Vojenské Rozhledy

Czech Military Review

Vojenské rozhledy / Czech Military Review Nr. 2/2017: 89-105

Neorealism and Contemporary US-Russian Military Competition in the Post-Soviet SpaceReviewed - Review

Jan Eichler

In the light of neorealist theory, the Eastern enlargement of NATO satisfies basic feature of expansion: 9 former countries of the Warsaw Pact become members of NATO. USA as a Sea power reinforced its superiority at the detriment of the RF as a continental power. The annexation of Crimea, as a Russian answer, had intensified security fears of post - Soviet countries and of Poland and enlarged the space for external balancing of the USA. Author warns that a confrontational structure had become typical for the area or the Western part of the Post - Soviet space. It increases the number of military incidents, and, even, the threat of a direct military confrontation including a Russian use of tactical nuclear arms, being inspired by the Rogers plan from 1980´s.

Keywords: Neorealism; Internal and External Balancing; Balance of Threats; Sea and Land Powers; Conventional War; Nuclear War.

Published: June 15, 2017  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Eichler, J. (2017). Neorealism and Contemporary US-Russian Military Competition in the Post-Soviet Space. Czech Military Review, 98(2), 89-105
Share...
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. DOBROVSKÝ, L. Polemika s neorealistickými teoriemi mezinárodních vztahů, o něž se opírá článek Jana Eichlera Černomořská dimenze války na Ukrajině ve VR 2016/1. Vojenské rozhledy č. 2/2016. Roč. 25(57), 144-147.
    2. EICHLER, J. Černomořská dimenze války na Ukrajině. Vojenské rozhledy č. 1/2016. Roč. 25(57), 6-23. EICHLER, J. Mezinárodní souvislosti války na Ukrajině. Vojenské rozhledy č. 1/2015. Roč. 24(56), 5-19.
    3. LEBOW, R. N. The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism. International Organization. Vol. 48(2) Spring 1994, 249-277. 4 MORAVCSIK, A. and J. LEGROS. Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security. Vol. 24(2) Fall 1999, 5-55.
    4. MEARSHEIMER, J. J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2014.
    5. McFAUL, M.; S. SESTANOVICH and John J. MEARSHEIMER. Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis? Foreign Affairs. November/December 2014.
    6. MEAD, W. R. The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2014.
    7. IKENBERRY, G. J. The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2014.
    8. PARENT, J. M. and S. ROSATO. Balancing in Neorealism. International Security. Vol. 40(2) Fall 2015, 51-86.
    9. NEXON, D. The Balance of Power in the Balance. World Politics. Vol. 61(3) 2009, 330-359.
    10. SCHROEDER, P. Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory. International Security. Vol. 19(1) Summer 1994, 108-148.
    11. HUNTINGTON, S. P. Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results. Public Policy. Vol. 8(1) 1958, 41-86.
    12. WALTZ, K. Theory of International Politics. New York, 1979, 33.
    13. PARENT, J. M. and S. ROSATO. Balancing in Neorealism. International Security. Vol. 40(2) Fall 2015, 51-86.
    14. NEUMANN, I. B. Russia's Europe, 1991-2016: inferiority to superiority. International Affairs. 92(6) 2015, 1381-1399.
    15. MORGENTHAU, H. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and peace. 4. Ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, 201-202.
    16. LITTLE, R. The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, 238-239.
    17. BRITANNICA 2017. [on-line]. Sea Power. Dostupné z: https://www.britannica.com/topic/sea-power.
    18. GALLOIS, P. M. Géopolitique: Les Voies de la puissance. Paris: PLON, 1990, 107-140.
    19. HARDING, Richard. Naval History 1680-1850. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006.
    20. HUNTINGTON, S. P. Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results. Public Policy Vol. 8(1) 1958, 52.
    21. BLAGDEN, D. W; J.S. LEVY and W. R. THOMPSON. Sea Powers, Continental Powers, and Balancing Theory. International Security. Vol. 36(2) Fall 2011, 190-202.
    22. MEARSHEIMER, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, 2001.
    23. ELMAN, C. Introduction: Appraising Balance-of-Power Theory. Jack S. LEVY. Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design. In: VAZQUEZ and ELMAN. Realism and the Balancing of Power, 2002.
    24. WALTZ, K. Theory of International Politics. New York, 1979, s. 157.
    25. WEITSMAN, P. A. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
    26. BECKLEY, M. The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts. International Security. Vol. 39(4) Spring 2015, 17-22. 30 WALTZ, K. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security. Vol. 25(1) Summer 2000, 5-41.
    27. PARENT, J. M. and S. ROSATO. Balancing in Neorealism. International Security. Vol. 40(2) Fall 2015, 59.
    28. JERVIS, R. Securiry Regimes. In: Stephen D. Krasner. International Regimes. Cornell University Press, 1983.
    29. PARENT, J. M. and S. ROSATO. Balancing in Neorealism. International Security. Vol. 40(2) Fall 2015, 64.
    30. 1999 ČR, Polsko a Maďarsko; 2004 pak Slovensko, Slovinsko, Bulharsko, Rumunsko, Lotyšsko, Litva a Estonsko; 2009 Albánie a Chorvatsko.
    31. Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016). COMMUNIQUE PR/CP 116. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Press & Media - Presse & Médias, 2016, 4.
    32. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). The Military Balance 2016, 190-193.
    33. DRULÁK, P. Teorie her. In.: Encyklopedie mezinárodních vztahů, Praha: Portál, 2009, 290-294.
    34. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). The Military Balance 2016, 189.
    35. JOAC (Joint Operational Access Concept), Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 17, 2012.
    36. ZAPFE, M. and M. C. HAAS View further author information. Access for Allies? NATO, Russia and the Baltics. The RUSI Journal. Vol. 161(3) 2016, 37.
    37. ZAPFE, M. and M. C. HAAS View further author information. Access for Allies? NATO, Russia and the Baltics. The RUSI Journal. Vol. 161(3) 2016, 38.
    38. FRUHLING, S. and G. LASCONJARIAS. NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 58(2) 2016, 95-116.
    39. MANDELBAUM, M. The Fate of Nations: the Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1988.
    40. FRIEDMAN, T. L. Now a Word From X. New York Times, MAY 2, 1998. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html.
    41. MANDELBAUM, M. Preserving the New Peace: The Case against NATO Expansion. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74(3) 1995, 9-13.
    42. BROWN, M. E. The flawed logic of NATO expansion. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 37(1) 1995, 34-52.
    43. GADDIS, J. L. The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion, New York Times: April 27, 1998. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/27/opinion/the-senate-should-halt-nato-expansion.html.
    44. GADDIS, J. L. Surprise, security and the American experience. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2004.
    45. SSSR se zdiskreditoval nejen v očích západoevropských demokratů, ale i západoevropských levicových, a dokonce i komunistických stran, jmenovitě pak italské, španělské a francouzské.
    46. GOLDMAN, E. O. and ANDERS, R. B. Systemic effects of military innovation and diffusion. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/innovation/jciss/syst.htm.
    47. BOOT, M. War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today. Gotham, 2006, 124-130.
    48. BRODIE, B. and ‎F. McK. From Crossbow to H-bomb. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, 137-138.
    49. MODELSKI, G. and W. R. THOMPSON. Sea power in Global Politics, 1494-1993. Palgrave, 2014, 75-76.
    50. HOROWITZ, M. C.: The Diffusion of Military Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, 138-139.
    51. MAHNKEN, T. G. Beyond Blitzkrieg: Allied Responses to Combined Arms Armored Warfare during World War II. In Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds.: The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, 243-253.
    52. GLANTZ, D. M. and Jonathan M. HOUSE. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2015, 286-289.
    53. PAPE, R. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 276-283.
    54. LEE, W. T. and R. F. STAAR. Soviet Military Policy since World War. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1986, 10-15.
    55. KLEIN, M. Russia's military: on the rise? Transatlantic Academy Paper Series n.2, 2016, 11-12.
    56. CARTER, A. A Strong and Balanced Approach to Russia. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. December 2016-January 2017, 55-56.
    57. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). The Military Balance 2017, Chapter 5: Russia and Eurasia.
    58. HALAČKA, T. Zapojení Ruské federace do konfliktu na východní Ukrajině v období duben 2014 - únor 2015 (1. část). Vojenské rozhledy č. 4/2016. Roč. 25(57), 72.
    59. BREEDLOVE, P. M. NATO´s Next Act. Foreign Affairs. July/August 2016, 96-105.
    60. CARTER, A. A Strong and Balanced Approach to Russia. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. December 2016-January 2017, 58.
    61. BLAGDEN, D. W; J. S. LEVY and W. R. THOMPSON. Correspondence: Sea Powers, Continental Powers, and Balancing Theory. International Security. Vol. 36(2) Fall 2011, 190-202.
    62. BAR-TAL, D. Siege Mentality. Beyond Intractability. September 2004, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/siege-mentality.
    63. PILLAR, P. R.: Why America Misunderstands the World. National Experience and Roots of Misperception. Columbia University Press, 2016.
    64. MEARSHEIMER, J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2014.
    65. BRENNER, M.: Washington´s Putin Obsession. Défense et Stratégie, No 40 - Automne 2016, s. 5.
    66. KROENIG, M. Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 57(1) February-March 2015, 49-70.
    67. PIFER, S. NATO 's response must be conventional, not nuclear. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 57(2) April-May 2015, 120-124.
    68. La Crimée, un bastion stratégique sur le flanc méridional de la Russie, note no. 14. Paris: FPRS, 2014, p. 5.
    69. KULESZA, L. Putin ´s nuclear bluff. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 52(2) April-May 2015, 125-129.
    70. BAHR, E. and G. NEUNECK. Against renuclearising Europe. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 57(2) April-May 2015, 130-133.
    71. PETERS, J. E. Evaluating FOFA as a deterrent. The RUSI Journal. Vol. 132(4) 1987, 39-44.
    72. ROGERS, B. Follow-On Forces Attack. NATO Review. Vol. 1, 1985, 1-9.
    73. BRUUSGAARD, K. Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 58(4) 2016, 7-26.
    74. BRUUSGAARD, K.: Crimea and Russia's Strategic Overhaul. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2014/11_BruusgaardKristin_Crimea%20and%20Russia's%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf, 2014, 84-87.
    75. NEDELIN, A.V., V.. LEVSHIN and M. E. SOSNOVSKY. 'O primenenii iadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalastii voennikh dyestvii' [On the Use of Nuclear Weapons for the De-Escalation of Military Conflict]. Voyennaya Mysl. Vol. 3 May-June 1999, 34-7.
    76. KALINKIN, D.A., A.L. KHRYAPIN and V.V. MATVICHUK. 'Strategicheskoye sderzhivanie v usloviakh sozdaniya SShA global'noy sistemy PRO i sredstv global'nogo udara' [Strategic Deterrence in the Context of the US Global Ballistic-Missile Defense System and Means for Global Strike]. Voyennaya Mysl. Vol. 1 January 2015, 18-22.
    77. ADAMSKY, D. Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia. Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol. 37(1) 2014, 91-134.
    78. NEUMANN, I. B. Russia´s Europe, 1991 - 1996: Inferiority to superiority. International Affairs. Vol. 92(6) 2016, 1381-1399.
    79. PERSSON, G. Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective. 2016, 194- 195.
    80. PERSSON, G. Security policy and military strategic thinking. In: Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective. 2013, 71-88.
    81. PERSSON, G. Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective. 2016, 191.
    82. HUNTINGTON, S. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993, 22-49.
    83. European Tribune. Testing Huntington in Ukraine. http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2014/3/1/204/17909, 2014.

    Return to the content