at the NATO's level, the security equation in the region shapes as of extreme complexity, with multiple variables to be taken into account.

Although in the last two years attention has been focused on the Ukrainian crisis and, recently, the resumption of violent clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, we should not forget the recent evolutions of the other frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area, especially those in Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While all eyes were on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova went through one of the most serious political crises, determined by extended endemic corruption.¹⁶

A special relevance can also be attached to the strategic partnership agreed between Russia and Abkhazia (November 2014) providing a closer social, economic, humanitarian, as well as foreign, security and defence cooperation between the two entities. Also, in South Ossetia there is a referendum on the course of organization of joining the Russian Federation. The referendum was supposed to take place no later than August 2016, but on May 30th, 2016 it was postponed for 2017. This political measure is considered thoroughly illegal as not only was the majority of Georgians in South Ossetia ethnically cleansed by separatists in 1991-1992, but also, after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the province has been hosting thousands of Russian troops, which gives Moscow a high leverage of influence.¹⁷

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the EU's approach to its eastern neighbourhood has also begun to change. The political-military crisis experienced by Kiev was also the first time the EU's actions based on liberal principles determined such a crisis with serious military implications. In this line of thought it is useful to recall that the first stages of this crisis consisted in massive street protests against the Ukrainian political decision to suspend the negotiations about the Association Agreement with the EU. The authorities' attempt to put an end to the peaceful protests in a violent manner and the flight of the Ukrainian president were followed by Moscow's decision

¹⁶ "Corruption Index reflects Moldova's disappointing response to corruption", Transparency International, 27 January 2016, URL: http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/corruption_index_reflects_moldovas_disappointing_response_to_corruption, retrieved at 10 May 2016.

¹⁷ Vasili Rukhaze, "Is Russia Preparing the Annexation of South Ossetia?", in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 74, 15 April 2016, URL: http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45326&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=641&cHash=d3faa24a03deed7b9dea1827fa7bd73c#V065mf197Dc, retrieved at 20 May 2016.

to annex Crimea, under the pretext of protecting the Russian population in Ukraine.

Consequently, the EU repeatedly condemned and called for the immediate cease of the Russian actions in Ukraine and adopted a series of measures of coercion aimed at making the Russian Federation cease the destabilizing actions in Ukraine: economic sanctions and diplomatic measures such as the suspension bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and discussions on the new (EU-Russia) agreement as well as preparations for participation at the G8 Summit in Sochi.

At the same time, Brussels continued to support political and economic reforms that are necessary to consolidate a democratic, independent, united and prosperous Ukraine. There were undertaken measures to contribute to this state's economic and political stabilization, including a 11 billion EUR financial support. Also, on December 1st, 2014, European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine formally began operations from its headquarters in Kyiv. This civilian mission is aimed at assisting the Ukrainian authorities in a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights.¹⁸

Briefing up, the EU's role in the Ukrainian crisis context presents a range of peculiarities, differentiating it from the role plaid within the resolution of the other frozen conflicts in the area. Firstly, there can be identified a direct role in triggering the crisis: Association Agreement negotiations with Kyiv - the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend these negotiations under Moscow's pressures in this respect¹⁹ - popular protests - Ukrainian president's flight - Crimea's annexation by Russia - war in Donbas. Secondly, the EU reacted to this crisis, with serious implications for its own security and for the manner in which security is perceived, by combining a set of soft power measures (the support granted to the Ukrainian government) with coercion measures envisaging Russia (economic and diplomatic sanctions).

Relations with the other states in the area experiencing frozen conflicts develop approximately on the same coordinates, the main exception consisting in the implementation of the Association Agreements with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Nevertheless, Brussels continues its long term approach to frozen conflicts resolution, focusing on enhancing these states' self-governance capacity by supporting political, economic, social, and even military reforms.

CONCLUSION

The highest incentive for a new EU security strategy - rising instability in its neighbourhood - is also making this project a challenge in itself. It is also notable that even though instability in the Black Sea region has been attracting international and, especially, European attention in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, its dynamics isn't a new one. Frozen conflicts have been constant in these states' evolution ever since the end of the Cold War. Their multiplication (Ukraine) and their high risk of re-ignition reveal not only their constancy, but also the EU's lack of efficiency in this respect. As far

¹⁸ European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine [online] [cit. 2016-06-03]. Available at: <http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/en/what-we-do/our-mission>

¹⁹ For details, see: Cristina Bogzeanu: Political-military Crises in the Black Sea Area: From Chronic to Acute. *Strategic Impact*, no. 4[53]/2014, pp. 7-17.

as its eastern neighbourhood is concerned, there are several aspects shaping or supposed to shape EU's strategy:

- a) ENP failure in reaching its objective of fostering a ring of stable, secure, prosperous and well governed states around EU's borders;
- b) The emergence of the conflict prospect in the European security environment and the disclosure of the geopolitical and geostrategic calculi leading international actors' behaviour on the international arena as opposed to the EU's mostly idealist rhetoric in this respect;
- c) The acute degradation of West-Russia relations;
- d) The need for the European actors to assume strategic autonomy, especially in their neighbourhood.

If the scope of the future EU security strategy is the one of a grand strategy, than we shall expect this document to stand as a source of all sectorial strategies, guiding the manner in which the EU will promote and defend its interests on the world arena. Therefore, the main challenge for the project of drafting a new EU security strategy emanating from its eastern neighbourhood could be briefed as developing strategic autonomy in the neighbourhood in times when its stability and security are at the lowest level ever since the end of the Cold War.

There are two main aspects giving the real image of the challenge of approaching security in the EU's vicinity. The first one relates to the approach of complex, evolving crises which also involve taking into account setting the grounds for a win-win approach with an increasingly hostile neighbour. Additionally, there is also the need of building and preserving security and stability in the neighbourhood it shares with Russia, on different grounds than the ones proved inefficient by the Ukrainian crisis.

The EU's reaction to the Ukrainian crisis can be already assessed as showing a first step toward the further development and adaptation of its foreign and security policy to the specific of the security environment dynamics, as this reaction revealed a combination of hard power and soft power measures, in accordance with the present EU's capabilities and specifics. Nevertheless, the current trend of security evolutions at regional and international levels requires further development of the EU's capabilities, including the military ones, to promote its interests. Given the overall security context, both the internal and the external one, this fact could turn in a serious challenge for the efficiency of the new EU security strategy.

Concerning the available resources necessary to put these objectives into practice, there are two main issues to be approached: the institutional framework and the available capabilities. As far as the institutional framework is concerned, the first challenge could be seen in the relatively new institutional and conceptual framework created through the Treaty of Lisbon. The 2003 European Security Strategy was designed before the European External Action Service and even before major developments in the area of crisis and conflict management. Institutions need time to prove their efficiency. So, there is a justifiable degree of reticence regarding the current ability of CFSP/CSDP structures and capabilities to function as an efficient leverage for the EU to act as a relevant international actor, capable of efficiently contributing to regional and international security.

Also, recent events in the EU's eastern neighbourhood could lay at the basis of an upgrade of this region in Brussels' security priorities and even the enhancement of cooperation with these states under the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The preservation and the flare of instability and insecurity in this area could function as an incentive for the delineation of a coherent, strong vision and strategy of the EU's member states for this region. Nevertheless, in our opinion, one shall also keep a circumspect view on this due to the numerous security challenges the EU has to address not only externally, but also internally.

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Peer-Reviewed Article

Hybridní válka – případ Chorvatska a Ukrajiny

Hybrid Warfare - Cases of Croatia and Ukraine

Slavko Barić, Robert Barić, Jugoslav Jozić¹

Abstrakt: Navzdory snahám označovat hybridní válku jako novou formu válčení, nebo dokonce jako faktor, který mění povahu války, hybridní válka je součástí ozbrojených konfliktů od starověku do současnosti. Podstatou hybridních válek je paralelní využívání pravidelných i nepravidelných ozbrojených sil a různé způsoby působení na protivníka, s cílem, bez použití otevřeného útoku jej oslabit. Článek předkládá analýzu informační dimenze v hybridní válce proti Chorvatsku (1990-91) a Ukrajině (2014). V obou případech byla hlavním cílem hybridní války sociální jednotu napadených zemí. V případě Chorvatska, navzdory silné propagandistické kampani, následované použitím vojenské síly, se nepodařilo prolomit sociální soudržnost většiny obyvatel Chorvatska. V případě Ukrajiny, díky absenci sociální soudržnosti společnosti hybridní válka vedena Ruskou federací je mnohem efektivnější.

Abstract: Despite the attempts of labeling hybrid warfare as a new form of warfare or even as a factor that is changing the nature of war, hybrid warfare is part of a war from the Antiquity to the present day. The essence of hybrid warfare is in parallel use of regular and irregular military forces and different means of pressure by a power unwilling to openly attack a weaker opponent. Information dimension is analyzed in the cases of hybrid warfare against Croatia (1990-91) and Ukraine (2014). In both cases the key target of hybrid warfare was social cohesion of the attacked countries. In the Croatian case, despite a strong propaganda campaign followed by the direct and indirect use of military force, the attacking side was unable to break social cohesion of the majority of Croatia's population. In the Ukrainian case, the lack of social cohesion has prevented organization of the efficient response to hybrid warfare waged by the Russian Federation. Both cases also indicate the significance of national identity in preserving a society's social cohesion.

Klíčová slova: hybridní válka; válka; informační operace; Chorvatsko; Ukrajina; Ruská federace.

Keywords: Hybrid Warfare; War; Information Operation; Croatia; Ukraine; Russian Federation.

¹ The views and attitudes expressed in this paper represent the authors' personal opinion and cannot be considered as attitudes and opinions of the Croatian MOD or the Croatian Armed Forces.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that hybrid warfare is currently described by many scholars as a new form of warfare, recognized particularly in the new Russian military doctrine, in reality, it does not represent a novelty but a form of warfare that has existed for centuries. The first recorded example in history was the Peloponnesian War², although some other examples may be mentioned, such as the British conquest of Ireland (1593-1604), the Union's counterguerilla operations in the American Civil War (1861-1865), the British colonial wars (1700-1970) or the Chinese-Japanese War (1937-1945).³ Historical experience shows that hybrid warfare represents a combination of conventional, irregular, political and economic warfare - a synchronized application of various elements of national power. Actually, it can be said that hybrid wars are more common today than conventional interstate conflicts. For example, there was no conventional war between two countries in the last ten years. However, a whole range of conflicts that can be included in the category of hybrid warfare have taken place in this period, such as the Israeli-Hesbollah conflict of 2006, the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, the Sri Lankan Civil War (ended in 2009), the Syrian War, the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War (still underway).

Therefore, hybrid warfare can be described as a conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors aimed at achieving a common political goal.⁴

In most cases the political goal is to destabilize certain state institutions and to polarize members of a certain community. A broad spectrum of action, such as conventional military operations, special operations, irregular armed groups (paramilitary groups, terrorist organizations and criminal organizations), intelligence activities, information activities (media, cyberspace, propaganda), and different economic pressures are used to achieve this goal.

The following definition of a hybrid threat is derived from these facts: "any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same time and battlespace to obtain their political objectives."⁵

Hybrid operation as a means to carry out a hybrid threat can be defined as a combination of two or more violent and non-violent state means of power projection capabilities (political and economic tools, information warfare, threat of military force, cyber attacks, and engaging in special operations) to achieve the desired political end state.⁶

Five examples of hybrid warfare can be mentioned here:

- [1] Aggression of a stronger state against a weaker one, in which the aggressor does not want to intervene directly but wants to destabilize the country in order to

² Mansoor, 2012, pp. 3-4.

³ For these historical examples of hybrid warfare as well as some others, see Murray and Mansoor, 2012.

⁴ Mansoor, 2012, pp. 2-3.

⁵ Hoffman, Frank, "On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats." Blog War on the Rocks, 28.7.2014. (<http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybridthreats/>).

⁶ Aapo and Pasi, 2015, p. 4.

stage a coup or to conduct a direct intervention at a later stage. An example is the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in the period from 2014 to 2016.

- [2] Assisting the rebel forces in a certain country with no direct intervention. An example is the U.S. secret financial and material support to the Nicaraguan anti-regime military force (the Contras) in the period from 1981 to 1989.
- [3] The use of methods of hybrid warfare to combat the adversary's irregular forces. An example is the British colonial warfare in the 19th and 20th centuries, or the U.S. operation against the Viet Cong force in the period from 1965 to 1972.
- [4] Activities of irregular forces aimed against the central government authorities, the occupying force or a foreign aggressor. An example is the activity of the Chinese communist force against the Japanese force and the Kuomintang (1937-1945).
- [5] Conflict between the belligerents in the process of disintegration of the state union. The example is in the coordinated activities of the League of Communists of Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) against the Republic of Croatia in the period from 1990 to 1991.

A range of situations in which hybrid warfare is likely to be waged indicates the fact that it is not possible to make a precise classification of hybrid warfare, or to define several organizational models of hybrid warfare. The authors' opinion is that this approach is not possible due to specific conditions (social, cultural, geographic, climatic and other conditions) under which every conflict takes place. All these factors will lead to a different way of waging hybrid warfare in each particular case. Therefore, instead of defining the model of hybrid warfare (e.g. attempts to define the Russian model or a model based on the conflicts in the Middle East), it is necessary to define certain general characteristics of this type of warfare and analyze the ways in which these characteristics are displayed in each particular case (adjusting the use of military and non-military capabilities to wage hybrid warfare in accordance with specific characteristics of the goal).

The following are the general characteristics of hybrid warfare:

- [1] A clearly defined political goal to be achieved and shaping the strategies of action aimed at achieving the goal. Hybrid warfare does not represent an improvised use of different means, but a clearly defined sequence of combining different military and non-military methods of pressure on the adversary in accordance with the defined strategic goal.
- [2] The multidimensionality of the military and non-military methods of operation for the purpose of creating synergistic effects. In order to succeed, it is necessary to achieve the unity of effort in the use of all engaged forces and measures (especially in coordination with the operation of state and non-state actors engaged in hybrid warfare).
- [3] The target of the attack is a certain community - its identity, political structures, state institutions and economy.
- [4] At least one side in hybrid warfare should be the state (as an aggressor or as the target of the attack).

From this description, it can be concluded that hybrid warfare does not represent a change in the nature of warfare. It is just a manner in which the belligerents wage war in the early 21st century. The Russian views on the character of hybrid warfare should

be considered in this context. The oft-cited article by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, emphasized that hybrid warfare is an expression of change in the character of warfare. According to him, in the early 21st century the efficiency of non-military means in fulfilling strategic political goals in a certain conflict has exceeded the use of the weapon systems. A hybrid war confirms such thesis.⁷ The West has used this method of operation in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya), so Russia should study its experience very carefully. The efficiency of military means has been significantly increased by combining them with non-military means and by using the local population as the fifth column, complemented with secret military measures and an open action (peacekeeping operations) in order to achieve strategic political goals. Hybrid wars can turn a stable country into an area of armed conflict very quickly. In this context, Gerasimov emphasized the crucial role of new information technologies. Therefore, it can be concluded that the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine in the Russian discourse represents the incorporation of Western concepts and methods of operation in hybrid warfare in the Russian military theory and practice. The Russian analyses emphasize the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as an example of the Western hybrid warfare.⁸ No matter if we agree with this thesis or not, the Russian use of the methods of hybrid warfare does not represent a new military doctrine or strategy.

A key characteristic of today's hybrid warfare is its information dimension - conducting information and psychological operations by using modern communication systems that provide access to the global media space. The appearance of the Internet, together with further development of the traditional media (radio and television) has resulted in the fact that information warfare has gained an advantage over conventional and non-conventional military actions. A good information campaign can turn military defeat into victory, such as the case with the Vietnamese Tet Offensive in South Vietnam in 1968.

Psychological-propaganda activities are directed at three levels of activity:

- [1] A change in the perception of its own population (mobilization of population in order to achieve certain political goals).
- [2] A change in the perception of the adversary's population and force.
- [3] Legitimizing actions at the international level.

The significance of the information dimension of all types of armed conflicts (including hybrid warfare) is evident in the Russian views on this matter. In the Russian perception, the "information-psychological struggle" together with the use of other non-military means (political, economic and technological) should create conditions to paralyze the adversary's decision-making process and thus prevent the use of its military capabilities. The purpose is to neutralize the adversary without or with minimum use of military power in the final stage of the action, primarily through achieving information superiority.⁹ This is an opposite approach from the Western views which emphasize kinetic effect (the use of weapon systems), and not achieving information superiority.¹⁰

⁷ Gerasimov, Valery, *Ценность науки в предвидении (The Value of Science in Prediction)*. Military-Industrial Herald, 27.3.2013., <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>.

⁸ Korybko, 2015, pp. 33-52.

⁹ Adamsky, 2015., pp. 23-24.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 30.

The goal of information operation is to destroy the social cohesion of the population in a certain country or a region (e.g. operation directed at a specific ethnic community dispersed over the territory of several states). In the Russian views, this is the use of moral and psychological manipulation of social awareness aiming to annihilate the resistance of the population, or even to provide assistance to the aggressor. Such manipulation is based on exploitation of the population's dissatisfaction directed against the governing structures and the disfunctionality of state institutions.¹¹

Although there are many definitions of social cohesion, their common characteristic is the establishment and maintenance of social connections between members of a certain social group - the existence of interdependence and a sense of belonging to a group, cooperation for mutual benefit, and collective resistance to external influences that might endanger the group.¹² This is the essence of the definition of social cohesion given by Emile Durkheim, the founder of this concept: the basic characteristic of a society representing a continuous distribution of different human tasks and the basic element in social solidarity. To Durkheim, the existence of a cohesive society depends on shared loyalties which citizens owed to each other and to the state, based on interdependency.¹³

Morton Deutsch defines cohesiveness as a force that binds the parts of a group together and resists disruptive influences. According to Deutsch, cohesion, based on cooperation between group members, encourages motivation of members to continue working with the group, feeling an obligation to the group.¹⁴

Although in the conflict analysis the social cohesion as a factor is considered in conflicts within a single state (e.g. in analyses of the causes of ethnic conflicts), its consideration in hybrid warfare cannot be avoided, since in this case a foreign aggressor is trying to create or use the existing divisions within a certain community through psychological operations and propaganda. Therefore, the maintenance of social cohesion of a certain community is the primary means for defence against hybrid warfare.

Signs of disrupted social cohesion are:

- [1] Division of the population (ethnic division, political-ideological division) as the source of conflict.
- [2] Disrupted political and economic infrastructure calling into question the management of the basic functions of a state.
- [3] Exclusion of certain categories of population from political and economic processes.

Social cohesion makes a positive contribution to stability of the country and its resilience to external threats, including hybrid warfare. Seth Kaplan mentions the ability to increase cooperation between community members as a precondition to reduce the state organization's fragility, and social cohesion as a means to gain this ability.¹⁵ Kaplan also mentions a shared national identity as the basis for a strong social

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 27-29.

¹² For illustration of the concepts of social cohesion, see Bruhn, 2009, pp. 31-48.

¹³ For illustration of Durkheim's ideas on social solidarity, see Cuff and Francis, 2006, pp. 54-59.

¹⁴ Bruhn, p. 37.

¹⁵ Kaplan, Seth, *A Framework for Fixing Fragile States: Leveraging Social Cohesion and Local Institutions*. Global Economic Symposium, 2009. (<http://www.global-economic-symposium.org/knowledgebase/the-global-polity/repairing-failed-states/proposals/a-framework-for-fixing-fragile-states-leveraging-social-cohesion-and->

cohesion and stability of the state organization.¹⁶

In the end, we can say that hybrid warfare (a combination of conventional and irregular military action and the use of other non-military measures to destabilize the adversary) is a form of warfare that has existed for centuries. At this moment, the dominant characteristic of hybrid warfare is the information dimension directed at breaking social cohesion of the country under attack. Psychological operations and propaganda, including other forms of action within hybrid warfare, are successful only if they represent part of the united effort directed at achieving a clearly defined strategic goal of the aggressor.

The three elements previously mentioned - the existence of a clearly defined strategic goal of the aggressor; the unity of effort in hybrid warfare, and information dimension directed at breaking social cohesion - represent the elements for analysis of two cases of hybrid warfare - the aggression against Croatia (1990-1991) and the aggression against Ukraine (2014).

1. HYBRID WARFARE AGAINST CROATIA

The aggression initiated against Croatia by the leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia and Montenegro and by the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) (1990-1991) represented a culmination of political and economic crisis that seized former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and eventually led to its break-up in 1991. The goal of this aggression was to prevent Croatia's independence, either through recentralization of the federation or in pursuit of the Greater Serbia project.

A period of hybrid warfare against Croatia lasted from January 1990 to January 1992. It can be divided into the three following phases:

Phase one: From the 14th extraordinary congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (January 22, 1990) until the start of Serbs' armed rebellion in Croatia (August 17, 1990). In this phase, the main efforts were directed at seeking legitimacy from the Serbian political leadership and JNA leadership to take measures against those republics (primarily Croatia and Slovenia) that had rejected the program of recentralization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) with the Socialist Republic of Serbia as the dominant member of the reorganised Yugoslav federation. The 14th congress was dissolved after the representatives of the League of Communists of the four federal units of former Yugoslavia left the congress. This resulted in two parallel processes in the federation. One was the continuation of negotiations on future arrangement of the SFRJ during which the Serbian political leadership together with the JNA tried to execute the idea of a centralized federation. The other was the Plan B of Serbia's leadership - to create another Yugoslavia/Greater Serbia through territorial crippling of Croatia, to allow Slovenia to leave the federation and to organize a new state union (composed of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) under Serbia's domination. The second process took precedence after the multiparty elections held in Croatia.

Phase two: From the start of the Serbs' armed rebellion in Croatia until Croatia's independence (August 1990 - August 1991). Phase two started in August 1990 with an open armed rebellion on Croatia's territory with the majority Serb population (the so-

local-institutions).

¹⁶ Kaplan, 2009, pp. 466-472.

called Log Revolution) organized with JNA's assistance. The rebellion started on August 17 in Knin,¹⁷ and its purpose was to pressure Croatia into negotiations on future relations with other Yugoslav republics and into making decisions on Croatia's future arrangement, and to use it as an instrument for a violent change of power and/or separation of areas with Serb majority in case the primary goal would not be achieved. Since October 1990 there had been a series of attacks on the Croatian police committed by rebels (200 attacks were recorded until 1991) who also started setting up roadblocks and assumed power in rebel municipalities. Rebel activities were directed at causing a great conflict with the Croatian authorities and at justifying JNA's intervention aimed at overthrowing the Croatian government elected in the multiparty elections in April 1990. The rebellion escalated after the intervention of the Croatian police to unblock the area of Plitvice Lakes on March 31, 1991. On May 2 twelve Croatian police officers were killed in Borovo Selo (eastern Slavonia), followed by the ethnic cleansing of Croats in rebel-controlled areas.¹⁸

The JNA had constantly provided active support to rebel activities. At the beginning of the rebellion (in August 1990), the JNA prevented the police intervention in Knin thus enabling rebel Serbs to fortify their positions and create the so-called SAO Krajina/Republic of Serbian Krajina. Other measures taken by the JNA leadership in the first and second phase of hybrid warfare against Croatia were the following:

- [1] Disarmament of Croatia's Territorial Defence Forces in May 1990 that was conducted without a decision of the SFRJ Presidency.¹⁹
- [2] Attempts of the JNA leadership and the Serbian political leadership to introduce a state of emergency and overthrow a new legally elected Croatian government (an attempt to disarm the Croatian police in January 1991; a failed attempt of provoking military intervention in February 1991; an attempt to create the conditions for a military coup based on Serbia's attempt to cause crisis in the SFRJ Presidency in March 1991).²⁰
- [3] Redeployment of the JNA forces on Croatia's territory (formation of the Zagreb Corps) with the aim of fast take-over in case a decision was reached to introduce a state of emergency (JNA's plans to operate in emergency situations in order to prevent a civil war).²¹ The JNA leadership had also developed a new version of a war plan called Sutjeska 2 in which a Croatian region (northwest battlefield) was declared the main area of defence of the former SFRJ. This plan envisaged the possibility of NATO's intervention for the purpose of giving assistance to the internal rebellion, and its elements were used in the JNA aggression against Croatia in September 1991.²²
- [4] Implementation of a legally questionable decision by the incomplete SFRJ Presidency of May 4, 1991 on deployment of the JNA between the Croatian police force and rebels. These buffer zones were created to prevent the Croatian police actions against the rebel forces, thus creating conditions

¹⁷ Barić, 2005, pp. 77-81.

¹⁸ Barić, 2005, pp. 124-125.

¹⁹ Marijan, 2008, pp. 151-156.

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 231-246.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 156-170.

²² Ibid, pp. 182-183.

favourable for further development of the rebellion. Buffer zones were created in the area of Pakrac, Plitvice, Borovo Selo and Glina.²³ In this way the JNA played a major role in the creation of SAO Krajina/Republic of Serbian Krajina.²⁴

[5] Direct armament of Serbian rebel forces after the failed JNA intervention in Slovenia.²⁵

Phase three: Direct intervention of the former JNA which took the side of Serbia (August 1, 1991 - January 2, 1992). This phase was the result of Croatia's decision to leave the former federation. This decision was made on June 25, 1991 based on the results of the referendum held a month before.²⁶ In this phase the disintegration of the JNA and its transformation into the military organization of Serbia²⁷ was followed by a direct military intervention and an open support to rebels in Croatia (attacks in eastern and western Slavonia, Banovina, Lika, the Dalmatian hinterland and Dubrovnik).²⁸ The beginning of the Battle of Vukovar (August 25) and the beginning of the attack on Kijevo near Knin (a day later) - in both cases, the attacks were carried out by the former JNA with the assistance of the Serbian paramilitary forces - is the formal beginning of the military aggression of the former federal army against Croatia. The aggression continued until a truce was signed on January 2 in Sarajevo and the JNA withdrew from Croatia's territory.

If we look at the first two elements of the analysis - the existence of a clear strategic goal and the adversary's unity of effort to achieve the goal - it is evident that they were not accomplished in the case of hybrid warfare against Croatia. In phase one the Serbian political leadership, together with the Montenegrin and JNA leaderships, tried to mobilize the rest of the Yugoslav federation to act against Croatia and Slovenia, and to reorganize the Yugoslav federation in terms of greater centralization that would lead to Serbia's domination. The JNA military leadership supported such strategy because it annulled the changes in the former Yugoslavia's defence system caused by the 1974 constitutional changes (transfer of significant powers to the federal units).²⁹ In this way, the JNA forged an alliance with Serbia despite its criticism of the actions taken by the Serbian political leadership.³⁰ However, despite a number of attempts, other Yugoslav republics did not support this plan. In phase two Serbia gave up attempts to centralize the federation and started the plan to create a smaller Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia. In doing so, a large part of the territory would

²³ Marijan, 2008, pp. 244-245.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.228-229, 247-250.

²⁵ Ibid, pp. 283-288.

²⁶ The referendum on Croatia's independence was held on May 19, 1991. Out of 83,56% of registered voters who cast ballots, 94,17% voted for Croatia's independence from the SFRJ. Based on the results of the referendum, on June 25, 1991 Croatian Parliament enacted a constitutional decision on independence and sovereignty.

²⁷ This was confirmed by Federal Defense Minister General Veljko Kadijević in late July 1991, when a decision was made to transform the JNA into a Serbian (and Montenegrin) Army (Marijan, 2008, p. 356). In early October 1991 the SFRJ Presidency included only Serbian and Montenegrin representatives. In fact, at that time the JNA became the military organization of Serbia. On May 28, 1992 it was renamed the Army of Yugoslavia.

²⁸ Marijan, 2008, pp. 289-314.

²⁹ See Marijan, 2006, pp. 36-37.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 350-351.

be seized from Croatia.³¹ In summer 1991 the JNA leadership finally accepted the project of Greater Serbia, although JNA's pro-Serbian attitude had eventually led to its disintegration. Members of other nations left the JNA, which also lost support of a part of the Serbian population because of its communist past and its hesitation to side with the project of Greater Serbia. The result was a failure to carry out general mobilization in Serbia and serious weakness of command caused by the departure of a large number of officers that resulted in the failure of JNA's offensive operation on Croatia's territory in September and October 1991.³² This situation led to the point that in 1991 the JNA had no clear objectives and plans of action against Croatia, while the process of its disintegration after accepting the project of Greater Serbia had erased its main advantage (material and numerical superiority in relation to Croatian forces).

What was the role of the information dimension in hybrid warfare against Croatia? The role of the media in the propaganda war that Serbia started in order to achieve the plan for re-centralization of the Yugoslav federation, which was later transformed into the plan to create Greater Serbia, represented the key factor to initiate the process which caused the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars waged on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Renaud de la Brosse made a study for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during the trial of Slobodan Milošević.³³ According to de la Brosse, in the 1980s the Serbian political leadership used the Serbian state-run media as a means for national homogenization and for the establishment of nationalist ideology. This was part of a well-devised plan of occupation based on creating the atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs against other ethnic groups, and using media as a weapon in the military campaign aimed at seizing large parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnic cleansing of non-Serb population.

The Serbian propaganda machine described the Croats' and Zagreb's attempts to reconstruct the SFRJ as a confederation, preparing for a new genocide against Serbs and the renewal of the Ustasha regime (accusing officials of the League of Communists of Croatia of ustashism). In this way it tried to force Croatia to accept Serbia's plan to recentralize Yugoslavia. Having failed to impose this concept on Croatia and other republics of former Yugoslavia, these arguments were used to prepare and organize the Serbs' rebellion in Croatia and to justify the military intervention and seizure of Croatian territory in Yugoslavia and on the international scene. An example of Serbian propaganda is a story published by Serbian newspaper "Večernje Novosti" that falsely described the Pakrac clash between the Croatian police and Serb rebels on March 2, 1991 as the massacre of 40 local Serb civilians.³⁴ According to de la Brosse, without the active role of the Serbian media, it would not be possible to create hostility and hatred against Croatia in the eyes of the Serbian public.³⁵

³¹ For the analysis of Serbia's territorial claims against Croatia, see Klemenčić, 1993, pp. 285-304.

³² See Marijan, 2012, pp. 251-275.

³³ Renaud de la Brosse, *Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create 'A State For All Serbs': Consequences of using media for ultra-nationalist ends*. ICTY 10.6.2003 (http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/prosexp/bcs/rep-srb-b.htm).

³⁴ For description of Serbian propaganda, see Vasić, Miloš, *Politika falsifikata (Politics of Forgery)*. Vreme No. 431, Beograd 21.1.1999. (http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/431/8.html).

³⁵ Ramet, 2002, p. 41.

After the open outbreak of war, the Serbian propaganda used the methods previously described to encourage wartime mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro, while on the international scene it tried to prevent, or at least to slow down the process of Croatia's international recognition. An example of Serbian war propaganda is a false story about 41 Serb babies that were slaughtered in Vukovar published by Belgrade's daily newspaper "Večernje Novosti" just before the Serbian forces seized the city of Vukovar.³⁶ Reuters also published the news (believing it came from a reliable source),³⁷ while the daily newspapers "Večernje Novosti" and "Politika" published cover stories on alleged Ustasha crimes committed against Serbian children. Later the Radio Television in Belgrade publicly rebutted the alleged crime; but in the same news it broadcasted a report on Serbian volunteers arriving in Croatia to prevent further massacres of Serbian children.³⁸

Importance of the information dimension was visible during the third phase of hybrid war against Croatia, regarding the issue of international recognition of Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics. From the period before the independence referendums in Croatia and Slovenia until the military intervention of JNA in September and October 1991, at least on the surface, the European Community member states had a common stance. In reality from mid-1991 the EC was split over the issue.³⁹

The open JNA military intervention was the turning point that made the EU common policy toward Yugoslavia non-existent. It was a trigger for an official change in the German policy which replaced the support for preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia with the open support for the recognition of the secessionist republics.⁴⁰ Devastating JNA attacks in Eastern Slavonia (attacks on Vukovar and Osijek) and Dalmatia (Zadar and Dubrovnik) gave the Croatian side a perfect opportunity for using those events to counter Serbian propaganda and to influence the public opinion in the EC member states, especially in Germany.

Serbian attacks created a widespread outrage in the German public opinion. German media coverage of the artillery shelling of towns and "ethnic cleansing" practiced by Serbian forces in Croatia created a powerful impetus for a shift in the German government's policy toward the war in former Yugoslavia. In that process German media played an important role in influencing the German public opinion, putting strong pressure on the German political elite.⁴¹

Information war against Croatia was followed by a series of other measures that can be subsumed as hybrid warfare:

³⁶ *Pokolj pre predaje (Butchery before Surrender)*, Večernje Novosti, November 21, 1991.

³⁷ *41 Children Found Dead in School after Croats Flee*, Reuters 20.11.1991.

³⁸ This case has been described in detail in de la Brosse's study.

³⁹ Germany, Austria and Italy were generally more supportive to the efforts made by the governments of Slovenia and Croatia for a confederation of sovereign states. Serbian attempts to create the more centralized federation were received more sympathetically in the UK and France. Such different approaches and policies by the most powerful members of the EC prevented formulating common policy toward the Yugoslav issue.

⁴⁰ The nature and aims of Serbian aggression were a direct attack on the basic tenants' of the German foreign policy: peaceful self-determination, anti-expansionism and commitment to the development of European multilateral institutions. For German foreign policy establishment it was necessary to stop a case of open territorial aggression in the post-Cold War Europe by removing incentives for Serbian territorial expansion. The easiest way to achieve this goal was the recognition of the independence of the seceding republics. See: Glaurdić, 2012.

⁴¹ See Marčić, 2013, pp. 32-37, 50.

- [1] In the field of economics, on December 16, 1990 Serbia intruded into the payment system of the former Yugoslavia seizing 2.6 billion of German Marks.
- [2] Apart from providing political support to rebel Serbs in Croatia (e.g. on March 9, 1991, over 100,000 people in Belgrade protested against the Croatian authorities), Serbia's political leadership also provided material support and organized sending their volunteers.⁴² One of the used pressure methods were so called "truth meetings", massive pro-Serbian demonstrations organised on the territories of the other republics of former Yugoslavia.
- [3] JNA's organization of intelligence activities. An example is the Operation Labrador organized by the Counterintelligence Service of the Yugoslav National Army (KOS). On August 19, 1991 in Zagreb the KOS regional headquarters carried out two bombings of Jewish community facilities (there were no casualties). Together with Operation Opera (a propaganda campaign devised by the KOS to feed disinformation to the media), further bombings were intended to create the image of Croatia as a pro-fascist state. Further activities were stopped in September, after Croatian authorities captured the KOS regional headquarters in Zagreb and confiscated documents related to both operations.⁴³

Despite the fact that the adversary did not manage to achieve the required unity of effort, Croatia's position at the time of its independence in late 1991 was extremely difficult. The defence capabilities were minimal - the creation of the Croatian Armed Forces began with the establishment of the National Guard Corps in April 1991, but rapid arming of the newly created units was rendered impossible because the EU imposed an arms embargo on the area of former Yugoslavia. Croatia's international recognition remained questionable and despite the failure of the former JNA's offensive activities, one third of Croatia's territory was occupied. The new country's economic perspective was not great. A puppet state was formed on the occupied territory directed by Belgrade, posing a permanent military threat (there was the possibility of enemy military operation aimed at separating the coastal areas from the continental part of Croatia, while the main Croatian industrial centres were exposed to the enemy artillery attacks).

However, this situation did not lead to the break-up of the social cohesion of Croatian population. In all phases of the hybrid warfare against Croatia, psychological operations and propaganda were directed at exploitation of deep ideological divisions within the Croatian society created during the World War II and in the post-war period of Communist rule.⁴⁴ This was evident in constant attacks of Serbian and Montenegrin leadership on Croatia's requests for political and economic reforms and Croatian opposition of Serbian dominance in the federation (declaring Croatian intentions as a

⁴² To illustrate how sending of Serbian volunteers was organized, see Barić, 2005, pp. 319-324.

⁴³ Marijan, 2008, pp. 416-417.

⁴⁴ This refers to the polarization of the Croatian society based on the division between the left (related to the Partisan movement which, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, struggled against the Nazi Germany and pro-Nazi regimes on the territory of former Yugoslavia) and the right (advocates of the Ustasha regime and the fascist NDH) political traditions. This polarization is described in Šiber, Ivan, *Povijesni i etnički rascjepi u hrvatskom društvu* (Historical and Ethnic Divisions in Croatian Society). Published in: Kasapović, M., Šiber, I. and Zakošek, N. (eds.): *Birači i demokracija: utjecaj ideoloških rascjepa na politički život* (Voters and Democracy: Impact of Ideological Divisions on Political Life). Alinea. Zagreb 1998.

renewal of Croatian nationalism, ustashism and extremism, and an endangering of the Serbs in Yugoslavia). JNA's leadership also attempted to exploit this polarization. In the attempt to prevent the disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in November 1990 it organized a political party called the League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia as a framework for gathering all Yugoslav nations to overthrow incompetent and corrupt republican leaderships and preserve Yugoslavia.⁴⁵ This action, in combination with the methods previously described, should strengthen the divisions that had existed in the Croatian society and should enable Croatia's pacification with the minimum use of force.

The factor that enabled the preservation of the social cohesion was the Croatian national identity. The national identity can be described as a feeling of belonging to a certain state or a nation. There are several key characteristics of the Croatian national identity,⁴⁶ although the following two key characteristics are necessary to preserve the social cohesion:

- [1] The development of the Croatian national identity as a defence mechanism against a foreign aggressor. This was the factor that had constantly marked the development of the Croatian national identity since the arrival of the Croatian people to the area of today's state of Croatia in the 7th century until present day. The need for unity in defence against a foreign threat required the creation of a unique national identity that would include separate regional identities developing in certain parts of the Croatian ethnic area under the rule of other powers (Istria, territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire), including different administrative political entities within the same state community (organization of the Military Frontier as a region separated from the rest of Croatia under the control of the Habsburg Monarchy, that existed until 1881). In this way, in late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Croatian national identity was created as a means to preserve the nation. An expression of these tendencies was the preservation of statehood in the union with Hungary and later the Habsburg Monarchy, and the demand for a renewal of the independent state of Croatia that disappeared after Croatia's entry into the personal union with Hungary in 1102. This factor is also related to ethnocentrism as one of the characteristics of the Croatian identity (using one's own culture as a basis for judging other cultures).
- [2] The heroic codex as a characteristic of Croatian national identity. Vera St. Erlich (the founder of Croatian anthropology) called this phenomenon present in the Croatian identity the heroic codex - heroism, bravery, self-denial and sacrifice for the defence of the homeland. In peacetime, this codex is latent (or at the end of war, it is transformed into authoritarianism), however, it is reactivated in crisis situations. Although St. Erlich believed that the heroic codex is culturally endemic in the Dinaric region, it is also present in the lowlands and in the coastal region, which was evident in the war waged against Croatia from 1991 to 1995.⁴⁷ A survey conducted among students of the University of Zagreb in 2010 showed that the expression of Croatian national identity is related to ethnocentrism and

⁴⁵ Marijan, 2008, pp. 130-137.

⁴⁶ The Croatian language, the Latin alphabet, Croatia's belonging to the Western civilization circle, its sense of belonging to Catholic Christianity, a thousand-year-long culture, a desire for renewal of the state of Croatia (Budak, 2004, pp. 7).

⁴⁷ See Županov, 2011, p. 56.

a strong national affective attachment and readiness for self-sacrifice for the defence of national identity.⁴⁸

These characteristics explain how the Croatian nation, through collective identification and readiness for sacrifice in defence of its homeland, has managed to overcome the long-lasting divisions present in Croatian society and to preserve the social cohesion necessary for defence against the adversary's hybrid warfare.

2. HYBRID WARFARE AGAINST UKRAINE

In the case of hybrid warfare that was initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 three analyzed elements demonstrated a different outcome as compared to the Croatian case. As hybrid warfare against Ukraine is still underway, this analysis will elaborate its initial phase - the period from February (the fall of Yanukovych's regime) till September (conclusion of the agreement in Minsk) 2014 as a reference framework for comparison with the Croatian case.

The first element – a clearly defined strategic goal - is clearly indicated in the case of the Russian operations toward Ukraine. The opinion of the authors is that, in Russian perception, the overthrow of Yanukovych's government due to withdrawal from the economic agreement with the EU, has posed a direct threat to key strategic interests of Moscow. We can state the following factors that caused the respective Russian perception:

Strategic position of Ukraine. Today as in the past, the military factor has a strong influence on geopolitical perception of Russia. That is a consequence of the development of Russian grand strategy during the past seven centuries (territorial expansion to attain security). Without Ukraine as a shield in the case of military attack from the West, it would not be possible to protect the centre of the Russian state (the area between Moscow and Petersburg) with the strategic depth of the Russian territory. Likewise, transition of Ukraine to the Western side opens the possibility of severing the central part of Russia from Caucasus. By losing Ukraine Russia would also lose the Crimean peninsula and pertaining airport and naval bases necessary for projection of power in the territory of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In these considerations, economic loss that would occur with the inability to access the ports of Sevastopol and Odessa is also a significant factor.

- [1] If Russia wishes to renew its status as a great Eurasian power after achieving its internal political and economic stability, it needs to retain the control of states near its border (Belarus, Ukraine) and influence other states in the area of the former USSR (especially the areas of Caucasus and Baltic) to secure and maintain the buffer zone toward the West (EU, NATO).
- [2] According to Moscow's perception, the change of regime and transition of Ukraine to the Western side will trigger a chain reaction that will first expand onto other allies (Belarus) and then to the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the reiteration of Coloured revolutions from the 2004 and 2005 cannot be allowed since that creates a bridge-head for further expansion of the Western political and economic influence that could, in the long term, jeopardize the national security of Russia.

⁴⁸ See Šram, 2010, pp. 113-142.

- [3] In the events in Ukraine in February 2014 Moscow saw the action of Washington directed toward reduction of Russian influence in area of the Commonwealth of Independent States through fostering the model of political and economic changes that will be ultimately applied to Russia.

The stated determinants defined a strategic goal of the Russian engagement in the hybrid warfare against Ukraine. The key goal is to create a frozen conflict in Ukraine that will destabilize Kiev in a political and economic manner and prevent the transition of Ukraine to the Western side. The constant instability should force Kiev to internal restructuring directed toward federalization of the country that would ensure constant divisions within Ukraine. Although the Russian goal is not the territorial expansion on the account of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea took place as a message sent to the West that, from the Russian perspective, all red lines were crossed and that Moscow will now respond to every further attempt to endanger its key national interests by the West.

Russian hybrid operations toward Ukraine can be divided into three phases:

- [1] The period from the overthrow of the Yanukovych's government (22 February 2014) till Putin's official proclamation of annexation of Crimea (18 March 2014). The change of regime in Ukraine and negation of the agreement made with the EU on the solution of the political crisis in Ukraine surprised Moscow and gave incentive to Putin to instantly organize a counteraction. Strong propaganda campaign was launched toward negation of the legitimacy of the new regime in Kiev and with the aim of preparing the Russian public for further operations against Ukraine. Even before Putin's decision about the annexation of Crimea made on March 3, mass demonstrations were organized on February 26 in the Crimean area against the new government in Kiev, and the Crimean Parliament attempted to organize a referendum regarding weakening the connections with Kiev. Pro-Russian paramilitary groups were concurrently organized on Crimea. Two days later, unidentified armed persons (later on identified as members of the Russian armed forces) seized the airport in Simferopol. That marked the start of a well organized action of the occupation of strategic facilities in Crimea carried out by members of the Russian army's Special Forces (at the beginning, soldiers who seized the key facilities claimed they were local volunteers). Russian explanation of this step (that technically did not represent a breach of Ukraine's sovereignty since, according to the agreement between the two countries on deployment of the Russian military forces, Russia could hold a contingent of up to 25,000 soldiers in Crimea) was protection of the predominantly Russian domicile population. The referendum held on March 16 (its legitimacy was not recognized by Ukraine and international community) voted for annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and two days later the annexation of Crimea was officially carried out.
- [2] Insurrection in the eastern part of Ukraine (areas of Donbas and Luhansk, late March till early August). The annexation of Crimea marked a new phase in the escalation of the crisis, inducing the insurrection of the pro-Russian oriented population in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine against the new Ukrainian government that was partially successful (unsuccessful rebellions in Odessa and Kharkov). Demonstrations in Donetsk started already on March 1 and soon they spread across towns in eastern Ukraine. The cause for protests was a conviction that Kiev would nullify the rights of Russian minority and fear of the

attack of the Ukrainian radical right-wing forces; those rumours were disseminated by the Russian media after the Maidan uprising. The seizure of local governmental institutions began in early April in the area of Donbas. Soon, demonstrations were transformed into armed rebellion directed against the authorities in Kiev. The "Republic of Novorossia" was proclaimed on May 24 in Donbas and leaders of the self-proclaimed republic appealed to Russia for a direct intervention. After the initial success in the area of Donetsk and Luhansk, in the course of June and July, insurgent forces began losing ground in the combat with the Ukrainian security forces; that event represented the start of the third phase of Russian actions against Ukraine.

- [3] Covert Russian military intervention in the eastern part of Ukraine (August 2014). Losses of the insurgent forces and the Ukrainian military offensive in the mid August that led to encirclement of the rebel forces in the towns of Donetsk and Luhansk led to Moscow's decision to send regular military units of the Russian armed forces to eastern Ukraine. Although Moscow has never officially acknowledged the use of its regular military units in Ukraine (Moscow acknowledged only sending volunteers), on August 16 the newly appointed Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed National Republic of Donetsk admitted that Moscow had organized a four-month training of 1,200 pro-Russian combatants on the Russian territory and donated 150 armoured vehicles to the rebels. The Russian military engagement was decisive: despite successes achieved up to that time, the strength of Ukrainian forces was not sufficient and they were not organized to stop the insurgent counter-offensive aided by regular Russian military forces. In the battle for Ilovaik in late August Ukrainian forces suffered a heavy defeat. After that the advancement of the insurgents' forces toward the town of Mariupol forced Kiev to accept the armistice.

Russian operations in all three phases of the hybrid warfare against Ukraine during the 2014 demonstrate a unity of actions of all components of the Russian national power, directed toward realization of the clearly set strategic goal. The following examples reveal that:

- [1] Military operations of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Although till December 2015 Russia did not acknowledge the presence of Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine⁴⁹, according to Western information, since the annexation of Crimea, Russian military presence has been constant along with the actions of providing support to insurgents in eastern Ukraine as well as training of pro-Russian forces in Russia (in border areas with Ukraine).⁵⁰ According to NATO estimates from March 2015 about 12,000 Russian soldiers were deployed to Ukraine⁵¹. In addition to direct operations, Russian military presence in Ukraine and along Ukrainian borders was also aimed to discourage Ukrainian leadership from undertaking more

⁴⁹ In an interview conducted in November 2015, Russian president Vladimir Putin admitted the presence of Russian military intelligence officers in Ukraine, although he continued to deny the presence of regular military units. Ref.: *Putin admits Russian military presence in Ukraine for the first time*. The Guardian 17/11/2015 (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putin-admits-russian-military-presence-ukraine>).

⁵⁰ Ref: Czuperski, Maksymilian, Herbst, John, Higgins, Eliot, Polyakova, Alina and Wilson, Damon, *Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine*. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington D.C. 2015.

⁵¹ Urban, Mark, *How many Russians are fighting in Ukraine?*. BBC News 10/3/2015 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31794523>).

resolute military actions against insurgents, due to possibility of launching mass Russian conventional attack.

- [2] After the failure of the insurgents in the initial phase of the rebellion till launching an offensive in August 2014, Moscow carried out cleansing of the political and military leadership of the insurgent forces that became completely dependent on Russian support afterwards. At that time all military forces were under control of Moscow.⁵²
- [3] Economic measures against Ukraine. During 2014 Russia introduced and till early 2016 expanded economic measures against Kiev. Moscow continues to refuse the restructuring of Ukraine's debt of three billion USD from 2013. Since November 2015 the privileged status to Ukrainian migrants in Russia has been revoked. In January 2016 Russia withdrew customs privileges for Ukrainian goods and imposed commercial embargo on Ukrainian agricultural products and restricted the transport of Ukrainian products to Kazakhstan. From 2019 Russia plans to stop the transit of its oil and natural gas via Ukraine. The interruption of the military cooperation will (regardless of big problems caused to the Russian military industry) probably mean the end for most of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex.

Unlike the failure of the hybrid warfare in Croatia, in the case of Ukraine the attacking side had a clearly defined strategic goal and visible unity of efforts in applying instruments of national power in its realization. The informational dimension of the hybrid warfare against Ukraine is particularly important.

After overthrow of Yanukovych's government Russian psychological-propaganda actions were directed toward linking the pro-European protests on Maidan with the Ukrainian radical right-wing pro-fascist movements, with the goal of depriving legitimacy of the new government and sending messages how the new government would revoke the rights of the Russian minority in Ukraine (change of status of the Russian language in Ukraine). Within Russia these messages were intended to create a support for operations against the Ukrainian government. In Ukraine the goal was to mobilize the pro-Russian forces. At the same time, propaganda toward the West was intended to send the message of legitimacy of the Russian intervention. Moscow described the interference of the West in Ukraine as the threat to its key national interests. The second part of the Russian message was the readiness of Russia for a new agreement with the West that would take into consideration the Russian interests regarding Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The key innovation in the Russian "new propaganda", as compared to operations in the past, is its goal. Instead of attempts of convincing domestic and foreign public in certain narration that could be refuted⁵³, the goal was to hide the truth and replace it with a mix of conspiracy theories and misleading viewpoints and standpoints directed toward preventing clarification of the situation on the ground. In addition to traditional media, Internet and social networks were given a more important role. In the described manner Russia achieved complete control over its domestic media scene.

⁵² *Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine*. International Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°79, 5/2/2016 (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/ukraine/b079-russia-and-the-separatists-in-eastern-ukraine.pdf>), pp. 6-9.

⁵³ That was the case in Georgia in 2008.

The second success is the dominance in the media space of the eastern Ukraine (and preservation of influence over the pro-Russian part of the population). The third success is the disruption of the Western media objectivity in reporting events in Ukraine during 2014 and beginning of 2015.⁵⁴

Regarding the issue of social cohesion of the Ukrainian society, the Russian propaganda offensive also has attained success: despite the clear external threat, homogenization of the population and common response to aggression did not occur as in the case in Croatia. The first reason was the non-existence of the social cohesion in the Ukrainian society. That was result of the process of political and economic transition of Ukraine implemented since 1991. The transition process did not lead to clear break with the political and economic legacy of the communist system. Instead, the elites of the old system used their political power to gain personal wealth and created a new post-communist oligarchy that caused a political and economic decline of the country. Results were devastating: depopulation (the population of Ukraine reduced by 10 million as compared to 1991), corruption and inefficiency of the public administration and authoritarian political system.⁵⁵ The Ukrainian security sector was severely hit - corruption and incompetence destroyed the armed forces, intelligence community and police.⁵⁶ The result was the Ukrainian armed forces' incompetence in their attempts to quench the rebellion in eastern Ukraine. Despite the initial success, Ukrainian units were poorly equipped and trained and made a series of mistakes. Russian intervention in combination with the improved quality of the pro-Russian insurgent forces created the opportunity for the attacker to make the most of the Ukrainian mistakes and to inflict heavy military defeat to the Ukrainian side.⁵⁷

The decisive element for preservation of the social cohesion in the Croatian case - a singular national identity - did not exist in Ukraine. For centuries Ukraine existed as a poorly connected conglomerate of various ethnic groups and territories. The situation was additionally complicated by frequent changes of the borders of Ukraine, by which new ethnic groups joined its system. That resulted in the development of two variants of identities instead of a singular national identity, and two concepts of building the Ukrainian national state. Richard Sakwa named them monistic nationalism and pluralism.⁵⁸ The starting point of the monistic nationalism is the development of the Ukrainian national identity that excludes other influences, particularly Russian. The Ukrainian state has to develop in such a manner to build up its borders with the population that will be monolingualistic (the use of Ukrainian language), singular and culturally specific in comparison to Russia. This viewpoint on the development of the Ukrainian identity is confronted by the pluralistic approach based on the standpoint that there is not only one but several various cultural groups on the Ukrainian territory that have preserved their specific identities in addition to the Ukrainian identity. According to this viewpoint, the Ukrainian identity is multidimensional, and specific

⁵⁴ Giles, 2016, pp. 31-32

⁵⁵ For outline of the development of Ukraine after 1991, see: Åslund, 2015, pp. 3-17, 59-97.

⁵⁶ For situation in the Ukrainian police and armed forces, see: Rácz, 2015, pp. 76-79.

⁵⁷ For analyses of combat actions of the Ukrainian armed forces, see: Robertson, Paul, Explaining the Ukrainian Army's defeat in Donbass in 2014. In Black J.L. i Johns, Michael (eds.), *The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia*. Routledge, London 2016., pp. 108-125.

⁵⁸ Sakwa, Richard, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. I.B. Taurus, 2015. The first chapter of the book provides a detailed outline of the Ukrainian national identity.

particularities resulting from such conception of identity require a different government organization that will enable the preservation of specific qualities of these groups (e.g. transformation of Ukraine into a federal state). Both confronting viewpoints of the construction of the Ukrainian identity and statehood are geographically clearly determined - monism in the western part of the country and pluralism in the southern and eastern parts. The stated models of the Ukrainian identity have been in conflict since the independence of Ukraine. Russian military intervention in 2014 did not result in two sides coming closer, but in further divisions.⁵⁹ Due to this it was not possible to take advantage of the external danger as an incentive for strengthening the social cohesion of the Ukrainian society, as it was the case in Croatia.

How is it possible to evaluate the Russian engagement in the hybrid warfare against Ukraine? It is not possible to give a final evaluation because the Russian action against Ukraine is still underway. However, up to this moment Russia has achieved the key goal of initiating hybrid warfare against Ukraine. Although many analyses state serious consequences for Russia (international isolation, economic embargo and its consequences for the Russian economy), these analyses have neglected the fact that the main goal of Russia was the creation of a frozen conflict in Ukraine. That goal has been attained and the next step of Russia is directed toward the efforts of converting this tactical victory into a strategic one (international recognition of the status of Ukraine as a country under Russian patronage). Whether Moscow will succeed to achieve this goal depends on whether the West will be capable of defining a common strategy of further actions against Russian expansionism, which is a topic that exceeds the framework of this paper.

CONCLUSION

Hybrid warfare is not a new type of warfare but a form of warfare that has been present since the beginning of written history. The combination of operation of regular and irregular military forces accompanied by other measures aimed to destabilize the opponent is not a novelty. However, in relation to hybrid warfare in the past, its key dimension nowadays is to achieve domination in the informational field.

In both analyzed examples of hybrid warfare (Croatia, Ukraine) the importance of achieving information dominance is visible. The use of propaganda-psychological warfare in combination with intelligence operations and other types of pressure is aimed to destabilize the social community and facilitate the external intervention directed toward gaining control over it.

When we talk about the defence against hybrid threats, the role of external factors (NATO, EU) is often emphasized. However, if the social community under attack is not capable of countering the first strike, external help could be belated or maybe, could completely fail to occur if the attacker's side is able to attain requested objectives with quick actions. That means that the first line of defence is the preservation of social cohesion of the attacked community. It is preserved, resistance of the state to hybrid warfare is built up. In hybrid warfare, the aggressor is attempting to achieve quick

⁵⁹ Plekhanov, Sergei M., Assisted suicide: Internal and external causes of the Ukrainian Crisis. In Black J.L. i Johns, Michael (eds.), *The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia*, Routledge, London 2016., pp. 4-8.

victory in situations when it is not ready or cannot carry out a conventional military attack. If the attacked state is capable to successfully counter the first strike, the aggressor is faced with a choice to withdraw or to further escalate the crisis conducting a direct military intervention (a situation they tried to prevent by the use of the hybrid warfare). We could pose a question: what would be the further Russian reaction if the Ukraine were capable to quickly suppress the pro-Russian rebellion in the eastern part of the country? Even if the attacker achieves success, maintaining social cohesion within the attacked state over the long term creates an opportunity for the negation of the aggressor's gains, as the Croatian case has demonstrated.

National identity is crucial for maintaining the social cohesion. This fact is clearly visible in the examples of Croatia and Ukraine. In the Croatian case the constituted national identity enabled the preservation of the social cohesion, whereas in Ukraine a completely different outcome is visible due to the underdeveloped Ukrainian national identity.

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Peer-Reviewed Article

Od subkulturních uskupení až k aktérům hybridní války: Současné trendy východoevropských konfliktů

From Subcultural Groupings to Actors of Hybrid Warfare: Current Trends in Conflicts in Eastern Europe

Miroslav Mareš

Abstrakt: Článek se zabývá proměnou několika vybraných subkulturních uskupení ve skutečné, případně potenciální aktéry hybridní války. Je založen na trendech a událostech vztahujících se k ukrajinské krizi a k aktuální projekci sil Ruské federace na území střední a východní Evropy, stejně tak jako na reakcích vlád a společností, které jsou tímto druhem války a politiky ohrožené. Koncepční rámec tohoto článku je založen na výzkumu subkultur a na zkoumání vojenských strategií. Autor analyzuje roli skupin vojenské historie, motorkářů, fotbalových hooligans a dalších mládežnických subkultur. Analýza rizik slouží k posouzení aktuálního dopadu a možného budoucího rozvoje výzkumu fenoménu.

Abstract: This article deals with transformation of several categories of subcultural groupings to real or potential actors of hybrid warfare. It is based on trends and events related to the Ukrainian crisis and to the new Russian power projection in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as on the reaction of governments and societies which are threatened by this way of warfare and politics. Research on subcultures and research on strategy and conflict form the conceptual framework of the article. The author analyses the role of military re-enactment groups, bikers, football hooligans and other youth subcultural groups. The risk analysis serves for an assessment of the current impact and a possible future development of the researched phenomenon.

Klíčová slova: Hybridní válka; subkultury; paramilitární skupiny; výzkum konfliktu; vojenské rekonstrukce; motorkářské gangy; fotbaloví hooligans, autonomní nacionalisté, střední a východní Evropa; ukrajinská krize.

Keywords: Hybrid War; Subcultures; Paramilitary Groups; Conflict Research; Military Re-Enactment; Motorcycle Gangs; Football Hooligans, Autonomous Nationalists, Central And Eastern Europe; Ukrainian Crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary forms of military conflicts in Eastern Europe are connected with a broad spectrum of actors who are involved in a direct military fight or in a broader scope of subversive activities. Recently we can observe a process of transformation of former subcultural groupings to actors of hybrid warfare. It has an impact on the assessment of risks and threats which accompany the growth of these groupings. The aim of this article is to identify the most important actors of current and possible future conflicts with subcultural roots in this area, to describe their turn to the "new level" of activities, and to assess their general impact on the security environment.

1. ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The current situation in Central and European countries is characterized by the growing importance of activists with the potential to be engaged in a modern form of hybrid warfare¹. The preparedness for action - including propagandist activities, threatening, militant demonstrations, vigilantism or military combat, etc. - can be an important advantage for tactics and strategy in such a kind of warfare, as the experience from the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as well as the contemporary rise of paramilitary groupings in East Central Europe show.²

Recruitment of activists into military and paramilitary activities as well as for other actors of hybrid warfare (rioters in service of conflict parties, logistics structures with links to organized crime etc.) is carried out in various milieus. One of the milieus consists of specific subcultural scenes. The aim of this article is to analyse the process of transferring the original subcultural identity to a form of warriors or supporters of hybrid warfare.

The analytical framework requires a combination of concepts of hybrid warfare and concepts of subcultures. One of the possible concepts of hybrid warfare (elaborated by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies) includes three fundamental elements:

- "- the use of conventional and unconventional forces in combination with information operations to intimidate, coerce and foment ethnic conflict;*
- the use of conventional and unconventional forces to strike rapidly in combination with cyber attacks;*
- the establishment of new political structures, economic relationships and social structures to consolidate gains and prevent reverses".³*

¹ GONCHAR, M. - CHUBYK, A. - ISCHUK, O. Hybrid war in Eastern Europe. Non-military Dimension. *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*. 2014 (3-4), pp. 27-36. ISSN: 1337-5482.

² LIEDERECKE, A., The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe [on-line], 2016, New Eastern Europe Online Edition, 2016-01-18 [cit. 2016-06-12], ISSN 2084-400X, available at <http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1862-the-rise-of-paramilitary-groups-in-central-and-eastern-europe>

³ THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, *The Military Balance 2015*. London: Routledge, 2015, ISBN: 978-1-85743-766-9, p. 18.

The concept of subculture is based on a specific shared style and identity (by that part of society that is different from the hegemonic part of a societal culture⁴). Youth subcultures represent a specific type of subcultures, with the interconnection with the young generation being their typical characteristic. Subcultures serve as a social environment for peers⁵ (including political believes in many cases). Collectiveness, activism and shared self-confidence are important challenges from the point of view of the conflict parties of the hybrid warfare on the one hand. On the other hand, willingness, discipline and subordination are necessary conditions for a successful transfer of subcultural actors to the actors of hybrid warfare.

In this article several cases of such transformation are identified in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. The complexity of this issue should be demonstrated with the help of these cases. From the methodological point of view, the actor analysis, descriptive method and risk and threat analyses are used in this article. The identification of the most important subcultural groupings being transferred into "hybrid warriors" is based on the author's expert assumption.

2. MILITARY RE-ENACTMENT GROUPS

The interest in military history is typical of the military re-enactment groups. It is characterized by collecting historical uniforms, weapons (or their imitations), equipment, etc. and usually also by public performances (mostly "playing" historical battles). These groups exist in many countries (mostly in Europe, the USA and Western Commonwealth countries). They are focused on various historical periods - from ancient times to the 21st century. In many countries some of them are connected with specific historical periods important for the national history (for example, the Civil War groups in the USA). The re-enactment scene can be considered as a subculture,⁶ however, this is not a youth subculture. Men and women of all age categories are active within this scene.

In Russia the boom of military re-enactment started in the 1990s (first groups were established in 1980s) and this phenomenon is continuing in the first and second decades of the 21st century. Living history activities, public shows and other activities are realized.⁷ Its growth is partially connected with the return of Russian imperial ambitions under Putin's regime. Tsarist Russian army, the Red Army from the Second World War and many other eras of Russian military history were and are represented in the military re-enactment subculture in Russia and in the countries with strong Russian minority (Ukraine, Belarus, etc.). A lot of members of these nationalist military re-enactment groupings entered the separatist units after the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine.⁸

⁴ HEBDIGE, D., *Subculture. The Meaning of the Style*. London: Routledge, 1979, ISBN: 0-415-03949-5.

⁵ SMOLÍK, J. - PAPIEŽOVÁ-VEJVODOVÁ, P., Die faszinierende Welt der Jugendsubkulturen. Jugendsubkulturen in der Tschechischen Republik. *Kriminalistik*, 2014 (6), pp. 389-395. ISSN: 0023-4699.

⁶ MAREŠ, M. *Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v České republice*. Brno: Barrister & Principal - Centrum strategických studií, 2003. ISBN: 80-86598-45-4.

⁷ CHABAROV, B., *Napravlenia razvitiya voenno-istoricheskoy rekonstrukcii*. Rekonstruktor, 2006 (7), pp. 2-5. Without ISSN.

⁸ MEDVEDEV, S. *Uboinoe fentezi: ak istoricheskaya rekonstruktsiya stala zhanrom rossiiskoi politiki* [online], Argument 2014-07-13 [cit. 2016-06-15], available at <http://argumentua.com/stati/uboinoe-fentezi-kak-istoricheskaya-rekonstruktsiya-stala-zhanrom-rossiiskoi-politiki>

Igor Girkin - Strelkov was also active in one of these military re-enactment groups. He is a Russian veteran from the Transnistrian, Bosnian and Chechen wars and later leader of the separatist units in Crimea and Novorossia in 2014. His photos in uniforms of a tsarist officer and Red Army soldier and as a medieval fighter were published after he had become famous due to his engagement in the Donbass conflict. He was active in the "Moscow Dragoon Regiment" military re-enactment group. He participated among others in the events such as "War of 1916", "The memorial of the Civil War", or "The Valor and Death of the Russian Guard"⁹. Until 2012 he was also an officer of the Russian intelligence service FSB and since 2015 he has been a leader of the political movement "Novorossia". In June 2016 he expressed criticism against the Russian president Vladimir Putin.¹⁰ Girkin – Strelkov's career can be also observed as following the trajectory warrior - intelligence officer - military re-enactor - military leader - political activist.

On the Ukrainian side the role of such groupings was also important - and not only as a "recruitment pool". As Alexander Nieuwenhuis wrote in September 2014: "A military re-enactment group is playing a strangely important role for the Ukrainian army fighting in the east of the country. Led by a man named Maksym, the group, which used to meticulously recreate scenes from World War II and other historic conflicts, has rare expert knowledge of the decrepit Soviet equipment used by Ukrainian troops on the frontlines."¹¹

Military re-enactment groups are active also in East Central Europe. A specific role is played by some groups which are focused on the history of the Red Army or the military, paramilitary and police forces of former communist states. The ideological profile of some (not all!) of these groups reflects their interest in history. For example, in the Czech Republic one group often participates in memorials organized by the pro-Russian and communist patriotic spectrum¹², including the memorial act visited by members of the biker club Night Wolves (see below) in Brno in May 2016¹³. The existence of such groups could be a reason for their monitoring as potential actors of hybrid warfare.

⁹ POLIKARPOV, M., *Oborona Donbassa*. Igor Stelkov - uzhas banderovskoi chunty. Moskva: Knizhnyy Mir, ISBN: 978-5-8041-0715-5.

¹⁰ WALKER, S., Russia's 'valiant hero' in Ukraine turns his fire on Vladimir Putin [online], The Guardian, 2016-06-05 [cit. 2016-06-16], available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/05/russias-valiant-hero-in-ukraine-turns-his-fire-on-vladimir-putin>

¹¹ NIEUWENHUIS, A., Military Reenactment Group is Fixing the Ukrainian Army's Decrepit Soviet Equipment[online], VICE news, 2016-09-14 [cit 2016-06-16], available at <https://news.vice.com/article/a-military-reenactment-group-is-fixing-the-ukrainian-armys-decrepit-soviet-equipment>

¹² MARES, M. Observation, Brno Central Cemetry 2015-5-04 (report in author's archive).

¹³ MOTOKLUB NOCNYE VOLKI, V cseshskom Brno okolo 100 „notschnych volkov“ vstretili chlebom i soliu [online], 2016-05-06 [cit. 2016-06-16], available at https://vk.com/video-3519447_456239079?list=51dc23e1b8a8f540e3

2.1 Bikers

Bikers, especially members of “outlaw” motorcycle gangs, can be labelled as a specific subculture. Motorcycle gangs are hierarchically organized and they have a strong internal discipline.¹⁴ The roots of this specific subculture are in the United States in the post-WW2 period. The most important US gangs are called the “Big Four” - it consists of the clubs Hells Angels, Outlaws, Bandidos and Pagans. These clubs and their supporters are in a permanent “state of war”, mostly due to their involvement in organized crime structures. These wars expanded also overseas (Europe, Australia), where branches of the above mentioned clubs were established.¹⁵ Local gangs and scenes were created in various parts of the world.

Since the 1990s biker clubs and gangs have been established also in the Soviet Union, later in Russia. The club Night Wolves (Nochnye Volki) can be assessed as a specific actor of contemporary hybrid war and Russian imperial power projection. It was founded in 1989 as the first biker club in the Soviet Union. The first years of its existence were accompanied with hooligan incidents and crime. However, during the Putin’s era they have become supporters of the government politics, including the cooperation with a part of the Orthodox Church. Leader of the gang - Aleksandr Zaldostanov - is a friend of president Putin. Putin took part in rallies of the Night Wolves in the past. The Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov is also a member of the club. Branches of the gang exist in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Germany; they also have friendly relationship with clubs in Slovakia and Czech Republic (Red Eyed Crüe). The Night Wolves have around five thousand members.¹⁶ They have their own “protection forces” and links to private security agency Wolf Holding (Holding Volf), led by Gennady A. Nikunov.¹⁷

Transformation into hybrid warfare actors was typical of the Night Wolves’ engagement during the Crimea Crisis. The gang possesses a camp on the peninsula near Sevastopol. In January 2014, the Night Wolves organized a home guard from this place to protect Crimean separatist institutions against the so called “Euromaidan”.¹⁸ Later several members of this club joined the separatist forces in Donbass. The Night Wolves were engaged also in logistics and law and order activities (against pro-Ukrainian activists) in the regions of Donbass and Crimea.¹⁹

¹⁴ SHIELDS, D. The Infamous ‘One Percenters’: A Review of the Criminality, Subculture, and Structure of Modern Biker Gangs [online], Justice Policy Journal; 2012, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-33 [cit. 2016-06-17], ISSN 1530-3012, available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/The_Infamous.pdf

¹⁵ QUINN, J. F. - FORSYTH, C., The Tools, Tactics and Mentality of Outlaw Bikers War, American Journal Of Criminal Justice, Vol. 36, Issue 3, pp. 216-230. ISSN: 1066-2316

¹⁶ WRIGHT, W. The Rise of Russia’s Night Wolves [online], Russia! 2015-07-14, [cit. 2016-06-18], available at <http://readrussia.com/2015/07/14/the-rise-of-russias-night-wolves/>

¹⁷ MUCHA, W., Night Wolves, Putin’s Death Squad [online], New Eastern Europe 2015-04-24 [cit. 2016-06-18], ISSN 2084-400X, available at <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1567-night-wolves-putin-s-death-squad>

¹⁸ PITALEV, I., Nochnye Volki vziali pod ochranu administrativu Sevastopola [online], Lenta 2014-01-27 [cit. 2016-06-18], available at <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/01/27/wolfs/>

¹⁹ SOUKUP, O., Noční vlci vyjí s Putinem. Na Krymu rozháněli Ukrajince [online], 2015-04-23, [cit. 2016-06-18] available at <http://zpravy.aktualne.cz/zahranici/nocni-vlk/r~cf2bff3ee99711e4994f002590604f2e/>

Due to these activities, the leader of the Night Wolves was blacklisted on the sanction list of the United States of America. The U. S. department of the treasury stated: *“Zaldostanov chairs the overall Night Wolves organization, and some of his responsibilities include the punishing of chapter groups and members for disloyalty to the Night Wolves organization. During the late-March storming of the Ukrainian Naval Forces Headquarters in Sevastopol, he coordinated the confiscation of Ukrainian weapons with the Russian forces. Zaldostanov is being designated for being a leader of a group, the Night Wolves, that is engaging in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.”*²⁰

The new role for the Night Wolves came in spring 2015. They announced the “Paths of Glory Rally” to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War. They had a plan to travel across Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Austria and to arrive in Berlin on the 9th May. However, members of the gang were denied entry to Poland and later Lithuania, despite protests from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹ Only a limited number of the Night Wolves were able to enter the EU territory. This situation repeated in 2016. At that time, some Night Wolves from Russia and Kazakhstan received bikes from members of the supporter clubs from Slovakia and Czech Republic. During their visit to Prague, rallies of supporters (a. o. from the Russian community) and protests of anti-Putin and Ukrainian activists accompanied this event.²²

“Paths” of Night Wolves are perceived by the pro-Western forces in East Central Europe as an expression of the Russian power projection. In 2015 framing as a reaction to the previous transport of US military convoys was typical. Supporters and opponents of contemporary Russian politics were mobilized for public demonstrations during the visits of the Night Wolves in the EU countries.²³ The risk of clashes with local branches of the US gangs (mostly Hells Angels) was eliminated up to now.²⁴ However, the engagement of the Night Wolves and their supporters for the purpose of hybrid warfare can be assessed as a threat for the future (in the case of growing tensions between Russia and the West).

²⁰ U. S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and Russian Individuals and Entities [online], 2014-12-19 [cit. 2014-06-18], available at <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9729.aspx>

²¹ GESSEN, M., Putin and Night Wolves vs. Poland [online], New York Times, 2016-05-1 [cit. 2016-06-18], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/putin-and-the-night-wolves-vs-poland.html?_r=0

²² VLACH, T., Vlčí jízda Evropu, Týden, 2016-05-09, pp. 72-73.

²³ REDAKCE ONLINE, Je průjezd ruských motorkářů Noční vlci bezpečnostním rizikem? [online], Security magazín, 2015-04-24 [cit. 2016-06-18], available at <http://www.securitymagazin.cz/zpravy/hysterie-kolem-prujezdu-ruskych-motorkaru-nocni-vlci-evropou-vrcholi-1404044258.html>

²⁴ POLICE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, information for the author, 2016-04-2.

2.2 Football hooligans

Football (or soccer) hooligans are a subcultural phenomenon with historical roots in England in the 1960s-1970s. Since 1980s the so called "British disease" has expanded to many countries. It was and is strong in Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that it is not correct to label the whole hooligan subculture as extremist,²⁵ many hooligans are under the influence of the right-wing extremist scene, among others in Central and Eastern Europe. They protect nationalist values at the club level as well as at the national level. The hooligan subculture in several Central and Eastern European countries grew into a dangerous violent threat.²⁶

Hooligans were active during the "Euromaidan riots" in Kiev at the turn of 2013-2014. At that time, they were active in fights against militant supporters (so called "titushky") of the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich. They created self-defence units.²⁷ However, some of the hooligan gangs were more and more aggressive against the moderate part of demonstrators that opposed the extreme right streams of the Maidan. They were directly supported by foreign far right hooligans who travelled to Ukraine, a. o. from Czech Republic.²⁸

On the other side of the starting conflict, in Eastern Ukraine the pro-Russian local hooligans were engaged in separatist violence against Maidan supporters. In The Daily Beast from 20th March, 2014 a 26 year old supporter of the football team Shakhtar Donetsk Sasha was quoted: "One day Shakhtar will play (St. Petersburg's) Zenit in the Russian league."²⁹ Members of the hooligan gangs joined massively the military and paramilitary units on both sides, including foreign fighters interconnected with the hooligan scene in their home countries.

Photos of several such domestic or foreign fighters in the war zone were presented on the Ultras Tifo website. On the Ukrainian side there are documented: supporters of the FC Vorskla Poltava, Vorskla Ultras (they posed also with a flag of the far right Battalion Azov Regiment), FC Metalist Kharkiv, FC Krystal Kherson, Dynamo Kyiv, FC Karpaty Lviv, FC Kryvbas Kryvyi Rih, FC Obolon Kyiv, Tavria Simferopol, Volyn Lutsk, FC Sumy, Metalurg Zaporizhzhya, Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk, Chornomorets Odesa, and Dynamo Zagreb (thanks to the friendship between Ukrainian and Croatian hooligans and fighters). On the separatist side there are documented: supporters of Spartak Moskva, CSKA Moskva and Serbian fans associated with FK Rad Beograd, Partizan Beograd (gang Grobari), Crvena Zvezda Beograd (gang Crazy North) and Vojvodina

²⁵ SMOLÍK, J., Football hooliganism from the standpoint of extremism [online], Central European Political Science Review, Vol. 4, No. 4 [cit. 2016-06-18], ISSN 1212-7817, available at <http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=212>

²⁶ MAREŠ, M. - SMOLÍK, J. - SUCHÁNEK, M., Fotbaloví chuligáni. Evropská dimenze subkultury. Brno: Centrum strategických studií - Barrister & Principal, 2004, ISBN: 80-903333-0-3, pp. 95-128.

²⁷ SINDELAR, D., Who Are Ukraine's 'Ultras'? [online] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2014-01-27 [cit. 2016-06-19], available at <http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-protests-sports-fans-euromaidan/25244357.html>

²⁸ MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, Report on extremism in the territory of the Czech Republic in the year 2014 [online], Prague, MVČR, 2015, available at <http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/file/report-on-extremism-2015-pdf.aspx>

²⁹ DETTMER, J., Soccer Hooligans prep Ukraine for Putin [online], The Daily Beast 2014-03-20 [cit. 2016-06-19], available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/20/soccer-hooligans-prep-ukraine-for-putin.html>

(gang Firma).³⁰

Ukrainian hooligans, including hooligans from Eastern Ukraine, were engaged predominantly on the nationalist Ukrainian side. They ended inter-club hostilities and organized a common fight against the pro-separatist forces.³¹ Ukrainian hooligans played probably an important role also in the incident in Odessa on 2nd May 2014. Pro-separatist forces - consisting of fighters from Russia, Ukraine and allegedly diversion groups from Transnistria - occupied the Trade Union House in the city.³² The following development was described in a special report of the Council of Europe:

“On 2 May 2014, a demonstration for national unity was planned before the football match was to take place between FC Chornomorets Odessa and FC Metalist Kharkiv. A small contingent of Right Sector activists also participated in this demonstration, but, reportedly, the majority of demonstrators were ordinary citizens. This demonstration, estimated at 1500 persons, was met by a group of around 300 pro-Russia supporters who were armed with batons and shields. Reportedly, the police did not intervene when this group attacked the pro-unity demonstrators. The clashes escalated and shots were fired, reportedly killing at least five pro-unity supporters. Following the attack on the pro-unity demonstration, pro-unity supporters moved to Kulikovo Field with the intention of clearing the pro-Russia camp that had been set up there. Overwhelmed by the pro-unity supporters, the pro-Russia supporters fled into the Trade Union Building that is situated on Kulikovo Field. The exact sequence of events is unclear but it is clear that both sides were pelting each other with stones and Molotov cocktails. In the course of these clashes a fire broke out on the second floor of the Trade Union House that spread rapidly to the third floor. Fire brigades reportedly arrived very late and could not reach the fire due to the large number of people present outside. At the end of the day, at least 37 persons had died as a result of the fire, most of them from asphyxiation / carbon monoxide poisoning and several who leaped to their death to escape the fire”.³³

The number of victims is usually estimated at 48. However, the incident has not been seriously officially explained up to now. The Czech diplomat Vladimír Bartuška commented the event in Odessa as an effective way how to stop Russian hybrid warfare. Due to this statement he was strongly criticized by political opponents.³⁴

³⁰ ULTRAS TIFO, Football supporters in the Ukraine war zone [online], 2015-01-25 [cit. 2016-06-19], available at <http://www.ultras-tifo.net/news/3217-football-supporters-in-the-ukrainerussia-war-zone.html>

³¹ VOLKAVA, E. – BARTKOWSKI, M., The Ukrainian soccer ultras: allies of the resistance [online], Open Democracy, 2014-06-24 [cit. 2016-06-20], available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/civilresistance/elena-volkava-maciej-bartkowski/ukrainian-soccer-ultras-allies-of-resistance>

³² 112UA, Ricnicia „2 travnia“ v Odesi: Pro tragediu v cifrách, 111UA, 2016-05-02 cit. 2016-06-21], available at <http://ua.112.ua/statji/richnytsia-2-travnja-v-odesi-pro-trahediiu-v-tsyfrakh-308269.html>

³³ Committee On The Honouring Of Obligations And Commitments By Member States Of The Council Of Europe (Monitoring Committee), Honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, Information note by the co-rapporteurs on their fact-finding visit to Kyiv and Odessa (7 to 11 July 2014). Co-rapporteurs: Ms Mailis Reps (Estonia, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), and Ms Marietta de Pourbaix-Lundin (Sweden, Group of the European People's Party) [online], Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, 2016-08-25 [cit. 2016-06-21], available at <http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2014/amondoc16-2014.pdf>

³⁴ ŠVAMBERK, A. Upalování lidí v Oděse jsem nikdy nehájil, brání se diplomat Bartuška [online], Novinky, 2015-05-27 [cit. 2016-06-21], available at: <https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/368127-upalovani-lidi-v-odese-jsem-nikdy-nehajil-brani-se-diplomat-bartuska.html>

Ukrainian hooligans with right-wing extremist background are still attacking the pro-separatist and leftist political activists.³⁵

On the other hand, Russian hooligans massively used violence during Euro 2016 in France. They were accused that they had links to Putin's regime. According to some sources they serve as a new instrument of hybrid warfare.³⁶ In fact, some Russian politicians expressed openly their sympathies for violence of "their boys".³⁷ However, the real background of the Russian violence during Euro 2016 is unclear and it is important to find more evidence in the future development to label these hooligan gangs as new actors of hybrid warfare.

2.3 Other subcultures and hybrid warfare

Former members of various subcultures can be found on Ukrainian battlefields and inside possible actors and counter-actors of hybrid warfare. Mostly they are connected with the right-wing extremist part of such subcultures. Many ex-skinheads joined nationalist groupings of the separatist and Ukrainian units, however, usually there is a long intermezzo in non-subcultural organizations between their youngster skinhead times and current battle engagement (an example can be found in former Russian neo-Nazi skinheads in Ukrainian units).³⁸

The Autonomous Nationalists represent a more recent phenomenon. They were important mostly on the Ukrainian side of the counter-separatist struggle during the war. The idea of autonomous nationalism came to Ukraine in the late 2000s and it won a significant position among the Ukrainian far right spectrum. During the war many of them fought in Ukrainian units (a. o. the Autonomous Nationalists from Zaporozhye or from Tiraspol). Currently they support far right military units, such as Regiment Azov, Karpatska Sich or Schidny Korpus.³⁹

The national socialist black metal plays a specific role. On the separatist side Team Vikernes was established in August 2014 from foreign volunteers (mostly of French and Brazil origin),⁴⁰ named after the Norwegian neo-Nazi pagan and black metal musician and political activist Varg Vikernes.⁴¹ On the Ukrainian side the local NSBM bands support nationalist military battalions, among others the most famous Ukrainian NSBM

³⁵ NEWS FRONT, Ukrainian 'heroes' attacked pensioners....old woman strikes back. Live Leak, 2016-03-17 [cit. 2016-06-21], available at http://edge.liveleak.com/80281E/u/u/II2/hd_video_icon.jpg

³⁶ BOFFEY, D., Whitehall fears Russian football hooligans had Kremlin links [online], The Guardian, 2016-06-18 cit. 2016-06-21], available at <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/18/whitehall-suspects-kremlin-links-to-russian-euro-2016-hooligans-vladimir-putin>

³⁷ ASLAN, E. – SVOBODA, K., Ruští chuligáni na Euru: hybridní válka to není, jen další příběh o zlém Západu, Aktualne.cz, 2016-06-20 [cit. 2016-06-21], available at <http://nazory.aktualne.cz/komentare/rusti-chuligani-na-euru-hybridni-valka-to-neni-jen-dalsi-pri/r~dae4007036bb11e69d46002590604f2e/>

³⁸ MAREŠ, M. – LARYŠ, M. The Transnational Relations of the Contemporary Russian Extreme Right. *Europe -Asia Studies*, Vol. 67, No. 7, 2015, 1056-1078. ISSN 0966-8136. doi:10.1080/09668136.2015.1067673.

³⁹ AVTONOMNYE NACIONALISTI TERNOPOLA, Volja Ukraini Jako Smert [online], Vkontakte, 2016-05-22 [cit. 2016-06-22], available at http://vk.com/ternopil_avtonom

⁴⁰ TEAM VIKERNRES, About the Company [online], Vkontakte, 2015-05-07 [cit. 2016-06-22], available at <http://vk.com/public93628709>

⁴¹ SMOLÍK, J., *Subkultury mládeže. Uvedení do problematiky*. Praha: Grada, 2010, ISBN: 978-80-247-2907-7.

bands Sekira Peruna and Nokturnal Mortum.⁴² However, parts of the black metal scene from Russia and Ukraine cooperate. In April 2016 members of the NSBM bands Kroda from Ukraine and M8L8TH from Russia demonstrated East European Black metal brotherhood during a common event.⁴³

3. COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

If we identify the risks and threats connected with the presented categories of subcultures transformed into military actors, we can focus 1) on their scope of involvement in hybrid warfare and the potential of this involvement, 2) on their preparedness for military activities and other forms of involvement in hybrid warfare, and 3) on the propagandist effects of this involvement (because propaganda is an important element of hybrid warfare).

Military re-enactment groups are involved in real activities in the Ukrainian scope significantly, however, the number of members of this subculture is probably lower than the involvement of football hooligans. They are strongly motivated and they were able to show a high level of military discipline. Strong ideological motivation can be a risk criterion also in East Central European conditions in the case of extension of the armed conflict in this area. The involvement of bikers has been up to now limited mostly to the activities of the Night Wolves and their short organized paramilitary activity in Crimea, joining separatist forces in Donbass and predominantly to the propagandist activities associated with their rides in Central Europe. Their supporters in Central European area can be involved in various diversion activities in the future and in clashes with pro-American biker gangs, however, the scope of these activities will be limited.

The most numerous subcultural group with ties to the actors of Central and Eastern European hybrid warfare are the football hooligans. They were active in pre-military stages of the conflict on both sides. Later they were able to participate in military activities and they keep their subcultural identity. On the other hand, the level of their discipline was at least in several cases not very high (however, it is difficult to assess the whole hooligan involvement due to lack of sources). The preparedness for violence is an important risk factor from the point of view of the future use of hooligans in hybrid warfare. During the first phase of the conflict escalation they can play an important role. The importance of the Autonomous Nationalists generally declined in previous years and their future role will be probably very limited. On the other hand, the small, however, well organized and internationally interconnected National Socialist Black Metal Scene can be a relevant propagandist actor among specific parts of right-wing extremist militants in the future.

⁴² STEEL RAY OF FREEDOM - VOLUNTEERS, Tribute to Ukrainian Battalions of Freedom (Euromaidan Song Contest #1) [online], 2016-05-03 [cit. 2016-06-22], available at <http://clips9.com/files/2016/05/tribute-to-ukrainian-batt/bKKIzaoVfiQ.html>

⁴³ MILITANT ZONE, Kroda (Ukraine) and M8L8TH (Russia) [online], V Kontakte, 2016-05-13 [2016-06-14], available at http://vk.com/wotanjugend_militant

CONCLUSION

The previous analysis analyzes the process of “militarization” of several subcultural actors into the actors of hybrid warfare in Ukraine and in East Central Europe. Military re-enactment groups and football (soccer) hooligans seem to be the most influential examples of this development, however, the potential for the future growth can be identified also within other subcultures (as the public attention toward bikers has shown). The internationalization of conflict actors is an interesting element which accomplishes this subcultural-military transfer (for example Team Vikernes). This broad spectrum of real and potential hybrid warfare actors with subcultural roots is an important challenge to the strategies of countering hybrid warfare.

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